Brasil: Acima de Tudo!! The Brazilian Armed Forces: Remodeling for a New Era

The history of the Brazilian military has been marked by repeated “reforms” and up -dating efforts to keep abreast of developments abroad. Since World War II such efforts were often weakened, delayed, and reduced by involvement in politics, lack of congressional support, and financial instability. The deep-sea oil discoveries were touted as the beginning of a new era of prosperity that would finally allow growth and modernization of the armed forces. The fall in oil prices likely have made that more of a dream than reality, but even so the armed forces have been moving ahead. Their schools, academies, and institutes are establishing more open relationships with the republic’s universities. The older army institutions, the Escola Preparatória de Cadetes do Exército and the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras , have reshaped their programs of study and training. In the process their recruitment pattern has changed in ways that may

Air Force: 77,000 [740 aircraft of which 223 are combat]

Fig. 1 Map of Brazil's Geographic Regions
Source: GONZALES, 2008, p. 64. The barracks, forts, and other installations that the Army accumulated over the centuries have served multiple functions since their initial construction. Modern military posts in various sea ports, such as Belém, Recife, Salvador, and Rio de Janeiro are located in or adjacent to colonial-era forts, those in Mato Grosso date from the war with Paraguay (1865-1870), the Villa Militar barracks and schools in Rio de Janeiro came from a military reform impulse in 1905-10, those in Rio Grande do Sul were part of a massive construction program in the 1920s as part of a defensive array against Argentina, the four jungle brigades, five jungle battalions, and twenty-five platoon posts in Amazonia were built as part of the Calha Norte project in the 1970s and 1980s. What this shows is that many of the army's installations, with the exception of Calha Norte, are the result of historical accumulation rather than contemporary national-level planning. It also represents a praiseworthy tendency to make do with what they have rather than to spend time, money, and effort building new facilities and relocating troops. Of course this tendency is also motivated by the low level of funding provided to the armed forces. It is politically difficult to move a unit if it means that a barracks will be closed.
That is not to say that there are not stateof-the-art facilities. The regional headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Brasília and elsewhere are of various ages, but have been continually updated. The school facilities, such as the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (Resende RJ) and the Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (Rio) are gleaming examples of modernity.
If there is one thing that the Brazilian Army has constantly changed and updated over the decades is its administrative structure. Its current structure (from 1986) consists of seven military commands. Each of the seven headquarters is located in a major city: Comando Militar do Leste (CML Rio de Janeiro); Comando Militar do Sudeste (CMSE, São Paulo); Comando Militar do Sul (CMS, Porto Alegre); Comando Militar do Oeste (CMO, Campo Grande); Comando Militar do Planalto (CMP, Brasília); Comando Militar do Nordeste (CMN, Recife); and Comando Militar Amazonia (CMA, Manaus). This structure reflects the growing importance of the Amazon region, the Brazilian west, and the Planalto around Brasília. The army, indeed the three armed services, historically has been largely autonomous, with only three exceptions the armed forces ministers were drawn from the general officers of the respective services. 7 The services themselves controlled the promotion process and so determined who advanced to the top ranks. Until 1999 each minister reported directly to the president of the republic, and in the military years  the president was a general, so for most of their history the armed forces were largely independent of civilian control. And, of course, throughout most of their history the armed forces were not challenged by the necessity of fighting wars. As President-General Ernesto Geisel once commented "An Army that does not make war 61 FD McCann. Diálogos,v. 21,n. 1, is a tremendously conservative organism." 8 The current Ministry of Defense is headed by a civilian, but a number of its sections are filled with military officers. 9 The three service chiefs are called commanders and are selected by the president from among the four-star general officers. Internally much of the old autonomy continues, except that the commanders report to the civilian minister. Some analysts argue that the minister of defense is too much under the influence of the armed forces, thereby effectively weakening civilian control. This view has the minister of defense acting more as the representative of the barracks before the president of the republic than as the agent of the president controlling the barracks. There was also concern that the ministry's weakness prevented it from effectively directing the armed forces and from defending its interests within the government. 10 One aspect of the conservatism that Geisel noted was the persistence of old patterns of stationing forces. For decades the number of elite units with the latest equipment located in the Rio de Janeiro area was striking. Rio was the capital throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries down to 1960 and during that time nearly a third of the army and much of the navy 8  In the 1940s and 1950s the services were governed according to the personal style of the generals acting as ministers who used or ignored the senior officers (generals, admirals, and brigadeiros) stationed in the Rio de Janeiro area. There was no legal high command. In 1964 President-General Humberto Castello Branco instituted the current high command made up of the four-star ranked officers. Whether this rule by committee is efficient or not is an open question. There is a Joint Staff of the Armed Forces [Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas] which may be a helpful sounding board for military opinion, and could be a vehicle for change if given real power. It was created in 2010 to plan and command in situations involving the joint operations of the three services. It is supposed to integrate their doctrine and operations emphasizing their 'interoperability' and optimizing their capabilities. But getting all three services to agree and approve is still difficult. 12 On the grand scale the Joint Staff is to make tangible the National Defense Strategy plan issued in 2008 and updated in 2012 to raise the armed forces capabilities to the level of guaranteeing the country's security in peacetime and in "situations of crisis." This staff revision was part of the 2010 "New Defense" law that looked to restructure the Ministry of Defense and to facilitate the coordination of the Armed Forces. 13 Whether it will be successful in imposing coordination on the three historically independent forces remains to be seen. But Brazil must be prepared for conflicts and threats that might appear on its path to becoming a first-ranked power. This preparation will require that the self-images and identities of the three services be transformed. Historically they have functioned independently of each other and so they will have to become more unified. Officers will have to think of themselves first as members of the Brazilian armed forces and secondarily as members of their respective services. 16 Such a restructuring of identity will require a deep rethinking of their missions, operations, officer education and training, transportation, and of course, military doctrine. Because the army has invested considerable history, expense, and effort spreading itself over the map of Brazil based on the idea that its presence is necessary to preserve law and order and national control of territory it might find it difficult to reshape itself into strategically placed units that could be transported as needed to deal with sudden crisis situations anywhere. It is doubtful that the services will reshape their identities without strong leadership by the minister of defense or forceful imposition from the government.
The end contains various "directives" (diretrizes) specifying what should happen. For example, Directives 8 and 9 dealing with the regional commands and the Combined General Staff proposes reducing the heavy concentration of units in the Southeast, transferring some of them to Amazonia and to the western frontier. The objective is to have more units on the frontiers (referred to as adensamento). The directive suggests that the various services' territorial divisions (regiões militares, distritos navais, and zonas aéreas) should be reshaped to coincide as much as possible. To develop operational capability, each area would have a Joint General Staff that will create and keep up-to-date area operations plans. Without lessening the importance of the South and the Southeast, Directive 10 called for giving priority to Amazonia. Rather than diminishing the first two regions, the idea is to raise the importance of the Amazon as a focus of national defense. concentrations of the South and Southeast are to be defended. Of course without a clear threat it is difficult to shape a proper defense. It assumes that the integration of the continent via Mercosul and Cone Sul will continue and proposes international integration of staffs, joint training exercises, and even integration of defense industries to build mutual trust and confidence.
There are difficulties with all this of course. In the south Brazil's clear military predominance cannot help but give the Argentine military pause. 17 The long antagonism between the two countries reaches back into their colonial pasts and extends down to the Malvinas War of 1982. The complete Argentine defeat by the British and with the Americans seemingly opting to support their NATO ally over their Rio Treaty (1947) partner caused the Brazilians to reassess their military structures and international relationships. Particularly it persuaded them that they needed units of professional soldiers, rather than the usual oneyear draftees. 18 The Brazilians work hard at being open and friendly trying to put their Argentine colleagues at ease. But the long history of suspicion is not easy to erase. In the first half of the twentieth-century both sides planned for war against each other. 19 In the past the Argentines chafed at the closeness between the Brazilians and Americans and considered Brazil the sub-imperial gendarme of Washington. 20 The current decline (2014-15) of the Argentine economy alarms Brazilian leaders because they need "a strong strategic partner, with which they can build international power in a context of integration." However it is encouraging that the Argentine public sees Brazil as a logical partner for the future. 21 Efforts at establishing better military relations began with the two navies in 1978 when they held a joint training exercise called Operação Fraterno, in the 1990s the armies and air forces followed suit. Interestingly this cooperation was initiated by the two militaries and became part of the foreign policies of the two governments only in 2005. In recent years combined field exercises, exchange of academy cadets, and joint technological projects have become common. The objective is to build mutual bilateral confidence and to build up the political-military power of both countries. A strong relationship between the historic rivals they hope will attract the rest of the region's countries to their orbit and lessen the possibility that other polls of attraction will develop in South America. Brasília seemingly believes that this configuration will allow Brazil to exercise its leadership on the continent, seconded by Argentina. The current Brazilian government sees this strategy as central to its policy of building a multipolar world. Of course this requires that Argentina, even if not admitted publically, become continually more politically dependent on Brasil. 22 The developing close military relationship could carry dangers for Brazil if Argentina continues to press its demands regarding the Falklands/Malvinas to the point of another invasion. In February 2014 Argentina increased its military budget by a startling 33.4%, reportedly the highest in its history, and has set out on an extensive rearmament program. 23 It is worth noting that the Brazilian army's websites provide much clearer and more fulsome information about its dispositions than does the Argentine army's websites.

Amazônia
Peace and security on the southern border allowed the Brazilians to reposition their forces. The Army considers Amazônia as its number one worry. 24 The military's anxiety reflects the region's inherent importance. All of seven and part of two of Brazil's twenty-five states are in Amazônia. Its natural resources, biodiversity, mineral riches, and hydrogenation potential are well known. Its over thirty thousand miles of navigable waterways embrace 20 % of the earth's fresh water. Historically with the nation's defense focused on the southern borders, the Amazon has moved from being a military backwater in 1950 with about 1,000 soldiers widely separated throughout the region to having the garrison force of 27,000 today. This is, of course, a small number to defend nearly 61% of national territory or 5.2 million Sq. Kms. From 1948to 1976  Perhaps such a positive attitude from scholars has persuaded the army command to offer a friendly hand to Brazilian academics by opening the frontier posts as support bases for scientific research. On March 18, 2015, General Theophilo Gaspar de Oliveira, commander of the Amazônia region, met with academics at the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia in Manaus to discuss a project that he called Antártica Verde (verde = green). The name is intended as a humorous tease aimed at the Navy in response to its Amazônia Azul (Blue Amazon) project of coastal defense. Just as the Navy's Antarctica research program (Proantar) has carried Brazilian scientists to the frozen continent since 1982, Antártica Verde would bring scientists from throughout Brazil to the long strip of frontier. General Theophilo wants the scientists to conduct their research in order to expand and deepen knowledge of the region's extreme diversities. He noted that the Army can only defend and develop what is known and understood. He offered the logistical support of the Frontier Platoons, along with assistance from the Air Force and Navy "so that we can know Amazônia better." Aside from the obvious public relations benefit for the Army, such a program would give researchers access to areas 67 FD McCann. Diálogos,v. 21,n. 1, hitherto beyond their reach. 31

How does the army see its presence in Amazonia?
It is responding to the "urgent necessity of integrating it into the national environment and articulating it with our neighbors, who also share this patrimonio." The Brazilian Army's website says that it has been in Amazonia since the beginning of the 17 th century, thereby claiming continuity from colonial days to the present. 32 Embracing the Portuguese past is a way of emphasizing that if this centuries-old patrimony is not settled and defended it could be lost to aggressive foreigners. The imagery of Portuguese conquest and defense makes nice press copy and morale-raising hoopla or drama, but it somewhat distorts the history of the army in the region. The imagined continuity from Portuguese to Brazilian defense of the region has a debatable historical foundation. Celso Castro and Adriana Barreto de Souza see this projection of a supposed "past into the future, as a strategy of constructing an institutional identity as a source of inspiration for concrete actions." 33 However, the armed forces are not trying to be 31  Massaging the history may heighten pride in the mission but it carries an undercurrent of fear that stimulates a wary protective posture. 35 The army portrays its role in the region as pioneering and trail-blazing (desbravador), while "preserving, developing, and protecting" it. Pointing to the frontier platoons the army declares that they "are poles of development, around which, as in the past, a core of population grows, guaranteeing Brazilian presence and our sovereignty. This is the principal motive [that] national priority confers on our Amazônia that it guides the manifest destiny of Brazil. Collaborating with the peopling of far off areas providing a minimum of infrastructure by furnishing basic services until development arrives; this silent work is a small part of the army's collaboration in the Nation's development." 36 The idea for such frontier military posts has its origins in the 19 th century military colonies that the Brazilian empire used to extend its reach into the frontier zones of that day. 37 Critics argued that today's outposts at strategic locations were intended "as bridgeheads for future settlement projects. To fill up the area with Brazilian colonists was their idea of inhibiting foreign craving for Amazonia." The critics feared that such posts would hasten deforestation and destruction of the native peoples. 38 The frequent appearance of the word 'development' in official statements does seem to support the critics' charge.
The Army's high-sounding phrases are not the likely only driving force behind its northern reorientation. When the PEF posts at Normandia and Bomfim in Roraima were established in 1969 there was no similar Guyanese military presence at Lethem on the other side of the Rio Tacutu, but there was worrisome leftist political activity in the neighboring country. However, as late as 1997 it took at least five days of difficult travel in specially reinforced trucks to make the journey from Georgetown to Lethem. Research is showing that the basin of the Rio Tacutu that lies between Brazil and Guiana has petroleum. 39 So it is prudent to secure the area. The basin is now more accessible thanks to the gravel road to the coast, which has reduced the trip from days to 37  The three frontier platoon posts in the west of Roraima at Surucucu (1987), Ericó, and Auaris were built a few kilometers away from the Venezuelan boundary which slashes unseen through jungle, but they are in the midst of the Yanomami population that exists on both sides of the borderline. An old Brazilian military concern is that this transnational indigenous population could one day coalesce into a Yanomami nation that could claim lands from both Brazil and Venezuela. 40 These same Yanomami lands are rich in minerals so it is not difficult to imagine Calha Norte, as did Anthropologist Bruce Albert, "as a project for 'bringing poles of development into the interior' under military control, [revolving] around a strategy to reduce Indian territories in order to facilitate the access of large-scale mining companies and placer-mining groups to the deposits located in these lands." Albert further charged that "Under its nationalist rhetoric of border protection against external threats, the Calha Norte Project thus consists of a traditional combination in Brazilian Amazonian development -large-scale mining investments, Indian land reduction and political control." 41 The question of the purpose of the frontier posts is intriguing, and has likely changed over time. Surucucu proved of some value in eliminating the thousands of gold miners who invaded Yanomami lands in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Of course, it seems to have attracted some of them in the first place. 42 The mission of the post at Pacaraima (also referred to as BV-8) on the highway into Venezuela from Boa Vista is clearer in that it guards the only paved road between the two countries. Each of the PEF posts is selfsufficient to some extent. They have their own power and water supply, their own medical doctor and dentist, a bakery, small scale gardens for fresh greens, along with goats, pigs, and cows. The troops are largely from Macuxi and Wapixana indigenous groups in eastern Roraima. 43 Indeed it is army policy to recruit local natives to garrison the posts wherever possible. 44 According to General Luiz Sérgio Goulart Duarte, commander of the 2ª Brigada de Infantaria de Selva (São Gabriel da Cachoeira) in 2012, of the 1400 soldiers then on the frontier with Colombia and Venezuela, 70% were indigenous. 45 Most of these rarely rise above simple soldiers and are not allowed to serve more than eight years. The relations between the platoons and the neighboring villages of Yanomami, Kuripako, Tukano, and Maku peoples is fraught with ethnic, religious, and sexual tensions that complicate the situation. 46 In the 1990s there was considerable objection, as the above quotation from Albert suggests, to the posts by anthropologists, environmentalists, and NGOs who interpreted the army's presence as contributing to destruction of the rainforests and harmful to the indigenous peoples. The heated international commentary about deforestation and the suggestion of some foreign leaders that perhaps planetary climate change trumped national sovereignty put Brazilian leaders on edge. In 1989, then American Senator Al Gore declared "Contrary to what Brazilians think, the Amazon is not their property; it belongs to all of us." 47 The Brazilian response was quick; "the Amazon is ours" became the rallying cry. Rumors that the United States wanted to establish bases in neighboring countries agitated the mood even further. In addition, the army found itself in the middle of an intense struggle over land between indigenous Macuxi and Wapixana peoples and Brazilian land grabbers in the Raposa Serra do Sol in northeastern Roraima. 48 In 1990 the Escola Superior de Guerra developed a document that looked ahead a decade at the "The Structure of National Power" and raised the possibility of war against international pressures to preserve "anthropological cysts" in Brazil. The commander of the Amazonian military region warned that the foreign pressures could turn the Amazon into a huge Vietnam. 49 In February 1991, the FARC incursion into the northwestern Amazon (Rio Traíra) was an alert that threats would not necessarily only come from nation states. And, of course, it pointedly confirmed the need for frontier troops. Even so some foreign scholars saw the Brazilian military as "an institution in search of a mission" to justify a claim on the national budget. 50 The Slowly the Brazilian army's thinking regarding Amazonian defense evolved to recognize that it could not repel an attack by a superior military power such as the United States, so it studied its own 1970s confrontation with guerrillas in the Araguaia region, and the experience of the Vietnamese in defeating the French and the Americans, and concluded that it could mount a defense by creating an extensive guerrilla operation to wear down an invader. The army sees guerrilla warfare as having been a major feature of Brazilian military history. An early proponent of this Lassitude strategy, Colonel Álvaro de Souza Pinheiro, observed in the 1990s that to give Brazilian soldiers and population the necessary moral support for a long-duration campaign "all foreign elements" would have to be removed from Brazilian territory. He did not explain which foreign elements or how they would be removed. But he did say that when the enemy had "suffered sufficient losses and the cost-benefit ratio is no longer in favor of action, the resolve for action will weaken. This will be the preponderant factor for the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Brazilian territory." He pointed out that while American Special Forces have experience working with foreign populations, the Brazilian Special Forces would "work with internal Brazilian populations -in a resistance movement environment -when an invasion 53 Alexandre Fuccille ,"Amazônia e Defesa Nacional: um olhar a partir da perspectiva brasileira," PAIAGUÁS vol. The Brazilian notion seems similar to the warfare in Afghanistan over the past decade. As difficult as it is to imagine an American invasion of Brazil, it is understandable that some Brazilians could conceive of such a thing.

NGOs seen as danger or a reason for nervousness
As odd as it may seem to Americans, the Brazilian military say that their fear is not invasion or war in the region as much as it is the negative influence of unspecified NGOs that could "foment separatism, the illegal sale of indigenous lands, the unwarranted appropriation of forest resources by foreigners, in addition impeding the region's development." General Walmir Almeda Schneider Filho of the Army's General Staff, who is responsible for monitoring situations that could become national crises, commented: "We work with risks. You don't necessarily have to invade Amazônia to control it. We think that some NGOs in Amazônia are problematic; we do not have control of them. And there is the selling of great plots of public lands to businessmen of other countries." 56 In 2008 the Army estimated that there were 350 NGOs active in the region.
The level of nervousness is quite high. The military saw the seemingly innocuous U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) as threatening the "Balkanization of the Amazon" provoking the Clube Militar to issue a rebuttal entitled "Sovereignty at Risk." The regional commander in 2012 General Eduardo Villas-Boas commented that the absence of the Brazilian state in Amazônia was the main reason that the region was the army's principal concern. General Villas Bôas emphasized that Amazonia was not yet incorporated into Brazil and that budgetary allocations for the armed forces in the area were inadequate. His new position as Army Commander (March 2015) will give him more ability to encourage heightened attention to the Amazon region. 57

SIVAM Sistema de Vigilancia Amazônia
One part of the Brazilian response to international anxiety about Amazônia has been to get more detailed information about what is going on in the region. Because much of its expanse had poor to non-existent air-traffic control, the government launched the System for the protection of Amazônia (SIPAM) that had as one of its components the SIVAM. Its objectives were to gather real time data that would allow better control over the environment, regional development, vigilance of rivers, roads, jungle, air-traffic control, response coordination in emergencies, monitoring of 56 weather conditions, and control of smuggling. It required construction of radar and telecommunications sites throughout Amazonia, often in difficult-to-reach locations. As part of SIPAM, the Air Force, which is responsible for Brazilian air space and air traffic control, took the lead in creating the Sistema de Vigilácia da Amazônia (SIVAM) which is the largest, fully integrated, remote monitoring system in the world. It supports Brazilian government efforts to control the environment and law enforcement over land, air and water resources. Developed by Raytheon, the system is composed of an extensive network of air traffic control and surveillance radars, environmental sensors, communications systems and airborne sensor systems. It was built between 2002 and 2005 and is fully operational.
It was not surprising that SIVAM became the focus of controversies that raised doubts, worries, and basic questions about creating such infrastructure. Aside from the high costs of the program there were passionate arguments about the role of the national government versus private enterprise and national technology versus foreign. A major problem for Brazilian nationalists was the agreement with the American company Raytheon, which was deeply connected to the American government. Brazilian scientists criticized the project as Pharaonic, recalling the Transamazonic road; they labeled this a "Transamazônica eletrônica". It was not viable, they argued, and worse it was a serious risk to involve foreigners in national security. They admitted the need for technically sophisticated surveillance, but said it should be controlled and run by the national intelligence service. Brazilian scientists and national technology should be used to extend, they argued, the Air Force' twenty-four hour basis. As a bonus the system provides secure satellite communications, including computer, telephone, and fax connectivity to many remote locations where land-based communications do not exist. 60 The days of the isolated platoon struggling to communicate by short-wave radio are likely to be soon gone. And the remote-sensing capabilities of the system have greatly increased information as to what is taking place locally and region-wide. 61 The uneasiness about supposed foreign covetousness (cobiça) of the Amazon continues to be mixed into Brazilian policy-making regarding the region. It adds heightened emotionalism to already difficult questions. Seeing the region as being under constant but vague foreign threat may not result in the best problem analysis. The region has become a route from the Andean countries for drug trafficking, not only to the United States, but also into Brazil itself and onward to Africa and Europe. The control of illicit cutting of valuable timber and illegal wildcat mining is extremely difficult. In June 2011, to gain better control over the borders the government started a border patrol plan that actively involved the military in policing the frontiers with targeted temporary operations. They are coordinated by the Joint Staff of the armed forces involving the Navy, Army, Air Force, eight ministries, 20 regulatory agencies, and federal, state and municipal entities. Military units conduct check points on roads, patrol rivers and creeks, and inspect airfields. The objective is to reduce drug and weapons trafficking, animal and timber contraband from neighboring countries, among other crimes.
In 2011 the armed forces held a massive operation called Agata 3 in the border areas of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Rondônia to "suffocate" the drug trade and to destroy illicit mining sites and landing strips. The following year Agata 4 saw 8,700 troops carry out a similar operation along the frontier with Venezuela, Guiana, Suriname and French Guiana. Military thinkers consider that 5,500 kms long section the weak stretch of the Amazonian frontier because it has relatively few garrisons. To head off apprehension in the neighboring countries the Brazilians sent officers to explain that they were dealing with lawlessness on their side of the borders. Such operations combine the three services and justify government expenditures, but whether they represent the best use of scarce money is debatable. They continue to be held, sometimes as bi-national operations. 62 The number of recruits selected each year depends on the spaces to be filled in local units. Each regiment, battalion, etc. draws its conscripts from the area surrounding the unit. This gives army units a very local, regional flavor. There are no national or regional training camps that could homogenize and standardize training. All training is carried out in the local garrison. The system has the advantage of keeping the recruits close to home and of giving the units a local face, which in some fashion may make its presence more acceptable. The training is conducted on a yearly cycle that is supposed to turn the civilian teenager into a combat-ready soldier with a clearer understanding of his role as a citizen. However it makes for some unevenness in the quality of training. How uniformity and quality control is insured is not known.

Recruitment
The Falklands/Malvinas war supposedly convinced the Brazilians that they could not depend fully on the draft short-term volunteer system and there have been efforts to staff some units with professionals. This trend increased onward from the 1990s. One of the problems is that Brazil's labor laws give permanency after 10 years employment. This makes it difficult to dismiss a soldier -a government worker -after that length of time. The paratrooper units and ready-deployment units have professionals. But there is a long history in the army that regards professional enlisted ranks as potential threats to discipline and so traditionally enlisted military careers are relatively short. Unfortunately this aspect of the army does not seem to have been well studied by outside researchers. There has been an effort to vary training schedules so that some units are considered ready when others are just beginning their training. It is not clear when during a typical year the whole Brazilian army could be considered trained and ready. There is certainly insufficient political will to create fully professional armed forces.
At the end of the year of service, the soldiers are released into a huge pool of reservists. Currently it is about 1,800,000 strong. As reservists they are to be available for call-up for a period of five years. Brazil does not have an organized reserve in which reserve units maintain training and readiness. Each year units recall a number of reservists for refresher courses and to participate in an operation. The theory is that in an emergency reservists could be called back to active duty from the reserve pool. There has not been a full-scale call-up so it is not known if it would actually work. But to maintain contact reservists are required to report to the units where they served their active duty for a mobilization exercise each December. 64 While Brazil does not have an organized reserve force such as exists in the United States it does have an extensive territorial guard, known as the Tiros de Guerra numbering some 233 units with a reported total of 66,000 members called riflemen or marksmen. 65 Participation in a Tiro unit satisfies the obligatory military service requirement. The young men experience 24 weeks of training for 12 hours a week. 66 The army considers them to be its 2d Class reserve. The Tiro units are spread all over the country in sponsoring municipalities. They train early in the morning so that they can work the rest of the day. They are led and trained in basic military skills by resident sergeants. The army can use them in situations that do not require long-term fully operational units. They extend the army's ability to deepen the public's awareness of military practices and provide a valuable presence at the community level. In theory the Tiros act as a locally based dissuasive force. Annually the army reportedly holds exercises involving Tiros and regular units in territorial defense. Their continuity depends on the locality's leadership to insure that the provided building, rifle range, and housing for the instructors are properly maintained and that there is a sufficient number of recruits. 67 The best study of the Tiros de Guerra suggested that make-work and civic activities took up a considerable part of available time producing frustration among the recruits and weakening military training per se. Municipalities arrange technical training (or in Amazonia instruction in agriculture and fishing) to prepare the young men for future employment. 68 Such non-military activity has to be detrimental to the army's goals. The Tiros could be considered as more a civic than a military organization. Of course the emphasis on citizenship, patriotism, and love of Brazil mixed with even less than perfect military training would contribute to the strategy of resistance against a more powerful invader.

Centros & Núcleos de Preparação de Oficiais da Reserva
An interesting aspect of the history of 67 There is extensive information about the Tiros at http://tirodeguerra.dsm.eb.mil.br/index.php/item/45-conceito-de-tirode-guerra-no-brasil . Undoubtedly such units can provide helpful information on local conditions. To host a Tiro unit the municipality agrees to provide a proper facility at its expense. At times units have been closed down when commitments have not been kept. A minimum of 50 is required to keep a unit active. The municipalities have to cover the costs of furniture, light, postage, secretarial assistance. This could amount to a monthly expenditure of R$ 1,000,000 to R$9,000,000. Upkeep and maintenance has been a constant source of friction. This leads local residents, who do not know about the convênio, to think that the Army is not taking care of the facilities. There appears to be a good rate of completion if 2014's numbers for the center in Rio de Janeiro are an indication. Of the 200 alunos who entered, 194 were graduated as reserve Aspirantes-ao-Oficial. Aspirante is the entry officer rank in the Brazilian system, marking a sort of probation for about ten months prior to promotion to Second Lieutenant. The best rated men are offered the opportunity to join a regular unit for more training and experience after which they are promoted to 2d Lieutenant R-2 and can stay on active duty for five years. 70 In addition the army offers short-term refresher courses to allow such officers to update their skills. 71 There are 18 state-level alumni associations grouped under a national organization that maintain an active round of social and military events. The army hopes that these temporary officers on returning to civilian life will play leadership roles in society "marked by a commitment of love and dedication to Brazil." 72 There are also specialized personnel, such as librarians, language teachers, dentists, medical doctors, etc. who pass through a training program to become Temporary Technical Officers. 73 To make matters a bit confusing, when officers retire they are said to be in the "reserve." As noted there is no active reserve, such retired "reserve" officers can be called back to duty if needed, but most are not. There is no national guard as in the United States. There are the state-level militarized police forces which are regarded as a reserve force, but their training is that of police dealing with traffic, crowd control and other appropriate policing tasks. Historically 70 The time limit is related to Brazilian labor laws that insure stability after ten years of employment. state military police were involved in internal insurrections, but they are not army units. In recent years they have cooperated with the army in regaining control of urban slums (favelas) in Rio de Janeiro.

Military Education
Brazil's military education system emphasizes officer preparation, and to a lesser decree training of non-commissioned officers. By contrast to the soldiers the officers and sergeants are distributed from the national level out to the various regions. Some years ago it had been the practice to move officers to different assignments every two years, and to move NCOs every five years. The rotation had the advantage of providing experience throughout the country over the length of a career. But the cost of such movement proved to be too high so that now there is more stability.

Militares)
An unusual feature of Brazilian military education is that it can start as early as age 14 at the sixth grade level. There are 12 "Colégios Militares" scattered throughout the country in large urban centers. A century ago the army created these schools to educate the sons of military men, who might be stationed far from home. They have long served elite civilian families as well. Today, the Colégios are coed, highly selective, seemingly well-funded and carefully staffed by mixed military and civilian faculties. Students wear smart-looking uniforms and are subject to a light form of military discipline. Nationally there are somewhere around 15,000 students in these schools. They are popular and sought-after and have extremely proud and active alumni. 74

Officer Education
Each of the three services has its own officer training school, offering a university-level education. The army has the Academia das Agulhas Negras at Resende, Rio de Janeiro; the navy has its Escola Naval on Villegagnon Island in Guanabara Bay at Rio; and the air force its Academia da Força Aerea at Pirassununga, São Paulo. The navy views its school as being founded in 1782 in Lisbon and being transferred to Rio de Janeiro with the fleeing Portuguese court in 1808 75 In any case its current facilities date from 1938. The three schools are the main entries into the regular officer corps of the Armed Forces. 76 There are no Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) or college-based Reserve Officer Training programs that allow entry into a regular officer career. There are the CPOR centers mentioned above that form "reserve" officers, but graduates can remain on active duty for only five years, they are not allowed to pursue a full 74 There are Colegios in Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Campo Grande, Fortaleza, Juiz de Fora, Manaos, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and Santa Maria. They enroll some 15,000 students in 6 th through 9 th grades and high school. While the students wear uniforms they do not receive military training, yet each of these schools have officers, usually temporary officers, on the faculty. Women were first admitted into the armed forces in the early 1980s. The Brazilian army was the first in South America to accept women. They had to have a bachelor's degree and were admitted by competitive examination into the Army's School of Administration in Salvador for a one-year course leading to the rank of first lieutenant. They were part of the Army's Quadro Complementar de Oficais and assigned to managerial duties, often in Brasília. Gradually the opportunities for women in the military are expanding. In 1991 the Navy and Air Force had about 3,200 female officers and enlisted. In 1996 the Air Force began taking women into its academy. 78 Soon all three service academies will have female students.

Air Force Academy Pirassununga
Upon entering the Pirassununga academy each new class goes through six months of basic training that involves field exercises, a parachute jump, instruction in military practice and doctrine, in addition to physical conditioning and academic study. Of 2014's class (turma) of 163 cadets, 9 prepared for infantry, 23 for quartermaster, and 124 for pilot status. There were 4 women and 7 foreigners in that year's class. At the end of basic training the class receives the short sword (Espadim) that in the Air Force represents command and nobility. This is somewhat similar to the custom at Agulhas Negras but without its depth of historical symbolism. 79 From the moment they receive the Espadim they are officially in the Air Force, so it is a time of emotion, accomplishment, and pride. Each class takes a symbolic name and composes a war chant or shout.
After four years at Pirassununga the cadets are commissioned Aspirantes-a-Oficial and receive two bachelor's degrees, one in Administration, with emphasis on public administration, and one in Aeronautical Science, with qualification in Military Aviation, or Logistical Science (aeronautic quartermaster), or in Military Science, with qualification in Aeronautic infantry. The stress in their education has been on how to command and lead. 80

Escola Naval
The Navy asserts that its school is the oldest military school in Brazil. It was transferred from Portugal when the royal family fled the French invasion in 1808. While that provides a certain color to its past it has been in its current location since 1938. It was on an island but the building of Santos Dumont airport tied it to the shore. Like the other service academies the Escola Naval stresses creation of close ties among 79  the members of each class or turma so that they become friends who encourage, stimulate, and assist one another. The student body is called the Corps of Aspirantes. And as at the other schools regular officers are in charge of the school's student units, but here the battalions, companies, and platoons have student-officers (Oficiais-Alunos) as commanders who work under the guidance of the regular officers.
In the first year the newcomers learn how to survive at sea and in the jungle. The 38 males in the class (turma) of 2014 could opt to become a naval officer or an officer in the fuzileiros navais, the Brazilian marines; but the 12 females in the class only had the option of becoming naval quartermasters. This was the first year that women were accepted into the naval school, if with restricted options. 81 The Escola Naval also follows the custom of presenting an Espadim to the students as symbolic of their status. It is significant that the class of 2014 had four Lebanese, one Nigerian, and one Senegalese.

Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN), Resende, RJ and the Escola Preparatório de Cadetes do Exército (EsPCEx) Campinas, SP
Brazil has had a military school since the transfer of the royal court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1808. But its various physical moves and inconsistent policies and traditions prevented the creation of a long-lasting tradition of officer preparation until the opening of the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras in 1944. 82 The academy boasts well-appointed barracks, classrooms, library, auditorium, and sufficient grounds of varied terrain (67 Sq. Km) that permit realistic field training. The Cadet Corps has about 1500 cadets divided across its fouryear course of study. 83 Unlike West Point, where cadets make their branch selection at the end of their four years shortly before commissioning as 2 nd Lieutenants, at AMAN they make that choice at the start of year two and so the study program has three years of emphasis on training for the selected branch. In another comparison with West Point, the cadets at AMAN do not hold cadet ranks (e.g. Cadet Sergeant through Cadet Captain), but they rotate through various short-term command functions. They are solely classified by year first through fourth. Each cadet unit is under the command and tutelage of a regular officer. Possibly this is a long-term response to the cadet rebellions of the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Certainly it means that leadership is taught very differently in the Brazilian and American armies. 84 There is a lot of emphasis on adjusting the cadet's personality to academy and army life. In the dining hall the tables are round and so 82 The first military school in Rio de Janeiro dated from 1811. The most famous one in Rio was Praia Vermelha which closed after a rebellion in 1904. It was succeeded by the Escola Militar de Realengo from 1911. There has been a recent significant change in the linkage between AMAN and the preparatory school in Campinas. In the past the majority of entering cadets were graduates of one of the Colegios Militares, along with a number of graduates of civilian high schools admitted by competitive examination, and some from the preparatory school. As of 2012 all those accepted for AMAN spend a year at Campinas going through a type of basic training and taking academic courses that used to comprise the firstyear course at AMAN.
This means that the entrance into a career as an army officer has been moved from AMAN to EsPCEx, whose mission is to insure a new level of uniformity in the preparation of those going on to the academy. The preparatory school's 520 "Alunos" are organized into three companies of five platoons each (35 to a platoon). Classes at the school are scheduled by platoon, so each class has 35 students. The atmosphere will change somewhat in 2015 when an additional company of female Alunas will be added. Female bathrooms and sleeping quarters are now [2013] being installed. Each company has its own ala (wing) of three floors. Classrooms are on the first floor and living quarters are on the top floor, with bunks arranged by platoon. On that floor too there is a large open space for company assemblies and exercise. The barrack-like bathrooms are communal. There is strict control over cell phones and use of social media. Behavior is rated as 10 % of the final grade. The objective is to produce a "passion" for the army via "Rigor Fraternal." There is a list of 11 attitudes that are stressed in judging the Alunos. The dining hall has the same round tables found at AMAN. Alunos march into meals in formation, breaking ranks at the entry while shouting Brasil! Acima de Tudo!! (Brazil Above All!!). The library is small, about 3,000 volumes, and is not topically extensive; however there were half-dozen computers available for Aluno use.
By making Campinas the requirement of entry into AMAN the Brazilian army's officer course now takes five years (instead of the previous four). When asked if the added year would diminish the appeal of an army officer career, the school's leaders emphasized that they wanted Alunos who had a "vocation" for army life. Back in 1986 the then minister of the army Gen. Leônidas Pires Gonçalves told me that he wanted, indeed preferred, those who had such a vocation. That idea has now been built into the structure of officer education. How successful this will be remains to be seen. But recalling that a high percentage of those entering the career are children of lower-ranked army personnel it is possible that the added year might not dissuade those paternally influenced. It is noteworthy that the Air Force and Navy are not following the army's lead. This is something very new and deserves the attention of researchers. Currently about 450 Alunos (out of the 520 total) go on to AMAN and complete the course to commissioning as Aspirantes ao Oficiais.
The EsPCEx faculty is a mix of retired officers and "temporary" officers, who are really civilians with academic training, who are given lieutenants' rank. The temporary officers teach courses in the sciences, math, and history. Candidates gain entry to the preparatory by examinations, prepared and corrected by the school's faculty. 86 Now that the preparatory has taken over the instruction that had comprised the first year at AMAN, the curriculum at the academy is being adjusted to use the freed-up space. Completing that first year at AMAN presumably the cadets will still make their branch selection. They will move into quarters composed entirely of their peers in the selected branch. 87

Current Perspectives on the Armed forces Air Force
The Air Force has a strategic plan for the period 2010-2031 so it is earnestly looking ahead. The Air Force plans new bases in the western Amazon to support the Army's frontier platoons, to extend radar coverage to eliminate current gaps in the system, and to work with the Navy in support and surveillance activities to protect the off-shore oil deposits. 88 The plan makes frequent references to the necessity to protect Amazonia, insuring that the landing fields, supporting technology and communications are functional in a combat situation. The plan lays out these objectives for the air force: (1.) promote security of air traffic control; (2.) contribute to the formation of national policies regarding aerospace programs; (3.) establish, equip, and operate the aerospace infrastructure; (4.) operate the Correio Aéreo Nacional (air mail) as it has since the 1920s; (5.) protect against all types of illegal air traffic, such as illicit movement of drugs, arms, munitions and people. In brief, this means maintaining sovereignty over national air space to defend the Pátria. The strategic plan notes that Brazil's civil aviation fleet is necessarily a major component in national mobilization and so good relations with the civilian companies is an air traffic control issue.
To fully understand the air force's capabilities we need to know more about recruitment at all levels. In June 2013, in Natal (Rio Grande de Norte) along the highway from the air field there were large banners advertising for volunteers to become sergeants. The major feature of the banners was the monthly salary the volunteers would receive. Presumably only highly qualified civilians would be hired.
The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) is the largest in Latin America with some 50,000 personnel flying about 600 aircraft. It has its origin in the army's air arm in the 1920s and gained its separate service status in 1941. It is organized into four functional commands: 1st Air Force: advanced fixed and rotary wing instruction; 2nd Air Force: Marine patrol, search 88 See the appendix for a map of air bases and regional commands.  A visit to the Air Force's principal training facility at Parnamirim Field, Natal in June 2013 allowed me to see flight training in operation. I thought it was curious that arranging the visit required approval from Brasília, even though the base is open to local school groups. It may have been because I am a foreigner, but a local newspaper reporter from Natal was denied permission to accompany me. The lack of openness is odd given the military's desire to improve its public image. The base was the largest American aviation facility outside the continental United States during World War II. A majority of the buildings, hangers, etc. were American-built and are still in use and holding up well. 90

Navy
The Navy's fleet, based mostly at Rio de Janeiro, consists of some 100 vessels, including British-built frigates, Brazilian-made Corvettes, and German-built diesel-electric powered submarines. Its sole aircraft carrier the São Paulo is the refurbished Foch (launched in 1963) acquired from the French Navy in 2000. Very aware of the difficulties of patrolling its gigantic maritime space from Rio, the Navy is planning a second squadron to be based at Belém, which would serve as a link between its Amazonian and Atlantic zones. With the 2008 discovery of oil in the pre-salt depths of the sea it has created a project with France to build a number of submarines, including an Atomic powered one. This last project has puzzled some commentators and raised concerns that it might destabilize regional equilibrium and arouse anti-Brazil sentiment. 91 The exact utility of a nuclear submarine for Brazil appears questionable, but its policy makers believe that it will make it the leading naval power in the South Atlantic, if not the whole Southern Hemisphere. 92 It certainly would announce the beginning of a new era of global prominence for Brazil. Brazilian policy makers are concerned about the possible spread of piracy from the coast of Africa and about West African countries (e.g. Guinea-Bissau) being trans-shipment points for Andeanproduced drugs. Looking further south Brazil has an active research station in Antarctica and wishes to extend its strategic reach to the frozen but potentially resource rich continent.
Brazil wants to be the major naval power in the South Atlantic and wants its shipbuilding capacity to contribute to the expansion of its future economic growth. The Navy has not been enthusiastic about a vast riverine mission, but considering that Amazônia has something like 30,000 miles of navigable waterways and ocean craft can go all the way to Peru, the demand for the Navy's attention has been great. It will increase the number of its riverine craft and devote more attention to the region. Such action also has budgetary benefits. Moreover the highlights of its own combat history were in the riverine campaigns in the war with Paraguay.
The Navy's long and intimate experience with the United States Navy gives its views on relations a more mellow tone. The U.S. Navy had a Naval Mission in Brazil from 1922 to 1977. During World War I Brazilian officers served on American warships, during World War II the two navies cooperated closely in combatting Axis submarines, and during the Naval Mission years American officers taught in the Brazilian Navy's schools.

Naval Geopolitics
In the last decade Brazil has worked toward closer relations with the West African countries. It had long participated in the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), most of whose members are African. In 1986, over the objections of the United States and doubts of European states it formed ZOPACAS (Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic) that united in a pact of maritime cooperation the South American and African states that front on the South Atlantic. 94 More recently Brazil has been seeking to create a "good will belt" around the South Atlantic by providing naval training, vessels, increased trade, and scientific assistance in studying continental shelf and undersea resource potential. In the process it is spreading the idea of a common South Atlantic region that should be developed and defended by the region's states. The Brazilian discourse objects to NATO involvement in the region, but at the same time Brazil cooperates in, and depends upon, defense 94 Zopacas involves the three Brazilian armed forces. There appears to be some hesitation about making a major effort to cement ties between the Brazilian army and the armies of Africa. There is a useful study: Major Carlos Alexandre Geovanini dos Santos," As ações do Exército Brasileiro em apoio á política externa brasileira voltada para a África subsariana." (Rio de Janeiro: Tese (Doutorado em Ciéncias Militares) Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, 2014), pp. 107,112,128,132,[140][141][142][150][151]. The author sees a vast distance between the two sides. Its good will efforts have included developing Namibia's navy since 1994 via officer and cadet training, construction of vessels and providing various types of logistical support; selling Super Tucano aircraft to Angola, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania; and joint weapons development with South Africa, as well as undersea mineral prospecting with Nigeria. 96 The navy has also claimed a role for itself in United Nations peace-keeping work. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (FTM-UNIFIL) is commanded by a Brazilian Rear Admiral, who leads a fleet of nine ships provided by six nations. This peacekeeping mission aims to suppress arms and munitions smuggling into 85 FD McCann. Diálogos,v. 21,n. 1, Lebanese territory from the Mediterranean. 97

General Staff Planning for the future of the Brazilian Army
The General Staff has developed "Strategic Projects" that have the overall goal of transforming or modernizing the army. 98 In summary they aim at gaining more control of Brazil's frontiers (SISFRON) via satellite observation, mapping, and integrating the army's emergency responses more intimately with those of civilian agencies. One of the related projects is in Cyber Defense to protect against cybernetic attacks. A project labelled Guarani seeks to transform motorized infantry and cavalry units into mechanized ones by modernizing existing units with the new Guarani vehicles. These are wheeled armored cars, whose production will also contribute to the growth of Brazil's defense industry. Similarly contributing to that industry is the Air Defense Project which proposes to fabricate various ground-to-air weapons and the Astros 2020 Project to create long-range tactical cruise missiles. A final project, ReCop, aims at maintaining a reasonable level of operational capability by addressing the need for continuous updating and adopting the latest innovations in equipment and training. 99 The Army's Center of Planning in the General Staff focuses on developing doctrine for future situations. Among other things the planners think in terms of image creation that would discourage foreign incursion by FARClike guerrilla forces from Colombia. The Agata border operations are to some extent part of this image creation idea. They are also envisioning an enhanced role in United Nations peacekeeping missions that could have a wide-variety of objectives. To be ready they are considering three-types of forces: a general purpose expeditionary force; a peace-keeping or enforcement force; a humanitarian outfit to respond to disasters. 100 The army's peace keeping experience in Haiti since 2004 is serving as a model for future operations. 101 All of these necessarily involve preparation and training of air and naval transport, inter-service cooperation, and considerable development of logistical capabilities. 102

Reputation and Shaping History
Memory of the years of militarydominated government from 1964 to 1985 is still very strong in Brazil. The armed forces have stopped commemorating the "Revolution of 1964" and have demonstrated that they are subordinate to the elected civilian leadership. This was notable because the president in 1913, Dilma Rousseff in her youth was part of the armed resistance, and had been arrested and tortured by army personnel. The process of reestablishing democratic rule had been slow and difficult. The military regime had not been defeated or completely destabilized rather it sought to liberalize the political situation because of infighting among military leaders over the nature of the regime and over control of it. And, of course, it was losing popular support. At its heart the internal debate within the military was whether the "Revolution" of 1964 was a timelimited surgical operation to correct a leftleaning government, or whether those events had created a long-term regime of command and control. 103 In the armed forces the officers who followed the thinking of General Humberto Castello Branco viewed the intervention in 1964 as a short-term clean up, while those who lined up behind Generals Costa e Silva and Medici saw it as a long-term venture. Ernesto Geisel, who became president in 1974, was one of Castello's men. Geisel was "not a democrat, he was a lover of order....'' 104 He wanted to institutionalize the "Revolution" by creating a Brazilian political model with two parties in a Congress dominated by the government party (Arena), but as time 103  passed he saw that this would not work. He aimed at a transition that would be slow and carefully controlled.
By the mid-1970s key officers were thinking that the "revolution" should have ended in the Medici period. It lost its momentum and maybe its reason for being. Such officers thought that it had been an error not to have given the necessary emphasis to social development, that is, housing, education, health care, and wages. The regime simply went on for too long, and worse, "it was a disaster for the Revolution to have Figueiredo as the last president." He was unprepared for the job and did not work at being president. 105 The most consistent argument in the military for why the regime lasted so long was to blame subversive action. However, General Leonidas Pires Gonçalves insisted that "transition was always in our spirit." And that "those that think we wanted to stay in power don't know the ideas of the Revolution, the spirit with which the Revolution began." He did admit that late joiners, who he called mediocrities "adored power and transformed themselves into great revolutionaries simply because they benefitted." Rather than being forced out he asserted that the direct elections movement (Diretas-Ja) occurred "because we let it." 106 The Amnesty movement began as a civilian affair aimed at letting the political exiles return home. How exactly it became a refuge for the violators of human rights needs further study. In 1979 the Joao Batista Figueiredo government declared a general amnesty that covered the agents of repression but it allowed for the return of exiles and permitted purged politicians to stand for election. 107 Amnesty prior to judgement and conviction wiped away the crimes of the agents of the state, but left the murdered and tortured without legal status. The question was how could state agents be amnestied for crimes that they were not charged with committing and that the military governments would not admit had occurred? In 1995, to make the matter more complex and confusing a law provided compensation for families that had lost loved ones. This was the first time that the Brazilian state accepted responsibility for the illicit acts post-1964. 108 In April 2010 the Brazilian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the amnesty law ruling that it prohibited prosecution of those from both the government forces and the armed resistance, but then in December of that year the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the law was illegal. The Inter-American court asserted that the "Amnesty" clashed with the treaty obligations that Brazil assumed under the OAS American Convention on Human Rights. It ordered Brazil to investigate gross violations of human rights.
While this legal controversy dragged on, there was also a slow movement to establish a truth commission to examine the repression. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed the idea in December 2009, but dropped it when the minister of defense and the three service chiefs threatened joint resignation. In the next administration of DiIma Rousseff the mood had changed enough for the Congress to approve the creation of a commission in September 2011. The Comissão Nacional da Verdade was to investigate human rights violations from 1946 to 1988, with emphasis on the military years . The commission of seven members completed its work in two years. Supposedly it was to have access to all government documents and could call victims and accused individuals to testify, but it could not compel them to appear. Then in March 2012 federal prosecutors charged Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra and civilian police chief Dirceu Garvina, with the 1971 disappearance of a union leader. The prosecutors argued that the amnesty law did not apply because victim's body was not found so the case remained open and continued beyond1979. Even the failed bombing attempt on the Rio Centro in April 1981 reappeared on a court docket in 2014 because it occurred after the 1979 amnesty limit. There was enough investigation and publicity to establish that army agents were responsible, even though the case eventually ended up being archived, it was a step toward justice. 109 The commission was met with hostility and lack of compliance by the armed forces. 110 The officer corps, especially retired officers, considered the Truth Commission a witch hunt to get revenge. "From the army of Caxias there would be no apologies. We always declared our conviction that we saved Brazil." 111 They objected to some of the individuals appointed to the commission and its state-level branches. The officers wanted official repression to be equated with the armed actions of their opponents. They criticized a recent statement of Minister of Defense Celso Amorim that the armed forces had violated human rights during the military period. The president of the Clube Militar, retired General Gilberto Pimentel, declared that the commission should have treated both sides impartially because "there were dead on our side too and human rights are for everyone." 112 The emotions were and are often raw and angry. Now thirty-one years after the return to democratic rule the Brazilian armed forces face the ethical and moral dilemma of how to deal with the realities of those military years. The real problem is not the seizure of power or even the long years of political control. It is the repression that the country suffered including the use of disappearance, murder, and torture as instruments of control. The reality of mistreatment of political prisoners is well documented in the military's own judicial records, but there is little institutional willingness to acknowledge what was done. 113 This stand-off has gone on since 1985. That year the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo published Brasil: Nunca Mais written by priests and laymen who had acquired more than a million pages of military court records containing the names of victims and their torturers and details of their experiences. At the time the editors decided to delay publishing the names of 444 torturers so as not to appear to be interfering in upcoming elections. 114 As the stories of death and disappearance became better known, the consensus on mutual forgetting slowly fragmented. The army's version of events was best presented in a series of interviews with 247 officers and civilians published in 2003. The interviews provided a virtual 'who's who" of those supporting the 1964 movement and the subsequent governments, and their publication was intended as a response to the criticisms of regime opponents. Those interviewed affirmed that from the outset they supported the civilmilitary regime. 115 After 1985 the struggle was to influence the memory of the nation. 116 Probably the case that holds the most interest is that of the conflict in the Araguaia region's section known as the Bico do Pagagaio in the eastern Amazon. Members of the Communist Party of Brazil began moving there in 1966 with the intention of establishing a base for guerrilla war and eventually a liberated zone. Some of them had been trained in China, at least one had been involved in the communist uprising of 1935, and another was an army CPOR-prepared reserve lieutenant. In total there were 107 guerrillas and some locally recruited campesinos. In April 1972 the army discovered their presence and the game was on. The initial massive infusion of regular troops was not successful so the army replaced them with carefully selected secret personnel operating in civilian dress with false names and light arms. The rule of law was set aside for the laws of the jungle. They used guerrilla-style tactics against the guerrillas. By the end of 1974 there were no more guerrillas in Araguaia. Orders from Brasilia were that none should be allowed to leave the region alive. A number were executed well after their capture. Those officers overseeing and conducting the operations in Araguaia wanted to keep the executions secret even within the military services. The families of the executed still await their remains. 117 The closing of the ranks to protect the military institutions is understandable to a certain extent, but the documented history of what took place is not going to disappear. As General Octavio Costa observed "most military had nothing to do with what happened (…) the vast majority did not leave the barracks and stayed there fulfilling purely professional military duties. (…) but what happened was that all the military (…) were tossed into the common grave with DOI-CODI and the intelligence services." He feared that the attitude of blaming all the military would persist "for many years and many generations." 118 The Brazilian Armed Forces are shielding a small minority of their predecessors at the expense of the current reputation of their institutions. The immense pain of relatives and friends on all sides who lost loved ones needs to be alleviated. Once that is done the armed forces can get on with building institutions committed to preserving Brazil's democratic society. Continued denial will make the future less bright, especially because it will distort the education of future Brazilian officers.
The Brazilian Armed Forces have the manpower, organization and experience to handle their current missions. They are avoiding involvement in politics. They want to be respected internally and internationally as professional forces dedicated to projecting national power so as to increase Brazil's stature in the world. They have gone a long way toward hardening the nation's soft power, but whether the country has the political will to continue to build up and expand its armed forces is an open question. Critics would ask why have a strong military if threats to national security seem nebulous? What had appeared possible a couple of years ago is now in doubt because Brazil fell into a recession in August 2015 which was predicted to continue through 2016. 119 The Real has fallen markedly against the U.S. Dollar. Added to the shocking Petrobras scandal and widespread disenchantment with President Dilma that led to her impeachment there are now the tensions produced by the cuts in federal spending for health, education, and city services that are especially felt by the poor and middle classes. 120 Some analysts predict that recovery may extend as far as 2023. 121 The discovery of the massive corruption involving many congressmen and private businessmen in the Lava-Jato investigations has undermined Brazilian politics nearly to the point of making the government illegitimate. How the current economic-political crisis will affect the Armed Forces is simply unknown. Even so the Armed Forces are accustomed to tight budgets and are good at finding ways to adapt to the lack of money. The purchases of jets and the construction of the atomic submarine will go forward thanks to the laying aside of funds for those projects. More likely the construction of new frontier platoon posts will be delayed. It is perhaps well to recall the comment by a British ambassador more than a century ago that "in  Bases, the Command structure, COMAR (Comando Aéreo Regional -Regional Air Command), the Air Space control, and the CINDACTA (Centro Integrado de Defesa Aerea e Controle de Trafego Aéreo -Integrated Center of Air Traffic Control and Air Defense). Source: www.milavia.net/airforces/brazil/fab_bases.htm