PSYCHOANALITIC CONSIDERATIONS ON DIFFICULTIES OF THE METHODOLOGY IN THE SCIENCES THAT DEAL WITH SUBJECTS

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ABSTRACT. This text is based on the confirmation, in the history of sciences and philosophy, about the substandard condition of our sensorial and cognitive tools for apprehension of the essence of the objects and the consequent importance of carefully studying the way you try this apprehension. Using psychoanalytic concepts, it considers the difficulties and the illusion which sustain the methodological discussions and the impacts of those discussions, mainly in the field of the sciences that address the subjectivity, referring to a single individual or to the collective. Initially addressing the psychoanalysis, the work proposes that its method corresponds to the transfer, which emphasizes ambiguity of the method, as it is both what enables the process and also what is presented as its greater obstacle. The resistance, in this sense, both from the analyst and from the analyzer would be the most evident sign of the character of imprisonment that the method represents for the emergency of the subject, which is the main purpose of the process. Hence, we consider that this discussion could be extrapolated to the general human sciences, where similar hindrances could be found. In the end, compliant with the anthropologist Viveiros de Castro, a methodology is proposed which should be processed in movement, in transformation, where the essence of what is sought is found on the novelty that causes the applied method to become uncertain.

Keywords: Methodology; psychoanalysis; subjectivity.
esas discusiones, principalmente en el campo de las ciencias que lidian con la subjetividad, ya sea ésta referente a un único individuo, ya sea a una colectividad. Inicialmente abordando el psicoanálisis, propone que el método de ésta corresponde a la transferencia, lo que realza la ambigüedad del método, una vez que ésta tanto es aquello que viabiliza el proceso, como también lo que se presenta como su mayor obstáculo. La resistencia, en este sentido, tanto del analista, cuanto del analizado, sería la señal más evidente de la peculiaridad de encarcelamiento que el método representa para la emergencia del sujeto, que es el objetivo principal del proceso. Se sugiere, así, que esa discusión pueda ser extrapolada para las ciencias humanas en general, donde dificultades similares podrían ser encontradas. Al final, en consonancia con el antropólogo Viveiros de Castro, propone una metodología que se procese en movimiento, en transformación, donde la esencia de aquello que se busca se encuentra en la novedad que lleva a estremecer el método utilizado.

**Palabras-clave:** Metodología; psicoanálisis; subjetividad.

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**Introduction**

When we talk about method in scheduling a research, we talk about the proposal to establish a procedure that aims to apprehend a given object over a predetermined time.

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Einstein, with his theory of relativity, gave us a way to conceive the existence where the relationship between these two supposedly independent dimensions, space (where the objects would exist) and time, would be much more complex than that in which our immediate senses present to us. For him, his main formalizations have been progressively confirmed, space and time would not be about separate dimensions, as if they were different universes, carriers of specific laws and characteristics. The common sense leads us to think of space as something substantial, or the receptacle where substances would exist, and thus carrier of an immutable essence that would be there to be unveiled by science. The second dimension, time, would be unfolded in a measurable, cadenced and quantifiable way by our symbolic tools (seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, years ...). To Einstein, however, the Whole would be a space-time continuum, a continuity that would be extendible also for other two apparently distinct "substances", mass and energy, which would be, similarly, interchangeable with each other. Further complicating, these four "substances": space, time, mass and energy, associated with a fifth, gravity, would see, disconcerted, their limits fading away within those that would be the central points of any galaxy, the black holes, annulling the discontinuity that we have learned to establish between them.

These considerations have a fundamental importance for psychoanalysis or the sciences that are intended to work in the field of subjectivity. In the case of the sciences that deal with the objectivity of the here and now of our sublunary world, the traditional conception of space (where we would find the objects) and time is, in most cases, adequate and operational. It is sought, in these sciences, which we would place in the field of positivism, to design the object as carrier of an immutable essence that is there to be apprehended, and it is sought, with a rigorously established method, to control all the variables within a temporality minutely cadenced, to allow the proper apprehension of what it would be immutable. However, especially for psychoanalysis, the way Freud and later Lacan address the issue of object and temporality, makes the conception of method that would be worked by us, becomes, at the very least, extremely complex. In addition, we believe that these difficulties can be extended, to a greater or lesser degree, to all sciences that deal directly with the conception of subject, whether this conception is thought in individual or collective terms.

1 - The illusion that sustains the method
In the history of science in general, the concern to restudy and continuously improve the methodology used is due to the disquieting confirmation that the object to be apprehended could be presented in non-identical ways according to the method used. If the object, in the way of presenting, can be relative (and this has proved to be almost an empirical confirmation), the concern ceases to be the object itself, and becomes the method. The effort to establish a more reliable methodology that may safely support the results is the initial step, no matter what scientific research is. That is, before attempting to apprehend the object in question (whatever it is), the most important becomes to determine or establish the method that will guide us. Because, this will be what will determine the limits that will be provided to us to filter what we will find at the end of the search. Einstein, in the only Nobel of physics that he raised, he showed to us that light is composed either of elements (photons) or waves, according to the receiver that is placed to read its emission: if it is a receiver able to read particles, it will confirm that the light is discontinuous and made of photons; if it is a receiver able to read waves, it will tell us that light behaves as a continuous wave. Studies on method, thus, become extremely important, as it will be decisive in the establishment of the field of objects with which we will work. Strictly speaking, when changing the method, changes the territory and the contours of what is to be found.

Bringing into discussion the difficulties inherent to the establishment of no matter which method, leads us to unfold a key issue. At the same time in which this discussion invites us to reflect on the relativity of the object in the way it is presented (since this is not apprehensible in nature, but is dependent on the method used in this apprehension), this discussion is still marked by the illusion the identification of a thought that would be universal, data that previously, would enable us to access the absolute of any object without falling into falsities. That is, in the reiterated concern of improvement of the scientific methodologies, there is, embedded, the idea that it would be possible, one day, to establish a method (or a knowledge, which is what sustains any method) that possesses the statute of universal, absolute. Descartes, for instance, after noting the precarious reliability of our sensory and cognitive tools to apprehend whatever it is, embarks on trying to build The Method, the one that would be able to show us exactly how the object would be independently of the perspective of the subject who observes or the distortions of our sensibility or the reason. He notes as an initial bait all apprehension we consider to be absolute of no matter which object can prove to be false, because it lies in unreliable instruments to then seek to establish, in a sophisticated way, a supposed solution to this constitutive bait, building “the” procedure that, if followed to the letter, would show us exactly what the object is:

As for the method, I understand by this as right and easy rules, whose exact observation will make that anyone ever take anything false as true, and that without uselessly expending any effort of intelligence, reach, with a gradual and continuous growth of science, the true knowledge of all that is able to meet. (Descartes, 1628-29/2007, p. 20)

Is this pretense/illusion of the possibility of establishing something that, existing externally to the object, would make us able to promote, without falsities, its unveiling, what moves all the sciences, including psychoanalysis?

2 – Impasses of the methodology in the field of psychoanalysis

2.1 – The transfer as a method

David-Menard (2015), in a recent text proposed that psychoanalysis could be understood as a radicalization of this difficulty in respect to discussions on methodology. According to her, the method that guides the psychoanalytical practice would be indissoluble, or would be mixed up with the transfer. That is, as it is the ground where the practice is developed, the transfer can be understood as being the own method of this practice, since it is in the management of this that a treatment covers its track. This is, however, an ambiguous method, because it is both what makes possible the attempt to apprehend the object in question (the unconscious), and what is seen as the greatest obstacle to the apprehension of that object (Freud, 1912/1969).

The psychoanalytical praxis (or the psychoanalysis science, as proposed by Freud) brings with it the confirmation of the impossibility of its method to apprehend the object that is desired to filter, even if
this method is, par excellence, the only possible way for the venture. Freud leads us to question, at least in the case of psychoanalysis, to what extent the object that is aimed, in this case the unconscious, exists. To what extent this object is nothing more than a construction propitiated by the proposed method, or created, to apprehend it. We cannot forget that, in order to exist psychoanalysis, it is required a psychoanalyst. In other words, the unconscious only “exists” when there is someone to listen to it. A Freudian slip, for instance, only acquires the status of manifestation of the unconscious (which is when it becomes, effectively, a manifestation of the unconscious) if there is someone to listen to it as such. In the absence of this listening, it will mean only a language error, a distraction, does not referring to the existence of unconscious desires.

Is our object (or perhaps any object) then nothing more than what our method (or any method) elects as being object? Does the unconscious “exist” independently of the transfer, or would it be nothing but an illusion created by the method proposed by Freud?

In his method, in apparent contrast to tradition, Freud stresses the “importance of the moments of failure in a research” (David-Menard, 2015, p. 3). Similarly, to Lacan, the end of an analysis, when it reaches its successful conclusion, is when it somehow fails, a situation characterized by the decay of the analyst to the position of remain, when the transfer (which is the method itself of this science) falls apart.

Speaking of the French physician and physiologist Claude Bernard (1813-78), regarded as the inventor of the experimental method, David-Menard (2015) proposes that all real novelty in scientific research occurs when the method fails. That is, when the previous knowledge that guides a given research fails to explain what is occurring, it is when is placed into motion the process of building of something unusual, not previously envisaged. A novelty, in this sense, is the result of the failure of the method to control the results. In psychoanalytical terms, in the eyes of David-Menard (2015), it would not be wrong suggest that no matter what method, in any of the fields regarded as scientific today, this would be nothing more than a symptom of the fatigue of the researcher, when he surrenders to the appeasement of a well-established ground, restricting the possibility of contingency.

Thus, we could expect that any discovery would be, strictly speaking, a consequence of a failure, a gap in the pre-existing knowledge, or a gap in the method (since, as we are proposing, the method is nothing more than the expression of the knowledge established that serves as ground for the researcher). Every discovery would be at the time of its birth, as a nuisance in the previous theory.

If the object is effect of the method, if it is a construction resulting from the knowledge conveyed by the method, the object is then dependent on a previous knowledge. That is, we only know an object if there is a knowledge that allows this object to be knowable or exist as such. David-Menard (2015) then raises the question: if the existence of an object requires a prior knowledge that makes possible the existence of this, what is the status of this knowledge (and thus of the unknown that this knowledge/method proposes to reveal)? In addition, going even further, if we are, as Freud, assuming that psychoanalysis is in the field of science, what is the status of the knowledge and the unknown that sustains it as a science?

We could propose that the status of the unknown for an analyst, or for the psychoanalysis, is different from that conceived by classical science. This is not about a lack of knowledge by powerlessness I am not able (yet?) to know this, but about an operational lack of knowledge, a constitutive impossibility responsible for the engendering of what will be presented as knowledge. The objective of the analysis is not exactly to apprehend a given object (knowing the unconscious), even if this is the necessary bait of all healing process, but let to be affected by this object. This is about to keep moving, changing, allowing to mobilize for something strange by knowing that it sustains the method itself, even if that strangeness, possibly, walk in the order of the knowledge if the fundamental rule of the method that references the psychoanalytical praxis is the free association, which in the end we see that this determination, although fundamental, in truth is nothing more than a bait, since there is nothing free in this association. Staying faithful to this rule, or not, strictly speaking does nothing to reduce the lack of knowledge and strangeness that are asked of us in the treatment. The real reason for this guidance of Freud of speaking freely is to facilitate that the patient regains the path of the word, the only way to put the cure in progress.
For psychoanalysis science the strangeness is irreducible. Its method, marked by an irreparable inadequacy, states us that such knowledge (or that method), as any knowledge, is nothing more than the bait required where the driving urgency, real motive of the entire process, takes shape. As a bait, all knowledge, when we think of psychoanalysis, is not an end in itself, but something in movement, in transformation, in continuous subversion.

2.2 - Drive

Returning to Monique David-Ménard (2015) for the French psychoanalyst what matters most to Freud in the course of a cure are not exactly the representations (or the objects, because every object is a representation), but the driving conflict, which is exactly what resists to any type of apprehension or control by the method put into action.

It is not here an apology for not knowing. We cannot forget that what sustains a healing process is the desire to know, whether from the analyst (on the unconscious desire of his patient) or from the analysand (about what moves him at the same time that traps him). Rather, this is about to transfer the search for a hypothetical knowledge to be unveiled, to the driving issue that would provide this knowledge. Moving from the knowledge itself to what is urgent, which puts in motion, unfolding as production of knowledge.

The desire to know from both the analyst and the analysand, is the way of the drive to be present in the psychoanalytical scene. However, this does not mean that this desire and drive are identified, or that this desire ends in what moves it. Just as we allow ourselves in saying that it is through this desire that the movement of the analysis is processed, we should be, however, careful not to identify it, as if it embodied, and in it exhausted, everything that concerns the psychoanalysis. As punctuates Zizek (2011), to Lacan “The Real has already countenance of Real” (unpaged [Author's translation]). That is, when we use the Real name, at the same time that we make it to exist, its existence will be disguised, and therefore lost in the very name that conveys it, since every other name is just a semblance of what it proposes to give name. If the desire to know is the spring that puts the analysis in motion, this movement, however, takes place in the subversion or in the transformation of what makes itself present. This desire to know is both what moves and what should be changed or subverted, in the movement of the analysis. Unlike classical objective sciences, which conceive the object as something to be filtered, situated in front of us, for psychoanalysis the object is located in the place of the cause, promoting a continuous subversion of what becomes present as its countenance.

2.3 - Resistance

Working the articles written by Freud about the psychoanalytic technique, David-Ménard proposes that this only begins to realize the fundamental role of resistance in the analytical treatment when he realizes its importance, initially, not exactly from its manifestation in the analysand, but through the confirmation of its manifestation in the analyst, in the difficulty of this in letting go of “his own desire of control through the knowledge” (Ménard, 2015, p. 6). We could assume that this phenomenon is what will authorize Lacan to affirm that in a healing process the resistance is not from the analysand, but from the analyst. The patient, strictly speaking, does not resist, but is subjected to follow his movement through the tracks that are provided to him for this purpose. Resistance, when presented, is a reflection of the difficulty of the analyst in letting himself be carried away by the movement of the analysis, in letting go of the illusion of a control of the analytical process. The belief in the existence of unconscious contents that are there to be revealed is the knowledge that, at the same time that boosts the action of the analyst, should be broken through so that the analysis itself occurs. Because if there is something that the hypnosis showed to Freud, is that the unconscious is not exactly about contents or knowledge to be unveiled, even if this belief is the fundamental bait that moves both the analysand and the analyst.

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2 We are using the term “drive” as a translation for the term “trieb” used by Freud, in German.
If the beginning of an analysis is marked by the exposition of the existence of an enigma, it is not for the analytical process to erase it through knowledge. The operational value of the lack of knowledge cannot be reduced to supposed contents to be unveiled.

Resistance, with regard to the analyst, has the fundamental role of warning him that his supposed capacity of being the holder of a knowledge that would put him in the control of what happens in the progress of the analysis, is nothing more than an illusion. The resistance, conceived as a phenomenon of the analyst, is what should be worked out so that this does not engulf the process in its own eagerness to know. Similarly, we could suggest that, for the analysand, resistance, while manifestation of a vacillation of the method is what protects him from being swallowed by the bait of the transfer itself (or the eagerness to know that puts this method in action).

In the analysis, it is about bringing to the scene the existence of an enigma that there is presented as mainspring of the events, and not exactly to apprehend this spring (a supposed unconscious content) in the field of the knowable. That is, the cause, the etiological equation that puts in motion a subject, is not apprehensible by the knowledge. Give it an explanation, unveiling a supposed unconscious “content”, only serves to appease or pasteurize the desire of the analyst. In this sense, the resistance of the analysand is nothing more than a protection against the urge to know everything of the analyst.

This is a great difficulty for those who work with supervision. The request of the supervised is always to understand as much as possible, apprehend the unconscious “contents” that were causing that behavior or symptom. In addition, the supervisor, using the theory, should firstly to deconstruct the inertia of any knowledge, and support the question. That is, through the knowledge, subverting what is presented as knowledge for the supervised person, showing its bait.

If the resistance that the analyst sees in the analysand does not cease to be, in fact, a modality of his own resistance, it becomes a little clearer because in the psychoanalytical method the distinction between researcher (analyst) and researched (analysand) is not simple. Bringing on stage the resistance of the analyst, or the resistance of this in accepting the freedom of the analysand in relation to the knowledge that he, the analyst, tries to impose him, does nothing more than highlight the drive that moves the own desire to know of the analyst. In addition, the way this desire to know makes itself present is always through the etiological concern, the concern in wanting to filter what causes the movement of the analysand. It is in this sense that one of the ways that can be used to define the end of analysis is when the analysand tires of asking, of seeking what the cause is, and throws himself in life.

It is the working-through (i.e. a movement of elaboration that is processed in continuous transformation or subversion of what makes semblance of object, where this cannot be thought independent of the subject (Cruz, 2012) that distinguishes the psychoanalysis method from any technique (understood as pure application of a rule).

3 – The methodology and the humanities

The question of the indiscernibility between subject and object is something pertinent to all so-called humanities, where the object of study is also located himself as subject in interaction with those who supposedly watches it. The geographer Milton Santos (2000), for instance, tells of the difficulties in answer “to the crucial question of knowing how and why the relationships between the society as an actor and the territory as acted and, in the opposite, between the territory as an actor and the society as object of the action, are given” (p. 109). In the conception of used territory conceived by Milton Santos, there is the proposal to “understand inseparably objects and actions” (p. 108). Instead of working with the perspective of a passive territoriality upon which the society would act, we should think society as indissoluble from the materiality of the relationships, or the dynamic movement that, locally, determines it globally, without the productivist tendency to break it in parts seeking to pragmatic interventions, self-interested, but that would disregard its global dynamic. The social reality should be understood from its territorial dynamics, where the overall structure of the society and the complexity of its use, would stand side-by-side, in relation to inter-affectation and imprecise distinction.
These difficulties are refreshed not only in research that is developed within what we would consider a same culture, but also when the object to be apprehended is understood as a distinct civilization, strange to our territory. All interface work bothers, because inevitably leads to the questioning of the assumptions involved, the latter always captive by that part that, in general considered the most evolved, launched itself into the movement to decode the other. Using a distinction made by Lacan (1971/2003) in *Lituraterra* when talking about the letter, we could suggest that, to put into operation two distinct territories, it is not about border, but coastline. The border establishes the separation between two elements of a same matter, while the coastline is a vague line, wavy, mobile, that expands, retracts and modifies, between different materials. There is not, in the conception of coastline, the prospect of assimilation of one part by the other, ever-present threat when it comes to borders, a bellicose word.

Problematising even more the question, the anthropologist Viveiros de Castro (2012) tells of a contemporary fade not only of the watertight boundaries between observer and observed, but, more radically, between nature and culture. In the latter duality, previously considered princeps reference by science that has as its object the society, we were ineluctably led to classify the civilizations according to a supposed greater or lesser proximity to what we would understand by culture and nature, in which our would always be considered hierarchically superior (more civilized), and the other closer to animality. This original foundational opposition from social sciences would have fallen apart already since the first Industrial Revolution, leading us to think that “the best of all possible worlds must necessarily be a world where another world is possible: but it is necessary that this another world is a world within this, immanent to this, as one of its possibilities not yet accomplished” (p. 153.). Viveiros de Castro tells us of the Moebius strip, where the essence of the alleged object that needs to be apprehended is not outside, but it is about an outside that is inside, in an immanent form. Viveiros moves from the rawness of the radical duality, where a clear border would divide what apparently appears as antagonistic, to a conception where the otherness would be, in immanent form, as a motor for a process of construction of a universality to be produced.

For the anthropologist of Rio de Janeiro, in the classical perspective of friction between two cultures, where a (A) would be more evolved than the other (B), the latter, in the position of object, would be measured, evaluated and judged according to the guidelines of the first. The object B, in this conception, is understood, and its limits is set, from the way in which A understands boundaries and relations. The major problem with this anthropological conception is the lack of understanding on the part of A that this B we are dealing with is actually the B that A is able to see, that is, understood as a decayed or primitive part of itself. Even when this understanding exists, this does not prevent that the scale of values of A continues to dominate, so that B is not only perceived as different, but as degraded in terms of value, in which the lower the capacity of A to absorb it, the greater degraded it will be.

To better understand what Viveiros de Castro proposes, we can use the mathematical theory of categories, the formal basis of the topology and knot theory, often used by Lacan in his last seminars. While in he mathematical theory of sets we work with objects and the possible way to group them, forming clusters that would become themselves objects of other sets, in the theory of categories we work not exactly with objects, but with beams that could be established between elements of two or more sets, and these beams may also become substrate to other beams (Lavendhome, 2001). These beams can concern to one, some or even all elements of each set indiscriminately, establishing relationships that would have own life with regard to the sets initially involved. It is dealt here with transformations, which unfold in transformations of transformations, without these transformations being graded or ordered according to transcendent principles of values. Alain Badiou (2006) describes the mathematical theory of categories as science of appearing. She gives us the conformation of any world, or the way in which this contingently comes into existence, from its intrinsic relationships or movements. For handling basically relationships, and not properly objects (in the ontological sense of the word, i.e., as having a determinable interior), the conceptions of rest, lack or excess would not make much sense in the field of categories. While in Theory of Sets we would find in operation the classical logic (obedient to the Aristotelian principles of the non-contradiction and the third excluded), the natural logic of the Theory of Categories is intuitionistic (we always have to show or tell how we build an object to be able to say that it exists).
The type of category that specifically interested to Badiou was the so-called Topoi, which are categories that allow constructions used in ordinary mathematics, being equipped with properties of the type Theory of Sets. It is called Topoi a category where there are co-limits to all finite diagram. To Leibniz, the Topoi of topology (branch of mathematics that works with continuous transformations, where the quantitative aspect is completely distanced, being purely qualitative) is called analysis situ (analysis of the place). It is, thus, in the Theory of Categories, the formalization that allows managing the topological transformations (Lavendhomme, 2001, p. 25).

Lacan, in turn, through the topology, sought to show the malleability of the structures and their plastic capacity of transforming themselves, without any eventual production of residues constituting obstacles. We might think that in the finite field (in ontological terms) of the transformations and topological movements, we would find ourselves more in the record of the norm than actually in the record of the Law. If the Law, understood as something transcendent, non-relativizable, establishes without nuances the differentiation between the right and the wrong, in the record of the norm, where we would see in operation the topological objects worked by Lacan, the regulation occurs in an immanent way than the field. We can, thus, start talking about quantitative differences "without prejudice to concepts such as truth, which do not commit us to relativism" (Garcia, 2011, p. 53). We move from the classical Aristotelian logic of the third excluded, to speak about an otherness that would not be reduced to the opposite, which would leave us under the identity traps. We could propose that, to the French psychoanalyst, the truth is the result of something that is not limited to the field of the outside, appearing also as inside. It is about the registration of an inside/outside, which, by being registered locally (and not as a consequence of a divine transcendence), has its universality always in question, requiring reiterated experimentation, if the case, stating its continuity and persistence. Here we have a truth that does not present itself more as a sacralized law, since from universal a priori, it now requires its confirmation with each new experience of reality. From divine truth, a priori existence of all things, we move to a truth to be confirmed, a search moved by immanent reasons, tested locally and randomly, from the contingencies of the experience. From the sure guarantee of the universality of a law that proposes to be irreducible, we move to the uncertainty of an entry marked by contingency of the casual encounters.3

Value judgments, from now defined in the territory, become marked by the plasticity of the relationships involved. We no longer have a single world, but several worlds or universes that coexist with each other, sharing elements and relationships that start to function as objects to other relationships. The regulatory mechanisms become continuous, proposing to qualify, measure, evaluate, rank, instead of imposing clear distinction between right and wrong through laws that were believed irremovable. It is observed here a desacralization of the Law, bringing the regulation to the territory.

Returning to Viveiros de Castro (2012):

The actantial scheme of the transformation, in this... case, is something like: B becomes B' by occasion and by means of the entry of A into its event horizon. During the process, B- B' turns back A into A', in equal measure to its participation in A (which can, moreover, be very small — or not). This transforms the system formed by A, B and other "letters" into a superobject C...

Note that the transformation here is not hierarchical or completed, in the sense that the power differentials between the collectives are not ordered according to a transcendent principle of value (the world history, the evolution of capitalism, the real subsumption etc.) (p. 161).

This is, in these transformations that unfold in new transformations, about placement on the scene, and in movement, of an intelligible difference. That is, although the process to highlight the existence of a difference, this presents points of resonance or liable to resonance, with the situation initially considered as that of origin. It is, in this case, a difference that is presented not as externality, but as a projection of an otherness that was already inside, giving to the movement the character of process motivated by immanent reasons. Bring another cosmos to the scene, "in a situation of intelligible

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3 For further discussion on the differences, in relation to psychoanalysis, between norm and law, we suggest to the reader the article Law and standard in psychoanalysis (Franca Neto, 2013)
difference with the conceptual currents that cross our own tradition", means places it as “strangely echoing the other side of our thinking, that is, as what our thinking sees as its other side, its smaller side, marginal, eccentric” (Castro, 2012, p. 166). The transformation, in this case, is not confined in the other, as the product of an attempt to adapt it to something similar to us. It has not the explicit objective of a reduction of the strangeness or difference. Rather it is a movement sustained by which the difference perceived echoes on what our own thinking conceives as its inappropriate, disposable side. The transformation, far from reducing the difference, has as motor of its movement the disclosure, provided by the shock with a supposed external difference, of what exists closely as Another of our identities. Using terms of Lacan, the alleged Another external is nothing more than the placement on the scene of our own ex-timity.

Probably seeking his resonances in Deleuze, Viveiros de Castro (2012) makes use then of the term “becoming", using it as a “key concept that purges the structuralist relationship of its latest commitment to stability or to anteriority of the terms, allowing finally think a relationship with otherness beyond the metaphor and metonymy — beyond, that is, the language” (p. 154).

The Slovenian Slavo Zizek (2016), working in a similar way, proposes to us that in the contemporary clash between East and West, the difference, the threat, lies not in the other, on the outside, but in itself (as an ex-timate intimacy). The Other is not outside, it is immanent. In this sense, facing bluntly what scares us in the other (for example, in the Muslim) would be an effective way to us and confront and subvert the most intimate joy that dwells in us.

That is, the great difficulty of the harmonious coexistence between two cultures, is related not so much with alleged irreducible differences, but with the mobilization that a culture makes of the most intimate form of joy of the other:

The final incompatibility is not between my jouissance and the jouissance of the other, but between myself and my own jouissance, which remains forever an ex-timate intruder. It is to resolve this impasse that the subject projects the core of his jouissance in Another, attributing to this Another full access to a consistent jouissance. (Zizek, 2016, p. 1)

### Final considerations

Both in psychoanalysis and in the humanities in general, we could suggest that the classic distinction between observer and observed more often distorts than enables the apprehension of what is desired to achieve. Similarly with the resistance to psychoanalysis, before being of the analysand, it is actually a difficulty of the analyst in extricating himself of his own knowledge and his illusory potency of control of the process, we could say that the dualist perspective for humanities, where the researcher, understood while external observer, believing himself powerful to discern observation from interaction, interiority from exteriority, only reveals the inability of this same observer to realize that any apprehension is not disentangled from what the alleged “external” Another affects him in what is most intimate to him, and therefore, more obscure.

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