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***Brasil: Acima de Tudo!!* The Brazilian Armed Forces: Remodeling for a New Era**

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Abstract

The history of the Brazilian military has been marked by repeated “reforms” and up-dating efforts to keep abreast of developments abroad. Since World War II such efforts were often weakened, delayed, and reduced by involvement in politics, lack of congressional support, and financial instability. The deep-sea oil discoveries were touted as the beginning of a new era of prosperity that would finally allow growth and modernization of the armed forces. The fall in oil prices likely have made that more of a dream than reality, but even so the armed forces have been moving ahead. Their schools, academies, and institutes are establishing more open relationships with the republic’s universities. The older army institutions, the *Escola Preparatória de Cadetes do Exército* and the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras*, have reshaped their programs of study and training. In the process their recruitment pattern has changed in ways that may make the officer corps less diverse. The Navy and the Air Force academies seem committed to keeping their programs as they have been. Those services, by their nature, are more technologically oriented than the army, but the army too is more computerized than a decade ago. Brazil is tightening its control of its Amazonian lands, air space, water ways, and ocean. Indeed it is shifting its military focus from the south to the far north and west. Internationally it has adopted U.N. peace-keeping as a consistent part of its set of military missions, the ongoing Haitian assignment being the most ambitious of several in recent decades. It is also accepting some South Americans and Africans as cadets at *Agulhas Negras*. Given the country’s population the armed forces are small. To expand their size the laws and practices of recruitment would have to change, which seems unlikely. The paper examines Brazil’s current military situation setting it against the history of its evolution.

Resumo

“Brasil: acima de tudo”!! Forças Armadas Brasileiras: reestruturação para uma nova era?

A história dos militares brasileiros tem sido marcada por repetidas “reformas” e atualização de esforços para manter o mesmo nível de desenvolvimento externo. Desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, esses esforços foram sempre enfraquecidos, retardados e reduzidos pelo envolvimento em política, ausência de apoio no Congresso e instabilidade financeira. As descobertas do petróleo do Pré-sal foram anunciadas como o começo de uma nova era de prosperidade que finalmente iria permitir o crescimento e a modernização das Forças Armadas. No entanto, a queda nos preços do petróleo tornou esse desejo mais um sonho do que realidade, mas mesmo assim as Forças Armadas continuaram a se mover à frente. Suas escolas, academias e institutos estão a estabelecer uma relação mais aberta com as universidades da República. As antigas instituições do Exército, a Escola Preparatória de Cadetes do Exército e a Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras, têm remodelado os seus programas de estudos e de treinamento. Nesse processo, seus padrões de recrutamento têm mudado de modo a formar um corpo de oficiais mais homogêneo. As academias da Marinha e da Força Aérea parecem empenhadas na manutenção dos seus programas como estavam. Esses serviços, por sua natureza, são mais tecnologicamente orientados que no Exército, mas o Exército também está mais informatizado hoje do que há dez anos. O Brasil está ampliando o seu controle do seu território amazônico, espaço aéreo, recursos hídricos e oceânicos. É *inegável* a mudança do foco militar do Sul para o extremo Norte e Oeste. No campo internacional, o país tem adotado de forma consistente a participação nas forças de manutenção de paz da ONU, com destaque para a contínua missão no Haiti, que é o projeto mais ambicioso das recentes décadas. Além disso, o Exército tem aceito alguns sul-americanos e africanos como cadetes na Academia das Agulhas Negras. Considerando a população brasileira, suas Forças Armadas são diminutas. Para a sua expansão, são necessárias mudanças na legislação e nas práticas de recrutamento, pois elas se mostram inadequadas. Este artigo examina a situação atual das forças militares brasileiras, contrastando-as com a história da sua evolução.

Resumen

Brasil: "Por encima de todo"!!! Fuerzas Armadas Brasileñas: ¿Reestructuración para una nueva era?

La historia de los militares brasileños ha sido marcada por repetidas “reformas” y por la actualización de esfuerzos para mantener el mismo nivel de desarrollo externo. Desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, tales esfuerzos se vieron debilitados, retardados y reducidos por su participación en la política, la ausencia de apoyo por parte del Congreso y por la inestabilidad financiera. El descubrimiento de yacimientos de petróleo del “Pre Sal” fueron difundidos como el comienzo de una nueva era de prosperidad que finalmente permitiría el crecimiento y la modernización de las Fuerzas Armadas. Sin embargo, la caída de los precios del petróleo transformó ese deseo más en un sueño que en una realidad; aunque eso no impidió que las Fuerzas Armadas continuaran elaborando proyectos para el futuro. Sus escuelas, academias e institutos establecieron una relación más abierta con las universidades de la República. Las antiguas instituciones del Ejército, la Escuela Preparatoria de Cadetes del Ejército y la Academia Militar de las *Agulhas Negras*, remodelaron sus programas de estudio y de entrenamiento. En este proceso, sus padrones de reclutamiento se orientaron a constituir un cuerpo de oficiales más homogêneo. Las Academias de la Marina y de la Fuerza Aérea parecen empenhadas en la manutención de sus programas como estaban. Por su naturaleza, esos servicios están más tecnológicamente orientados que en el Ejército, aunque éste también está más informatizado que diez años atrás. Brasil está ampliando el control sobre su territorio amazónico, el espacio aéreo, recursos hídricos y oceánicos. Es *inegable* el cambio del foco militar del Sur hacia el extremo Norte y Oeste. En el campo internacional, el país optó decididamente por la participación en las fuerzas de paz de la ONU, principalmente en la misión en Haití que constituye el proyecto más ambicioso de las últimas décadas. El Ejército también ha aceptado algunos sudamericanos y africanos como cadetes de la Academia de *Agulhas Negras*. Considerando la población de Brasil, sus Fuerzas Armadas son diminutas. Para su expansión, se hacen necesarios cambios en la legislación y en las prácticas de reclutamiento, que se muestran inadecuadas. Este artículo examina la situación actual de las fuerzas militares brasileñas, contrastándolas con la historia de su evolución.

Brasil: Acima de Tudo¹

The Brazilian armed forces are essentially defense forces. The several national constitutions have consistently limited recourse to war. Peaceful negotiations or arbitration are the rule in resolving international differences and disputes. Wars of conquest, alone or in an alliance are constitutionally forbidden.² The constitution specifies the purpose of the armed forces as “defense of the *Pátria* and guaranteeing the constitutional powers, law, and order.” They are designated as “permanent” national institutions.³ They exist to protect Brazil from foreign incursion, to support the national government, especially in the enforcement of law and the preservation of order. They are not positioned with any particular enemy in mind, rather “they are expected to be able to be present, in due time and with sufficient power resources, in any part of its territory to dissuade and to respond to any sort of aggression to its integrity.”⁴ The Armed Forces viewpoint is at once external and internal, but the deployment

of their units around the country has reflected a posture that emphasizes the idea of ‘presence’ throughout the country.

That emphasis flows naturally from the army’s history, which in the 19th century involved extending national control over the map inherited from Portugal, and in the 20th century spreading the reach of the national state and preserving its authority and control. Its 4,650 mile [7,491 kms] coast line presents an enormous face to the Atlantic, and its 10,492 miles [16,885 kms] of land frontier brings it into contact with 10 neighboring countries, but through most its history that distance, except where it met Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay, was largely uninhabited and comprised dense jungle, with little need for much border defense.

Internally, after playing the decisive role in overthrowing the Brazilian Empire (1822-1889) the army was the strong-arm of the Republic defending and extending its authority. There is a myth repeated in many text books of Latin American history that the transition from

¹ “Brasil: Acima de Tudo is the *grito de guerra* (war cry) used throughout the Brazilian Army. For example, at the army’s preparatory school in Campinas, the students (Alunos) marching into the dining hall, shout it out as they enter. Apparently it was popular with airborne units from where it spread to the rest of the army. An earlier version of this paper was given as part of the panel “New Perspectives on the Brazilian Military” at BRASA XII, Brazilian Studies Association, King’s College London, August 21, 2014. Research for this essay was underwritten by a Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative grant to the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California, San Diego. My thanks to Professors David Mares (UCSD) and Harold Trinkunas (Brookings Institution) for inviting my participation in the Brazil project. Thanks also to Brazilian army colonels (retired) Durval Lourenço Pereira, Eduardo Pereira, and Sergio Muniz Costa, and compadre Michael L. Conniff for their assistance and advice.

² See Article 4 of “Constituição dos Estados Unidos do Brasil.” Text is in Pedro Calmon, *História do Brasil*, Vol. XII (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editôra, 1959), pp.2581-2620.

³ Article 177 in *ibid.* p.2613. The current constitution, that of 1988, Article 142 specifies the three armed forces as “permanent and normal national institutions organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline under the supreme authority of the president of the republic.” *Constituição República Federativa do Brasil* (Brasília: Senado Federal, Centro Gráfico, 1988), p.98. Their mission is “to defend the *Pátria*, guarantee the constitutionally established powers and, on the initiative of any of said powers, law and order.” Complimentary law No. 69 of July 23, 1991 added to the army’s mission cooperation in national development and in civil defense. Rex A. Hudson, ed. *Brazil: A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1998), pp. 366-367.

⁴ Alcides Costa Vaz, “Brazilian Perspectives on the Changing Global Order and Security Challenges,” CEPS Working Document, N° 376 (February 2013), p. 3.
http://aei.pitt.edu/40232/1/WD_376_Alcidis_Costa_Vaz_Brazil's_Security_Challenges.pdf

monarchy to republic was bloodless. That was true for the single day of November 15, 1889, but the following 1890s was a bloodbath of civil war and repression of dissent. The discord and turmoil of those years profoundly affected the Brazilian officer corps. The suppression of the Naval Revolt of 1893-94 all but destroyed the navy and left a deep suspicion of the army among later generations of naval officers.⁵ Worse, the federation that took shape in the first decade of the twentieth century seemed constructed so as to impede national unity. For the next decades dissolution of Brazil was a constant fear. Several of the more prosperous states created state-level armies to check the power of the national government. São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Pernambuco were exemplary of this trend with their *Forças Públicas* and *Policias Militares*. São Paulo went so far as to employ the French Army to arm and train its forces (1906), which included artillery and aviation.⁶ The serious threat that state forces posed was best illustrated by the role that the *Paulista Força Pública* played in the three-month civil war in 1932. The Army did not gain complete control over such state forces until the military era (1964-1985).

Brazilian Armed Forces Personnel (2014)

Army: 219,585 [about 70,000 are conscripts]

Navy: 60,000 [15,000 are Marines (*Fuzileiros*) and there are about 100 ships]

Air Force: 77,000 [740 aircraft of which 223 are combat]




Fig. 1 Map of Brazil's Geographic Regions

Source: GONZALES, 2008, p. 64.

The barracks, forts, and other installations that the Army accumulated over the centuries have served multiple functions since their initial construction. Modern military posts in various sea ports, such as Belém, Recife, Salvador, and Rio de Janeiro are located in or adjacent to colonial-era forts, those in Mato Grosso date from the war with Paraguay (1865-1870), the *Villa Militar* barracks and schools in Rio de Janeiro came from a military reform impulse in 1905-10, those in Rio Grande do Sul were part of a massive construction program in the 1920s as part of a defensive array against Argentina, the four jungle brigades, five jungle battalions, and twenty-five platoon posts in

⁵ Even today naval officers view the army as maneuvering to keep itself as the dominant armed force. For a detailed study of the naval revolt see Hélio Leôncio Martins, *A Revolta da Armada* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1997). American involvement in the suppression of the revolt was an important step in the formation of decades of close relations; see Steven C. Topik, *Trade and Gunboats: the United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

⁶ Also there was the worrisome inheritance from the 19th century of a National Guard that had little military capability and functioned mostly as a social-political organization that provided muscle for local oligarchies. It was under control of the Ministry of Justice in the early republic. The army struggled to eliminate it. See McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria, A History of the Brazilian Army* (Stanford: SUP, 2004), p. 71, force levels for 1926 see p. 224.

Amazonia were built as part of the *Calha Norte* project in the 1970s and 1980s. What this shows is that many of the army's installations, with the exception of *Calha Norte*, are the result of historical accumulation rather than contemporary national-level planning. It also represents a praiseworthy tendency to make do with what they have rather than to spend time, money, and effort building new facilities and relocating troops. Of course this tendency is also motivated by the low level of funding provided to the armed forces. It is politically difficult to move a unit if it means that a barracks will be closed.

That is not to say that there are not state-of-the-art facilities. The regional headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Brasília and elsewhere are of various ages, but have been continually updated. The school facilities, such as the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras* (Resende RJ) and the *Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército* (Rio) are gleaming examples of modernity.

If there is one thing that the Brazilian Army has constantly changed and updated over the decades is its administrative structure. Its current structure (from 1986) consists of seven military commands. Each of the seven headquarters is located in a major city: *Comando Militar do Leste* (CML Rio de Janeiro); *Comando Militar do Sudeste* (CMSE, São Paulo); *Comando Militar do Sul* (CMS, Porto Alegre); *Comando Militar do Oeste* (CMO, Campo Grande); *Comando Militar do Planalto* (CMP, Brasília); *Comando Militar do Nordeste* (CMN, Recife); and *Comando Militar Amazonia* (CMA, Manaus). This structure reflects the growing importance of the Amazon region, the Brazilian west, and the *Planalto* around Brasília.



Fig. 2 Regional Military Commands of the Brazilian Army -2007

Source: <http://www.cb.mil.br/%252Fquarteis-por-estado1%3B1257%3B1100>

Abbreviations:

CMA – Comando Militar da Amazônia;
CMNE – Comando Militar do Nordeste;
CMO – Comando Militar do Oeste;
CML – Comando Militar do Leste;
CMP – Comando Militar do Planalto;
CMSE – Comando Militar do Sudeste;
CMS – Comando Militar do Sul.

The army, indeed the three armed services, historically has been largely autonomous, with only three exceptions the armed forces ministers were drawn from the general officers of the respective services.⁷ The services themselves controlled the promotion process and so determined who advanced to the top ranks. Until 1999 each minister reported directly to the president of the republic, and in the military years (1964-85) the president was a general, so for most of their history the armed forces were largely independent of civilian control. And, of course, throughout most of their history the armed forces were not challenged by the necessity of fighting wars. As President-General Ernesto Geisel once commented “An Army that does not make war

⁷ During the Empire civilian ministers were common, but under the Republic civilians were ministers of war and the navy only in 1919-1922 and of the air force in 1941-1945. The experiment did not take.

is a tremendously conservative organism.”⁸

The current Ministry of Defense is headed by a civilian, but a number of its sections are filled with military officers.⁹ The three service chiefs are called commanders and are selected by the president from among the four-star general officers. Internally much of the old autonomy continues, except that the commanders report to the civilian minister. Some analysts argue that the minister of defense is too much under the influence of the armed forces, thereby effectively weakening civilian control. This view has the minister of defense acting more as the representative of the barracks before the president of the republic than as the agent of the president controlling the barracks. There was also concern that the ministry's weakness prevented it from effectively directing the armed forces and from defending its interests within the government.¹⁰

One aspect of the conservatism that Geisel noted was the persistence of old patterns of stationing forces. For decades the number of elite units with the latest equipment located in the Rio de Janeiro area was striking. Rio was the capital throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries down to 1960 and during that time nearly a third of the army and much of the navy

were stationed there. This has changed somewhat in recent years. The Armored Brigade was moved to Ponta Grossa, Paraná and the Special Forces battalion transferred to Goiânia, Goiás. The First and Third combat regiments were sent from Rio to Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul. An infantry brigade was moved from Rio state to the Amazon. And consideration is being given to moving the Airborne Brigade from Vila Militar to Anápolis near Brasília. But the majority of advanced educational institutions remain in Rio de Janeiro. The Army's *Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais*, *Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército*, the *Instituto Militar de Engenharia*, the Navy's *Escola Naval*, the *Instituto de Pesquisas Navales*, and the *Escola de Guerra Naval*, the Air Force's *Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior da Aeronáutica*, and the interservice *Escola Superior de Guerra* are all located there. Almost all of the Navy's fleet and its land force or marine corps (*Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais*) are there as well.¹¹

In the 1940s and 1950s the services were governed according to the personal style of the generals acting as ministers who used or ignored the senior officers (generals, admirals, and *brigadeiros*) stationed in the Rio de Janeiro area. There was no legal high command. In 1964

⁸ Elio Gaspari, *O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), p.286. The long experience of keeping peace keepers in Haiti (*Minustah*) is being felt in the promotion process. Most of the Brazilian battalion's commanders have reached general's rank.

⁹ Plans to create a civilian career line in the ministry appear to be stalled by efforts to establish rank and salary equity between civilians and military.

¹⁰ Jorge Zaverucha, "A Fragilidade do Ministério da Defesa Brasileira," *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, (Nov. 2005) No. 25, pp. 107-121. See p. 118 for question of who is controlling whom. Zaverucha noted in his *Forças Armadas e polícia: entre of autoritarismo e a democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2005), p. 210 that the authoritarian national security law of 1983 continues in effect. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, "A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa e a Reorganização e Transformação das Forças Armadas," *Interesse Nacional* (Abril/Junho 2009), pp.71-83. See especially p. 73. <http://www.resdal.org.ar/producciones-miembros/estrategia-nacional-defensa-eliezer-rizzo.pdf> Judging from the several ministers to date it is tempting to say that their individual personalities have been more significant than institutional controls.

¹¹ This pattern is long standing. For old maps showing locations: Francisco José Corrêa-Martins, "Conquistar e manter"? a cartografia da presença do Exército Brasileiro no Rio de Janeiro nos últimos cinquenta anos." *Passado Presente nos Velhos Mapas: Conhecimento e Poder*, *Anais do 1a Simpósio Brasileiro de Cartografia Histórica*, Paraty, 10 a 13 de Maio de 2011 https://www.ufmg.br/rededemuseus/crch/simposio/CORREA_MARTINS_FRANCISCO_J.pdf.

President-General Humberto Castello Branco instituted the current high command made up of the four-star ranked officers. Whether this rule by committee is efficient or not is an open question. There is a Joint Staff of the Armed Forces [*Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas*] which may be a helpful sounding board for military opinion, and could be a vehicle for change if given real power. It was created in 2010 to plan and command in situations involving the joint operations of the three services. It is supposed to integrate their doctrine and operations emphasizing their ‘interoperability’ and optimizing their capabilities. But getting all three services to agree and approve is still difficult.¹² On the grand scale the Joint Staff is to make tangible the National Defense Strategy plan issued in 2008 and updated in 2012 to raise the armed forces capabilities to the level of guaranteeing the country’s security in peacetime and in “situations of crisis.” This staff revision was part of the 2010 “New Defense” law that looked to restructure the Ministry of Defense and to facilitate the coordination of the Armed Forces.¹³ Whether it will be successful in imposing coordination on the three historically independent forces remains to be seen.

Brazilian thinking regarding the role of the military has evolved to the point where a stronger military profile is now linked to the nation’s standing in the world. Brazil’s 2005 National Defense Policy document noted that it was not “prudent to conceive of a country without a defense capacity compatible with its

stature and political aspirations.”¹⁴ The Strategy of National Defense (*Estratégia de Defesa Nacional* referred to as *END*) issued in 2008 flows from the 2005 policy document and both start from the premise that Brazil must be a power capable of defending itself. If Brazil wishes to have its proper place in the world it needs to be “prepared to defend itself not only against aggressions but also against threats.” (Emphasis added) The Strategy asserts that Brazil will “rise to the first level in the world without exercising hegemony or domination. The Brazilian people,” it declares, “do not desire to exercise power over other peoples. They want Brazil to become greater without dominating others.”¹⁵

But Brazil must be prepared for conflicts and threats that might appear on its path to becoming a first-ranked power. This preparation will require that the self-images and identities of the three services be transformed. Historically they have functioned independently of each other and so they will have to become more unified. Officers will have to think of themselves first as members of the Brazilian armed forces and secondarily as members of their respective services.¹⁶ Such a restructuring of identity will require a deep rethinking of their missions, operations, officer education and training, transportation, and of course, military doctrine. Because the army has invested considerable history, expense, and effort spreading itself over the map of Brazil based on the idea that its presence is necessary to preserve law and order and national control of territory it might find it

¹² “Operation Anhanduí: Brazilian Armed Forces Train for Interoperability,” *Diálogo: Digital Military Magazine* (Oct. 31, 2011), http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2011/10/31/aa-brazil-operation-anhandui.

¹³ “EMCFA - Inovação nas Forças Armadas,” *Correio Brasileiro*, Brasília, September 2, 2013. The “New Defense” Law was Lei Complementar 10 of August 2010.

¹⁴ Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, *Política de Defesa Nacional* (Brasília, 2005), pp 3 & 12.

¹⁵ Brasil, Ministério de Defesa, *Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*, p. 6.

¹⁶ Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, “A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa e a Reorganização e Transformação das Forças Armadas,” *Interesse Nacional* Ano 2, Nº. 5 (Abril/Junho 2009), p.76. (http://internet-ant.esg.br/enec/leitura_complementar.pdf).

difficult to reshape itself into strategically placed units that could be transported as needed to deal with sudden crisis situations anywhere. It is doubtful that the services will reshape their identities without strong leadership by the minister of defense or forceful imposition from the government.

The end contains various “directives” (*diretrizes*) specifying what should happen. For example, Directives 8 and 9 dealing with the regional commands and the Combined General Staff proposes reducing the heavy concentration of units in the Southeast, transferring some of them to Amazonia and to the western frontier. The objective is to have more units on the frontiers (referred to as *adensamento*). The directive suggests that the various services’ territorial divisions (*regiões militares, distritos navais, and zonas aéreas*) should be reshaped to coincide as much as possible. To develop operational capability, each area would have a Joint General Staff that will create and keep up-to-date area operations plans. Without lessening the importance of the South and the Southeast, Directive 10 called for giving priority to Amazonia. Rather than diminishing the first two regions, the idea is to raise the importance of the Amazon as a focus of national defense.

The document is a bit vague as to how the great population and industrial

concentrations of the South and Southeast are to be defended. Of course without a clear threat it is difficult to shape a proper defense. It assumes that the integration of the continent via *Mercosul* and *Cone Sul* will continue and proposes international integration of staffs, joint training exercises, and even integration of defense industries to build mutual trust and confidence.

There are difficulties with all this of course. In the south Brazil’s clear military predominance cannot help but give the Argentine military pause.¹⁷ The long antagonism between the two countries reaches back into their colonial pasts and extends down to the Malvinas War of 1982. The complete Argentine defeat by the British and with the Americans seemingly opting to support their NATO ally over their Rio Treaty (1947) partner caused the Brazilians to reassess their military structures and international relationships. Particularly it persuaded them that they needed units of professional soldiers, rather than the usual one-year draftees.¹⁸ The Brazilians work hard at being open and friendly trying to put their Argentine colleagues at ease. But the long history of suspicion is not easy to erase. In the first half of the twentieth-century both sides planned for war against each other.¹⁹ In the past the Argentines chafed at the closeness between the Brazilians and Americans and considered Brazil the sub-

¹⁷ In Rio Grande do Sul there are 10 Infantry Regiments, 5 Artillery Groups, and 3 anti-aircraft batteries; in Paraná there are 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Regiments of light armor, 3 Infantry Battalions, and 1 Field Artillery Group; and in Santa Catarina there are 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Engineer Battalions, and 1 Artillery Group. Plus in each of the three states there are logistical and other types of support units. <http://www.cb.mil.br/rs>, <http://www.cb.mil.br/pr>, <http://www.cb.mil.br/sc>. See map below.

¹⁸ Vagner Camilo Alves & Márcio Teixeira de Campos, “A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e o Exército brasileiro, *Tensões Mundiais / World Tensions*, Vol. 8, No. 14 (2012), pp257-278; Frank D. McCann. “Repercussions of the Malvinas/Falklands War on Brazilian Foreign and Military Policies,” *Inter-American Review of Bibliography*, XL, 1 (1990), 39-49.

¹⁹ McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria*, pp. 251-258, 354-355. The location of Brazilian army bases in the south were chosen on the premise of war with Argentina. The location of Argentina’s First Division is related to check-mating the Brazilians with its XII Brigade headquartered at Posadas in Misiones and the III Brigade Headquarters at Resistencia in Chaco. There are infantry and armored regiments in Corrientes and Entre Rios. <http://www.ejercito.mil.ar/sitio/estructura/listado.asp?tipo=4>.

imperial gendarme of Washington.²⁰ The current decline (2014-15) of the Argentine economy alarms Brazilian leaders because they need “a strong strategic partner, with which they can build international power in a context of integration.” However it is encouraging that the Argentine public sees Brazil as a logical partner for the future.²¹




Fig. 3 Distribution of Brazilian Army units 2007, Not showing frontier platoons and detachments
Source: GONZALES, 2008), p.78.

Efforts at establishing better military relations began with the two navies in 1978 when they held a joint training exercise called *Operação Fraterno*, in the 1990s the armies and air forces followed suit. Interestingly this cooperation was initiated by the two militaries and became part of

the foreign policies of the two governments only in 2005. In recent years combined field exercises, exchange of academy cadets, and joint technological projects have become common. The objective is to build mutual bilateral confidence and to build up the political-military power of both countries. A strong relationship between the historic rivals they hope will attract the rest of the region's countries to their orbit and lessen the possibility that other polls of attraction will develop in South America. Brasília seemingly believes that this configuration will allow Brazil to exercise its leadership on the continent, seconded by Argentina. The current Brazilian government sees this strategy as central to its policy of building a multipolar world. Of course this requires that Argentina, even if not admitted publically, become continually more politically dependent on Brasil.²² The developing close military relationship could carry dangers for Brazil if Argentina continues to press its demands regarding the Falklands/Malvinas to the point of another invasion. In February 2014 Argentina increased its military budget by a startling 33.4%, reportedly the highest in its history, and has set out on an extensive rearmament program.²³ It is worth noting that the Brazilian army's websites provide much clearer and more fulsome information about its dispositions than does the Argentine army's websites.

²⁰ See Leonel Itaussu Almeida Mello, *Argentina e Brasil: A Balança de Poder no Cone Sul* 2d Ed. (São Paulo: Hueitec, 2012), p. 44 ff.

²¹ Allesandro Warley Candeas, “Relações Brasil-Argentina: Uma Análise dos Avanços e Recuos,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2005), p33. <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v48n1/v48n1a07>

²² Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, “A Cooperação Brasil-Argentina na Área Militar: Da Autonomia das Forças Armadas às Relações Estratégicas (1978-2009)” ,(dissertação de mestre em relações internacionais, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, 2010), pp.193-195.

²³ <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/461327/New-arms-threat-Argentina-s-3billion-boost-to-military> .If the Argentine government enters another debt default such plans likely would collapse. The reality appears to be an open question as negative news reports raise questions: “Calamitous” state of Argentine Armed Forces equipment,” *Mercopress*, Montevideo, July 24, 2014. <http://en.mercopress.com/2014/07/22/calamitous-state-of-argentine-armed-forces-equipment> .

Amazônia

Peace and security on the southern border allowed the Brazilians to reposition their forces. The Army considers Amazônia as its number one worry.²⁴ The military's anxiety reflects the region's inherent importance. All of seven and part of two of Brazil's twenty-five states are in Amazônia. Its natural resources, biodiversity, mineral riches, and hydrogenation potential are well known. Its over thirty thousand miles of navigable waterways embrace 20 % of the earth's fresh water. Historically with the nation's defense focused on the southern borders, the Amazon has moved from being a military backwater in 1950 with about 1,000 soldiers widely separated throughout the region to having the garrison force of 27,000 today. This is, of course, a small number to defend nearly 61% of national territory or 5.2 million Sq. Kms. From 1948 to 1976 the army had what it called a *Grupamento de Elementos de Fronteira* commanding its few troops from Manaus. It was transferred to Belém from 1957 to 1969. On being returned to Manaus it was restyled the *Comando Militar da Amazônia*.²⁵

In 1964, to deal with the region's defense

the army began preparations to create a jungle warfare training center in Manaus.²⁶ Its first course in 1966 was the beginning of a long reorientation of the army from a southern emphasis to a northern one. In 1985 the army announced its Northern Corridor (*Calha Norte*) project to gain more control of the region's borders. The idea was to establish a series of platoon sized posts (80 soldiers each) from Cayenne (French Guiana) all along the borders to Bolivia. Infantry battalions from Cruz Alta and Santa Angelo in Rio Grande do Sul were moved north to become jungle units. In 1992 the First Brigade of Motorized Infantry was transferred from Petrópolis-RJ to Boa Vista, Roraima where it transformed itself into jungle infantry. It was a vast project that is still in progress, but now includes 25 *Pelotões Especiais da Fronteira* (PEF) under the brigade headquarters in Boa Vista, on the Rio Branco river in Roraima, which also has an infantry battalion there and another in São Gabriel da Cachoeira on the Rio Negro in Amazonas. (See map flags labeled ESP) The platoons are usually commanded by lieutenants.²⁷ Twenty-eight more units are planned by 2022 at an estimated cost of *Reais* \$8.5 million per platoon.²⁸ The posts are under

²⁴ *O Defesa Net*, 16 de Agosto, 2012 (Brasília) "RICA, EXTENSA E VULNERÁVEL, AMAZÔNIA É PREOCUPAÇÃO NÚMERO 1 DO EXERCITO."

²⁵ Enzo Martins Peri (Commander of the Army), Testimony before the Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee, Federal Senate, Diário do Senado Federal - Suplemento (Brasília: 2007), p. 726.
<http://www.senado.gov.br/sf/publicacoes/diarios/pdf/sf/2007/11/011.br/sf/publicacoes/diarios/pdf/sf/2007/11/011>


²⁶ The *Centro de Instrução de Guerra na Selva* (CIGS) has earned an international reputation for the quality of its jungle warfare training. See "Guerra na Selva" <http://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/guerra-na-selva/platb/>. "Guerreiros do Brasil" <http://www.vidoevo.com/yvideo.php?i=eGNhOV9acWuRpT1B2TFU&guerreiros-do-brasil-jornal-da-record-10-08-09;> Antônio Eleutério Sucena do Carmo, "CIGS – Centro de Instrução de Guerra na Selva," *Revista do Exército Brasileiro*, Vol. 135 (3o Trimestre de 1998), 29-35. There is considerable information and photographs in the army's *Verde-Oliva*, Ano XLII, No. 225 (Outubro 2014), pp. 6-33. <http://pt.calameo.com/read/001238206a0f69eb7b9f0>

²⁷ I visited the PEF's in Pacaraima (BV-8) and Surucucu (1994), the PEF in Bom Fim (1995) and the brigade headquarters in Boa Vista (1994 & 95). For a breakdown of the command structure and location of units see Adriana Aparecida Marques, "Amazônia: Pensamento e presença militar" (Tese, Doutor em Ciência Política, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), pp. 77-87.

²⁸ Some of the estimates for when this will be completed say 2030.
<http://www.ternuma.com.br/index.php/parameditar/178-xiv-encontro-nacional-de-oficiais-da-reserva-do-exercito-xiv->

five Special Frontier Command/ Jungle Infantry Battalions, with headquarters from west to east in Tabatinga, Rio Branco, São Gabriel da Cachoeira, Boa Vista, and Macapá. Each battalion is supposed to be an operational maneuver unit. All toll these units amount to 27,000 soldiers for this vast region.²⁹

Fig. 4 Ordem de Batalha



Source: MARQUES, 2007, p. 81.

Some Brazilian environmental scholars have wondered why so few troops have been stationed in this enormous strategically important region. Professors Tássio Franchi, Marcel Bursztyn, José Augusto Leitão Drummond have argued that a greater presence of the armed forces “could contribute to the defense and even to the development of the region. The increased military presence and its supportive activities could contribute to the wellbeing of the less favored populations of the

region.”³⁰

Perhaps such a positive attitude from scholars has persuaded the army command to offer a friendly hand to Brazilian academics by opening the frontier posts as support bases for scientific research. On March 18, 2015, General Theophilo Gaspar de Oliveira, commander of the Amazônia region, met with academics at the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia in Manaus to discuss a project that he called Antártica Verde (verde = green). The name is intended as a humorous tease aimed at the Navy in response to its Amazônia Azul (Blue Amazon) project of coastal defense. Just as the Navy’s Antarctic research program (Proantar) has carried Brazilian scientists to the frozen continent since 1982, Antártica Verde would bring scientists from throughout Brazil to the long strip of frontier. General Theophilo wants the scientists to conduct their research in order to expand and deepen knowledge of the region’s extreme diversities. He noted that the Army can only defend and develop what is known and understood. He offered the logistical support of the Frontier Platoons, along with assistance from the Air Force and Navy “so that we can know Amazônia better.” Aside from the obvious public relations benefit for the Army, such a program would give researchers access to areas

[enorex](http://www.enorex.org.br) . Miguel Patrice Philippe Dhenin, Presença na Faixa de Fronteira? O Dilema dos Pelotões Especiais de Fronteira no Combate Contra as “Novas Ameças” warned against the possibility of funding cuts by future governments that would imperil completion of the program and difficulties related to relations with native peoples (such as at Marutá, Amazônia, with the Yanomami). <http://www.seer.ufrgs.br/rbed/article/download/48991/30698> .

²⁹ http://www.photius.com/countries/brazil/national_security/brazil_national_security_the_military_mission~275.html. O Defesa Net, 16 de Agosto, 2012 (Brasília) “RICA, EXTENSA E VULNERÁVEL, AMAZÔNIA É PREOCUPAÇÃO NÚMERO 1 DO EXÉRCITO.” For a brief, accurate account of the army in the Amazon see Luis Bitencourt, “The importance of the Amazon Basin in Brazil’s Evolving Security Agenda,” in Joseph S. Tulchin and Heather A. Golding, eds. *Environment and Security in the Amazon Basin* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002), 62-67.

³⁰ Tássio Franchi , Marcel Bursztyn , José Augusto Leitão Drummond, “A questão ambiental e o adensamento da presença do Exército Brasileiro na Amazônia Legal no final do século XX,” *Novos Cadernos NAEA* v. 14, n. 1, (jun. 2011) p. 21-41. Quotation from p. 38.

hitherto beyond their reach.³¹

How does the army see its presence in Amazonia?

It is responding to the “urgent necessity of integrating it into the national environment and articulating it with our neighbors, who also share this *patrimônio*.” The Brazilian Army’s website says that it has been in Amazonia since the beginning of the 17th century, thereby claiming continuity from colonial days to the present.³² Embracing the Portuguese past is a way of emphasizing that if this centuries- old patrimony is not settled and defended it could be lost to aggressive foreigners. The imagery of Portuguese conquest and defense makes nice press copy and morale-raising hoopla or drama, but it somewhat distorts the history of the army in the region. The imagined continuity from Portuguese to Brazilian defense of the region has a debatable historical foundation. Celso Castro and Adriana Barreto de Souza see this projection of a supposed “past into the future, as a strategy of constructing an institutional identity as a source of inspiration for concrete actions.”³³ However, the armed forces are not trying to be

historically accurate, they are adopting “the geopolitical vision of the Portuguese” employing the PEF posts as modern versions of the colonial era Portuguese forts. Eventual settlements around the PEF posts will create the desired living frontier further contributing to the defense of Brazilian possession.³⁴

Massaging the history may heighten pride in the mission but it carries an undercurrent of fear that stimulates a wary protective posture.³⁵ The army portrays its role in the region as pioneering and trail-blazing (*desbravador*), while “preserving, developing, and protecting” it. Pointing to the frontier platoons the army declares that they “are poles of development, around which, as in the past, a core of population grows, guaranteeing Brazilian

presence and our sovereignty. This is the principal motive [that] national priority confers on our Amazônia that it guides the manifest destiny of Brazil. Collaborating with the peopling of far off areas providing a minimum of infrastructure by furnishing basic services until development arrives; this silent work is a small part of the army’s collaboration in the Nation’s development.”³⁶

³¹ Defesa Net, Brasília, 20 de Março, 2015, “Comando Militar da Amazônia apresenta projeto Antártica Verde” <http://www.defesenet.com.br/toa/noticia/18471/Comando-Militar-da-Amazonia-apresenta-projeto-Antartica-Verde/>

³² <http://www.eb.mil.br/amazonia> .”O Exército, presente na Amazônia desde o início do século XVII ”

³³ Celso Castro com Adriana Barreto de Souza, “A Defesa Militar da Amazônia: Entre História e Memória” in Celso Castro, *Exército e nação: Estudos sobre a História do Exército Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2012), pp.177-228; quotation is from p. 221.

³⁴ Adriana Aparecida Marques, “O Exército na Amazônia: construindo estratégias e mitos,” *PALAGUÁS* vol. 01, nº2 (jul-dez -2015), p.40. <http://200.129.202.50/index.php/revpauas/article/view/1444/942>

³⁵ For deeper examination of military attitudes toward the region and its inhabitants see Adriana Aparecida Marques, “Amazônia: pensamento e presença militar” (Tese de doutorado em Ciência Política, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007), pp. 45-59. https://cpdoc.fgv.br/sites/default/files/militares-amazonia/txt_AdrianaMarques.pdf

³⁶ I added the emphasis to “until development arrives.” The original Portuguese reads: “Tudo isso deixa evidenciado que a Amazônia é, já há muito tempo, área estratégica de alto interesse para os brasileiros. Impõe-se a urgente necessidade de integrá-la ao ambiente nacional e articulá-la com os nossos vizinhos, também depositários desse patrimônio. Este é o motivo principal da prioridade nacional hoje emprestada à nossa Amazônia. Para ela orienta-se o destino manifesto do Brasil. ... Colaborando com o povoamento em áreas longínquas, proporcionando um mínimo de infraestrutura até que chegue o desenvolvimento, fornecendo serviços básicos, este trabalho silencioso é a parcela concreta de colaboração do Exército ao desenvolvimento da Nação”. <http://www.eb.mil.br/amazonia>

The idea for such frontier military posts has its origins in the 19th century military colonies that the Brazilian empire used to extend its reach into the frontier zones of that day.³⁷ Critics argued that today's outposts at strategic locations were intended "as bridgeheads for future settlement projects. To fill up the area with Brazilian colonists was their idea of inhibiting foreign craving for Amazonia." The critics feared that such posts would hasten deforestation and destruction of the native peoples.³⁸ The frequent appearance of the word 'development' in official statements does seem to support the critics' charge.

The Army's high-sounding phrases are not the likely only driving force behind its northern reorientation. When the PEF posts at Normandia and Bomfim in Roraima were established in 1969 there was no similar Guyanese military presence at Lethem on the other side of the Rio Tacutu, but there was worrisome leftist political activity in the neighboring country. However, as late as 1997 it took at least five days of difficult travel in specially reinforced trucks to make the journey from Georgetown to Lethem. Research is showing that the basin of the Rio Tacutu that lies between Brazil and Guiana has petroleum.³⁹ So it is prudent to secure the area. The basin is now more accessible thanks to the gravel road to the coast, which has reduced the trip from days to

eight to twelve hours by bus.

The three frontier platoon posts in the west of Roraima at *Surucucu* (1987), *Ericó*, and *Anaris* were built a few kilometers away from the Venezuelan boundary which slashes unseen through jungle, but they are in the midst of the Yanomami population that exists on both sides of the borderline. An old Brazilian military concern is that this transnational indigenous population could one day coalesce into a Yanomami nation that could claim lands from both Brazil and Venezuela.⁴⁰

These same Yanomami lands are rich in minerals so it is not difficult to imagine *Calha Norte*, as did Anthropologist Bruce Albert, "as a project for 'bringing poles of development into the interior' under military control, [revolving] around a strategy to reduce Indian territories in order to facilitate the access of large-scale mining companies and placer-mining groups to the deposits located in these lands." Albert further charged that "Under its nationalist rhetoric of border protection against external threats, the *Calha Norte* Project thus consists of a traditional combination in Brazilian Amazonian development – large-scale mining investments, Indian land reduction and political control."⁴¹

The question of the purpose of the frontier posts is intriguing, and has likely changed over time. Surucucu proved of some

³⁷ David L. Wood, "Abortive Panacea: Brazilian Military Settlements, 1850-1913" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Utah, 1972); General Carlos de Meira Mattos, *Geopolítica e teoria de fronteiras: Fronteiras do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1990), pp. 104-108.

³⁸ Alcida Rita Ramos, *Sanumá: Yanomami Ethnography in Times of Crisis* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p.276.

³⁹ I toured Roraima extensively in 1997 and 1998, including the Guyanese border area, thanks to the Universidade Federal de Roraima. Rebecca Santoro, "Corredor estratégico da Amazônia é causa de cobiça, Roraima concentra minérios nobres e até petróleo, e essa riqueza atrai a cobiça internacional." *Notícias Agência Amazônia*, 24 de Outubro de 2008. <http://ti.socioambiental.org/noticia/61763>.

⁴⁰ For the clash between military thinking and Yanomami sensibilities see Ramos, *Sanumá*, pp.287-289, 286-297.

⁴¹ Bruce Albert, "Indian Lands, Environmental Policy and Military Geopolitics in the Development of the Brazilian Amazon: The Case of the Yanomami," *Development and Change*, Vol. 23 (1992), pp. 35-70. First quotation is from p.52, the second from p.54. Albert was a researcher at the *Institut Français de Recherche Scientifique pour le Développement en Coopération* (Orstom) in Paris. <http://www.documentation.ird.fr/hor/fdi:35009>

value in eliminating the thousands of gold miners who invaded Yanomami lands in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Of course, it seems to have attracted some of them in the first place.⁴² The mission of the post at Pacaraima (also referred to as BV-8) on the highway into Venezuela from Boa Vista is clearer in that it guards the only paved road between the two countries. Each of the PEF posts is self-sufficient to some extent. They have their own power and water supply, their own medical doctor and dentist, a bakery, small scale gardens for fresh greens, along with goats, pigs, and cows. The troops are largely from Macuxi and Wapixana indigenous groups in eastern Roraima.⁴³ Indeed it is army policy to recruit local natives to garrison the posts wherever possible.⁴⁴ According to General Luiz Sérgio Goulart Duarte, commander of the 2ª *Brigada de Infantaria de Selva* (São Gabriel da Cachoeira) in 2012, of the 1400 soldiers then on the frontier with Colombia and Venezuela, 70% were indigenous.⁴⁵ Most of these rarely rise above simple soldiers and are not allowed to serve more than eight years. The relations between the platoons and the neighboring villages of Yanomami, Kuripako, Tukano, and Maku peoples is fraught with ethnic, religious, and

sexual tensions that complicate the situation.⁴⁶

In the 1990s there was considerable objection, as the above quotation from Albert suggests, to the posts by anthropologists, environmentalists, and NGOs who interpreted the army's presence as contributing to destruction of the rainforests and harmful to the indigenous peoples. The heated international commentary about deforestation and the suggestion of some foreign leaders that perhaps planetary climate change trumped national sovereignty put Brazilian leaders on edge. In 1989, then American Senator Al Gore declared "Contrary to what Brazilians think, the Amazon is not their property; it belongs to all of us."⁴⁷ The Brazilian response was quick; "the Amazon is ours" became the rallying cry. Rumors that the United States wanted to establish bases in neighboring countries agitated the mood even further. In addition, the army found itself in the middle of an intense struggle over land between indigenous Macuxi and Wapixana peoples and Brazilian land grabbers in the Raposa Serra do

⁴² On the gold rush into Yanomami lands see Gordon MacMillan, *At the End of the Rainbow? Gold, Land and People in the Brazilian Amazon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), for the site's attraction, pp.36-37. For photos of the wildcat mining see <http://www.boccacciophoto.com/amazongold/chapters/chapter3.pdf>. The PEF post at Surucucu was distant from the miners' invasion, as it was located 300 km from the key *Paapiu garimpo*.

⁴³ For a description of the jungle units see <http://www.militarypower.com.br/tropas.htm>. From the published reports it does not appear that any indigenous have been persuaded to enter officer training.

⁴⁴ Luis Kawaguti (BBC Brasil), "Índigenas ajudam Exército a defender fronteira do Brasil," 16 de agosto de 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2012/08/120815_militares_indios_lk.shtml.

⁴⁵ Luis Kawaguti (BBC Brasil), "Prestígio e dinheiro atraem índios para a carreira militar," 16 de agosto de 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2012/08/120815_soldado_indio_lk.shtml.

⁴⁶ Roberta Mélega, *Uma Crônica da relação índios e militares na Cabeça de Cachorro (AM)*. <http://www.socioambiental.org/esp/indiose militares/robertamelega.htm>.

⁴⁷ Alexei Barrionuevo, "Whose Rainforest Is This Anyway? Week in Review, *The New York Times*, May 18, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/weekinreview/18barrionuevo.html?_r=0. The posters that decorated American college dormitory walls showing scenes of the Amazonian rainforest under the label "Our Rainforest" conveyed the same idea.

Sol in northeastern Roraima.⁴⁸ In 1990 the *Escola Superior de Guerra* developed a document that looked ahead a decade at the “The Structure of National Power” and raised the possibility of war against international pressures to preserve “anthropological cysts” in Brazil. The commander of the Amazonian military region warned that the foreign pressures could turn the Amazon into a huge Vietnam.⁴⁹ In February 1991, the FARC incursion into the northwestern Amazon (Rio Traíra) was an alert that threats would not necessarily only come from nation states. And, of course, it pointedly confirmed the need for frontier troops. Even so some foreign scholars saw the Brazilian military as “an institution in search of a mission” to justify a claim on the national budget.⁵⁰

The American-led response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait startled and worried the Brazilian military. If it could happen there, why could it not happen in Amazônia? In 1993, an incident during joint United States-Guyana military exercises in the distant coastal region stimulated Brazilian concerns. A U.S. Marine helicopter landed at Lethem in Guyana opposite Bomfim, carelessly entering Brazilian air space briefly to make the landing. There is no way to properly land at that field without momentarily flying through Brazilian airspace. The PEF commander at Bomfim radioed Brigade

Headquarters in Boa Vista, which called Brasília. The Americans had failed to ask permission or even to inform the Brazilians of their visit to Lethem. It was all innocent, if sloppy, but the Brazilians responded with heated protests at the violation of their skies. The response may have been further stimulated by American joint exercises with Colombia and Suriname. In October 1994, perhaps to underline their seriousness, the Brazilians staged a massive field exercise involving 3,000 army troops. The air force dropped 700 paratroopers and flew in ground units; the navy provided logistical support with riverine patrol boats. They wanted to show that the armed forces were resolute about defending the borders and that the Americans had to show respect for Brazilian sovereignty. This came at a time when the American presence in neighboring countries, especially Colombia, was raising questions about Washington’s intentions.⁵¹ How much staying power the Brazilian worry about foreign interest in Amazonia will have is uncertain. Brazilian academics have questioned the validity of such fears.⁵² However, reports concerning American projections about future food requirements

⁴⁸ <http://Amazon\Fazendas expanding in Roraima.htm>; Ben Penglase, “Brazil: Violence Against the Macuxi and Wapixana Indians in Raposa Serra do Sol and Northern Roraima from 1988 to 1994”, *Human Rights Watch*, Vol. VI, No. 7 (June 1994).

⁴⁹ General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, chief of the Comando Militar da Amazonia was extremely concerned about “internationalization” of the region. His successor in 1992 softened the heated commentary. For news stories see *Folha de São Paulo*, May 29, 1990 and *Correio Brasiliense* (Brasília), June 18, 1991.

⁵⁰ Daniel Airker and Marvin Henberg, “Amazonia: Democracy, Ecology, and Brazilian Military Prerogatives in the 1990s,” *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter 1994), pp. 260 & 270.

⁵¹ Rex A. Hudson, ed. *Brazil: A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1998), 367-369. Worries about the intentions of the United States are complicated. <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/19/world/brazil-s-army-casts-us-as-amazon-villain.html>.

⁵² Andréa Zhouri, “O fantasma da internacionalização da Amazônia revisitado Ambientalismo, direitos humanos e indígenas na perspectiva de militares e políticos brasileiros,” XXVI Encontro Anual da ANPOCS Paineis GT11 - O desenvolvimento sustentável em questão na Amazônia brasileira, Caxambu, outubro de 2002.

contribute to such worries.⁵³

Slowly the Brazilian army's thinking regarding Amazonian defense evolved to recognize that it could not repel an attack by a superior military power such as the United States, so it studied its own 1970s confrontation with guerrillas in the Araguaia region, and the experience of the Vietnamese in defeating the French and the Americans, and concluded that it could mount a defense by creating an extensive guerrilla operation to wear down an invader. The army sees guerrilla warfare as having been a major feature of Brazilian military history. An early proponent of this *Lassitude* strategy, Colonel Álvaro de Souza Pinheiro, observed in the 1990s that to give Brazilian soldiers and population the necessary moral support for a long-duration campaign "all foreign elements" would have to be removed from Brazilian territory. He did not explain which foreign elements or how they would be removed. But he did say that when the enemy had "suffered sufficient losses and the cost-benefit ratio is no longer in favor of action, the resolve for action will weaken. This will be the preponderant factor for the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Brazilian territory." He pointed out that while American Special Forces have experience working with foreign populations, the Brazilian Special Forces would "work with internal Brazilian populations – in a resistance movement environment – when an invasion

threat to Brazilian territory occurs."⁵⁴ What such an approach would mean for American military planners is an open question, attrition-style strategies appear to be the wave of the future.⁵⁵ The Brazilian notion seems similar to the warfare in Afghanistan over the past decade. As difficult as it is to imagine an American invasion of Brazil, it is understandable that some Brazilians could conceive of such a thing.

NGOs seen as danger or a reason for nervousness

As odd as it may seem to Americans, the Brazilian military say that their fear is not invasion or war in the region as much as it is the negative influence of unspecified NGOs that could "foment separatism, the illegal sale of indigenous lands, the unwarranted appropriation of forest resources by foreigners, in addition impeding the region's development." General Walmir Almeda Schneider Filho of the Army's General Staff, who is responsible for monitoring situations that could become national crises, commented: "We work with risks. You don't necessarily have to invade Amazônia to control it. We think that some NGOs in Amazônia are problematic; we do not have control of them. And there is the selling of great plots of public

⁵³ Alexandre Fuccille, "Amazônia e Defesa Nacional: um olhar a partir da perspectiva brasileira," *PALAGUÁS* vol. 01, nº2 – jul-dez-2015, p.132. <http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpauaguas/article/download/1532/1129>.

⁵⁴ Colonel Álvaro de Souza Pinheiro, "Guerrillas in the Brazilian Amazon," *Military Review*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 2 (March-April 1996), pp.39-55. Quotes are from p. 54. He noted that American and Brazilian Special Forces had the same employment concept, namely that they would "establish unconventional warfare operational areas."

⁵⁵ See comment on Colonel Alvaro's article by Col. William W. Mendel, US Army Ret., "Significance of Brazilian Strategic Thinking," *Military Review*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 2 (March-April 1996), pp.51-53. For a broader statement of the colonel's views see his "Vision of the Brazilian National Security Policy on the Amazon," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 3, Nº. 3 (Winter 1994), pp. 387-409. [Http://ForeignMilitaryStudiesOfficePublications - A Vision of the Brazilian National Security Policy on the Amazon.htm](http://ForeignMilitaryStudiesOfficePublications-AVisionoftheBrazilianNationalSecurityPolicyontheAmazon.htm). For an American army view see William W. Mendel, "The Brazilian Amazon: Controlling the Hydra," *Military Review*, July-August 1999. <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/hydra/hydra.htm>.

lands to businessmen of other countries.”⁵⁶ In 2008 the Army estimated that there were 350 NGOs active in the region.


The level of nervousness is quite high. The military saw the seemingly innocuous U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) as threatening the “Balkanization of the Amazon” provoking the *Clube Militar* to issue a rebuttal entitled “Sovereignty at Risk.” The regional commander in 2012 General Eduardo Villas-Boas commented that the absence of the Brazilian state in Amazônia was the main reason that the region was the army’s principal concern. General Villas Bôas emphasized that Amazonia was not yet incorporated into Brazil and that budgetary allocations for the armed forces in the area were inadequate. His new position as Army Commander (March 2015) will give him more ability to encourage heightened attention to the Amazon region.⁵⁷

SIVAM Sistema de Vigilância Amazônia

One part of the Brazilian response to international anxiety about Amazônia has been to get more detailed information about what is going on in the region. Because much of its expanse had poor to non-existent air-traffic control, the government launched the System for the protection of Amazônia (*SIPAM*) that had as one of its components the *SIVAM*. Its objectives were to gather real time data that would allow better control over the environment, regional development, vigilance of rivers, roads, jungle, air-traffic control, response coordination in emergencies, monitoring of

weather conditions, and control of smuggling. It required construction of radar and telecommunications sites throughout Amazonia, often in difficult-to-reach locations. As part of *SIPAM*, the Air Force, which is responsible for Brazilian air space and air traffic control, took the lead in creating the *Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (SIVAM)* which is the largest, fully integrated, remote monitoring system in the world.

Fig. 5 SIVAM Sistema de Vigilância Amazônia



Source: <https://site-antigo.socioambiental.org/noticias/nsa/detalhe?id=394>

It supports Brazilian government efforts to control the environment and law enforcement over land, air and water resources. Developed by Raytheon, the system is composed of an extensive network of air traffic control and surveillance radars, environmental sensors, communications systems and airborne sensor systems. It was built between 2002 and 2005 and is fully operational.

It was not surprising that *SIVAM*

⁵⁶ Tahiane Stochero, “Rica, Extensa e vulnerável, Amazônia é preocupação número 1 do Exército,” G1 Brasil, Globo.com, 16/08/2012. <http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2012/08/rica-extensa-e-vulneravel-amazonia-e-preocupacao-numero-1-do-exercito.html>. A Brazilian officer told me he saw a European Union flag displayed in Yanomani territory near the Venezuelan border and that an Italian there objected to military entering the indigenous area. Communication from Colonel Eduardo de Souza Pereira, EB retired, Sept. 25, 2015.

⁵⁷ Pablo Scuticchio, “Brazil’s New Army Chief: The Challenges Ahead,” *Strife* (King’s College London), Feb. 9, 2015 <http://strifeblog.org/2015/02/09/brazils-new-army-chief-the-challenges-ahead/>

became the focus of controversies that raised doubts, worries, and basic questions about creating such infrastructure. Aside from the high costs of the program there were passionate arguments about the role of the national government versus private enterprise and national technology versus foreign. A major problem for Brazilian nationalists was the agreement with the American company Raytheon, which was deeply connected to the American government. Brazilian scientists criticized the project as Pharaonic, recalling the Transamazonian road; they labeled this a “Transamazônica eletrônica”. It was not viable, they argued, and worse it was a serious risk to involve foreigners in national security. They admitted the need for technically sophisticated surveillance, but said it should be controlled and run by the national intelligence service. Brazilian scientists and national technology should be used to extend, they argued, the Air Force’s *Sindacta* system over all of Brazil, cancel the Raytheon accord and keep the system fully under national control. Going ahead would create an unnecessary layer of dependence, economically, technologically, and geopolitically on the United States.⁵⁸ Perhaps some critics were mollified by Raytheon’s partnering with Brazilian firms on subprojects.⁵⁹ For example, the surveillance planes used to observe gaps in the radar coverage are *Embraer* aircraft (ERJ 145). They fly out of the airbase at Anápolis, Goiás, on a

twenty-four hour basis. As a bonus the system provides secure satellite communications, including computer, telephone, and fax connectivity to many remote locations where land-based communications do not exist.⁶⁰ The days of the isolated platoon struggling to communicate by short-wave radio are likely to be soon gone. And the remote-sensing capabilities of the system have greatly increased information as to what is taking place locally and region-wide.⁶¹

The uneasiness about supposed foreign covetousness (*cobiça*) of the Amazon continues to be mixed into Brazilian policy-making regarding the region. It adds heightened emotionalism to already difficult questions. Seeing the region as being under constant but vague foreign threat may not result in the best problem analysis. The region has become a route from the Andean countries for drug trafficking, not only to the United States, but also into Brazil itself and onward to Africa and Europe. The control of illicit cutting of valuable timber and illegal wildcat mining is extremely difficult. In June 2011, to gain better control over the borders the government started a border patrol plan that actively involved the military in policing the frontiers with targeted temporary operations. They are coordinated by the Joint Staff of the armed forces involving the Navy, Army, Air Force, eight ministries, 20 regulatory agencies, and federal, state and municipal

⁵⁸ Sivam - Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia, 26 de julho de 2002.

<http://www.frigoletto.com.br/GeoFis/Amazonia/sivam.htm>. The system reportedly cost \$1 Billion, 400,000. Humberto José Lourenço, “A Defesa Nacional e a Amazônia: O Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (SIVAM)” (Tese de Mestrado em Ciência Política, Universidade Estadual de Campinas – UNICAMP, 2003), pp. 61-107. Brazil shares collected data with neighboring countries.

⁵⁹ There have been suspicions in Brazil that Raytheon won the contract by bribing officials.

⁶⁰ A Brazilian company ATECH is also involved. A good description of the system is in Raytheon’s *Technology Today*, 2011, Issue 2 http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/technology_today/2011_i2/sivam.html. For much of the Amazon region SIVAM is revolutionary.

⁶¹ The Ministry of Defense and the three services are much better informed. <http://www.sipam.gov.br/assuntos/sensoriamento-remoto>.

entities. Military units conduct check points on roads, patrol rivers and creeks, and inspect airfields. The objective is to reduce drug and weapons trafficking, animal and timber contraband from neighboring countries, among other crimes.

In 2011 the armed forces held a massive operation called Agata 3 in the border areas of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Rondônia to “suffocate” the drug trade and to destroy illicit mining sites and landing strips. The following year Agata 4 saw 8,700 troops carry out a similar operation along the frontier with Venezuela, Guiana, Suriname and French Guiana. Military thinkers consider that 5,500 kms long section the weak stretch of the Amazonian frontier because it has relatively few garrisons. To head off apprehension in the neighboring countries the Brazilians sent officers to explain that they were dealing with lawlessness on their side of the borders. Such operations combine the three services and justify government expenditures, but whether they represent the best use of scarce money is debatable. They continue to be held, sometimes as bi-national operations.⁶²

Recruitment

Brazil’s system of recruitment faces challenges. It has been basically the same since

1916 when Obligatory Military Service went into effect.⁶³ All eighteen-year-old males must register for a lottery-style draft. The idea is to fill spaces not covered by volunteers. The system is under military control throughout the country. Penalties and benefits encourage compliance. Those called up serve for a year in a local army unit. For decades the navy and, after 1941, the air force did not benefit from the system, but today some of their recruits enter via the *Sorteio*. About 3,405,000 males reach military age annually, and Brazil’s 328,000- sized armed forces have no way of absorbing even a small percentage of that number. There are many exemptions, such as being a university student, so most just get their registration card, swear allegiance to the flag and have no more direct contact with military service. However they are legally subject to convocation in a national emergency. Women and clergy are not required to register.

The number of recruits selected each year depends on the spaces to be filled in local units. Each regiment, battalion, etc. draws its conscripts from the area surrounding the unit. This gives army units a very local, regional flavor. There are no national or regional training camps that could homogenize and standardize training. All training is carried out in the local garrison. The system has the advantage of keeping the

⁶² Luis Kawaguti, “Forças Armadas fazem mega-operação na Amazônia” 2 de Mayo de 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2012/05/120501_operacao_militar_amazonia_1k.shtml. It is not known how successful Agata operations have been in suppressing lawlessness. Intensifying surveillance of explosives smuggling was the main focus of Ágata 5 in August 2012 along the borders with Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia. See “New Edition of Operation Ágata Focuses on Supervision of Explosives”, *Diálogo: Digital Military Magazine, Forum of the Americas*, August 8, 2012, http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2012/08/08/feature-ex-3381.

⁶³ Frank D. McCann, “The Nation in Arms: Obligatory Military Service During the Old Republic” in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean, eds., *Essays Concerning the Socio-Economic History of Brazil and Portuguese India* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1977), 211-243. Celso Castro, *Exército e nação: Estudos sobre a História do Exército Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2012), pp.53-82. The question of why the recruitment model has endured was studied by Paulo Roberto Loyolla Kuhlmann, “O Serviço Militar, Democracia e Defesa Nacional: Razões da Permanência do Modelo de Recrutamento no Brasil” (Dissertação, Departamento de Ciências Política, Universidade de São Paulo, 2001), for history pp.56-77; Álvaro de Souza Pinheiro, “Serviço Militar: obrigatório ou voluntário?” *PADECEME* Rio de Janeiro N° 14 (1º quadrim. 2007), pp. 84-91.

recruits close to home and of giving the units a local face, which in some fashion may make its presence more acceptable. The training is conducted on a yearly cycle that is supposed to turn the civilian teenager into a combat-ready soldier with a clearer understanding of his role as a citizen. However it makes for some unevenness in the quality of training. How uniformity and quality control is insured is not known.

The Falklands/Malvinas war supposedly convinced the Brazilians that they could not depend fully on the draft short-term volunteer system and there have been efforts to staff some units with professionals. This trend increased onward from the 1990s. One of the problems is that Brazil's labor laws give permanency after 10 years employment. This makes it difficult to dismiss a soldier – a government worker – after that length of time. The paratrooper units and ready-deployment units have professionals. But there is a long history in the army that regards professional enlisted ranks as potential threats to discipline and so traditionally enlisted military careers are relatively short. Unfortunately this aspect of the army does not seem to have been well studied by outside researchers. There has been an effort to vary training schedules so that some units are considered ready when others are just beginning their training. It is not clear when during a typical year the whole Brazilian army could be considered trained and ready. There is certainly insufficient political will to create fully professional armed forces.

At the end of the year of service, the soldiers are released into a huge pool of reservists. Currently it is about 1,800,000 strong. As reservists they are to be available for call-up for a period of five years. Brazil does not have an organized reserve in which reserve units maintain training and readiness. Each year units recall a number of reservists for refresher courses and to participate in an operation. The theory is that in an emergency reservists could be called back to active duty from the reserve pool. There has not been a full-scale call-up so it is not known if it would actually work. But to maintain contact reservists are required to report to the units where they served their active duty for a mobilization exercise each December.⁶⁴

While Brazil does not have an organized reserve force such as exists in the United States it does have an extensive territorial guard, known as the *Tiros de Guerra* numbering some 233 units with a reported total of 66,000 members called riflemen or marksmen.⁶⁵ Participation in a *Tiro* unit satisfies the obligatory military service requirement. The young men experience 24 weeks of training for 12 hours a week.⁶⁶ The army considers them to be its 2d Class reserve. The *Tiro* units are spread all over the country in sponsoring municipalities. They train early in the morning so that they can work the rest of the day. They are led and trained in basic military skills by resident sergeants. The army can use them in situations that do not require long-term fully operational units. They extend the army's ability to deepen the public's awareness of military practices and provide a valuable

⁶⁴ See *Guia do Reservista*, (10) 'Disponibilidade'; http://dsm.dgp.eb.mil.br/images/phocadownload/destaque/guia_reservista.pdf. For all the rules see <http://dsm.dgp.eb.mil.br/index.php/servico-militar>.

⁶⁵ The *Tiro* marksmen date from 1906. McCann, "The Nation in Arms ..."(full citation in note 58), pp226-228, 237-238. For a detailed history of the *Tiros* down to recent years see Selma Lúcia de Moura Gonzales, "*A territorialidade militar terrestre no Brasil: Os Tiros de Guerra e a estratégia de presença*" (Diss. Doutor em Geografia, Universidade de São Paulo, 2008), pp.123-144. She surveyed 158 *Tiro* units in 21 states.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.144. Rather than the 40 weeks of training mentioned in the documentation it normally lasts 24 weeks, allowing two groups to be trained in a year. I thank Colonel Eduardo de Souza Pereira for this detail.

presence at the community level. In theory the *Tiros* act as a locally based dissuasive force. Annually the army reportedly holds exercises involving *Tiros* and regular units in territorial defense. Their continuity depends on the locality's leadership to insure that the provided building, rifle range, and housing for the instructors are properly maintained and that there is a sufficient number of recruits.⁶⁷

The best study of the *Tiros de Guerra* suggested that make-work and civic activities took up a considerable part of available time producing frustration among the recruits and weakening military training per se. Municipalities arrange technical training (or in Amazonia instruction in agriculture and fishing) to prepare the young men for future employment.⁶⁸ Such non-military activity has to be detrimental to the army's goals. The *Tiros* could be considered as more a civic than a military organization. Of course the emphasis on citizenship, patriotism, and love of Brazil mixed with even less than perfect military training would contribute to the strategy of resistance against a more powerful invader.

Centros & Núcleos de Preparação de Oficiais da Reserva

An interesting aspect of the history of

the Brazilian officer corps that has not attracted sufficient study has been the existence of temporary officers and the CPOR training program. Some of these officers are technical specialists who are recruited for specific tasks, but the largest group are graduates of the *Centros* and *Núcleos* that prepare reserve officers (R-2). To be eligible the candidates must be native-born university students. The program dates from the late 1920s and was a way for elite males to satisfy their military service obligation away from the typical barracks and among fellows of their own social-economic class. It has been attractive because they could serve without interrupting their studies. The program trained them for any of the combat arms and services, and could be completed in 45 weeks. Its graduates are then distributed to active units as needed. There are centers in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Recife, and Porto Alegre, as well as in 45 *Núcleos* associated with units throughout Brazil.⁶⁹ The *Núcleos* are located in certain units where they are trained to become officers in a particular branch, such as infantry, and then to serve in the training unit as lieutenants. The CPORs are proud of the fact that a third of the lieutenants in the World War II expeditionary force that served with the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy were graduates of the program.

⁶⁷ There is extensive information about the *Tiros* at <http://tirodeguerra.dsm.eb.mil.br/index.php/item/45-conceito-de-tiro-de-guerra-no-brasil>. Undoubtedly such units can provide helpful information on local conditions. To host a *Tiro* unit the municipality agrees to provide a proper facility at its expense. At times units have been closed down when commitments have not been kept. A minimum of 50 is required to keep a unit active. The municipalities have to cover the costs of furniture, light, postage, secretarial assistance. This could amount to a monthly expenditure of R\$ 1,000,000 to R\$9,000,000. Upkeep and maintenance has been a constant source of friction. This leads local residents, who do not know about the *convênio*, to think that the Army is not taking care of the facilities. Selma Lúcia de Moura Gonzales, "A territorialidade militar terrestre no Brasil: Os Tiros...", pp. 164-172.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 218-219. The Brazilian army labels such training as "citizen soldier" preparation. Special training agreements (*convênios*) are made with business oriented groups, such as SENAC.

⁶⁹ For a good overview of a CPOR see Sergio Luiz Tratz & Marcelo Gomes da Silva (organizadores), *CPOR / São Paulo: Escola de líderes* (São Paulo: Elevação, 2008) and Peterson Ferreira da Silva, "Defesa Nacional e Sociedade: Panorama Sobre a Contribuição do atual Centro de Preparação de Oficiais da Reserva de São Paulo," I Simpósio de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais do Programa "San Tiago Dantas" (UNESP, UNICAMP e PUC/SP), 8 a 11 de Novembro de 2011. http://www.santiagodantassp.locaweb.com.br/br/simp/artigos2011/peterson_da_silva.pdf

There appears to be a good rate of completion if 2014's numbers for the center in Rio de Janeiro are an indication. Of the 200 *alunos* who entered, 194 were graduated as reserve *Aspirantes-ao-Oficial*. *Aspirante* is the entry officer rank in the Brazilian system, marking a sort of probation for about ten months prior to promotion to Second Lieutenant. The best rated men are offered the opportunity to join a regular unit for more training and experience after which they are promoted to 2d Lieutenant R-2 and can stay on active duty for five years.⁷⁰ In addition the army offers short-term refresher courses to allow such officers to update their skills.⁷¹ There are 18 state-level alumni associations grouped under a national organization that maintain an active round of social and military events. The army hopes that these temporary officers on returning to civilian life will play leadership roles in society "marked by a commitment of love and dedication to Brazil."⁷² There are also specialized personnel, such as librarians, language teachers, dentists, medical doctors, etc. who pass through a training program to become Temporary Technical Officers.⁷³ To make matters a bit confusing, when officers retire they are said to be in the "reserve." As noted there is no active reserve, such retired "reserve" officers can be called back to duty if needed, but most are not. There is no national guard as in the United States. There are the state-level militarized police forces which are regarded as a reserve force, but their training is that of police dealing with traffic, crowd control and other appropriate policing tasks. Historically

state military police were involved in internal insurrections, but they are not army units. In recent years they have cooperated with the army in regaining control of urban slums (*favelas*) in Rio de Janeiro.

Military Education

Brazil's military education system emphasizes officer preparation, and to a lesser degree training of non-commissioned officers. By contrast to the soldiers the officers and sergeants are distributed from the national level out to the various regions. Some years ago it had been the practice to move officers to different assignments every two years, and to move NCOs every five years. The rotation had the advantage of providing experience throughout the country over the length of a career. But the cost of such movement proved to be too high so that now there is more stability.

Military High Schools (*Colégios Militares*)

An unusual feature of Brazilian military education is that it can start as early as age 14 at the sixth grade level. There are 12 "*Colégios Militares*" scattered throughout the country in large urban centers. A century ago the army created these schools to educate the sons of military men, who might be stationed far from home. They have long served elite civilian families as well. Today, the *Colégios* are coed, highly selective, seemingly well-funded and

⁷⁰ The time limit is related to Brazilian labor laws that insure stability after ten years of employment.

⁷¹ This advanced training is called the Estágio de Preparação de Oficiais Temporários (EIPOT). . <http://www.r2verdeoliva-rj.net.br/ciclo-atualizacao-oficiais-reserva.jpg>

⁷² They provide the army with entry into civilian society. One might say they are militarized civilians. See *Formação Profissional de Oficial R-2*, http://www.cnor.org.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44:r2&catid=3:newsflash&Itemid=6464 R2 R-2 Second Lieutenants might be promoted to First Lieutenant after two years.

⁷³ INSTRUÇÃO E PRAPARAÇÃO PARA OFICIAL TEMPORÁRIO (EIPOT), http://www.cporj.ensino.cb.br/pag_cfor.htm . Such technical officers are called *Oficial Técnico Temporário* or OTT.

carefully staffed by mixed military and civilian faculties. Students wear smart-looking uniforms and are subject to a light form of military discipline. Nationally there are somewhere around 15,000 students in these schools. They are popular and sought-after and have extremely proud and active alumni.⁷⁴

Officer Education

Each of the three services has its own officer training school, offering a university-level education. The army has the *Academia das Agulhas Negras* at Resende, Rio de Janeiro; the navy has its *Escola Naval* on Villegagnon Island in Guanabara Bay at Rio; and the air force its *Academia da Força Aérea* at Pirassununga, São Paulo. The navy views its school as being founded in 1782 in Lisbon and being transferred to Rio de Janeiro with the fleeing Portuguese court in 1808⁷⁵ In any case its current facilities date from 1938. The three schools are the main entries into the regular officer corps of the Armed Forces.⁷⁶ There are no Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) or college-based Reserve Officer Training programs that allow entry into a regular officer career. There are the CPOR centers mentioned above that form “reserve” officers, but graduates can remain on active duty for only five years, they are not allowed to pursue a full

career. This reserve officer training system has existed since the 1920s. It is noteworthy that a full reserve system, complete with reserve units has not been established. The veterans of the CPOR have formed associations all over the country and look to play an active role in alerting the public to Brazil’s defense needs.⁷⁷

Women were first admitted into the armed forces in the early 1980s. The Brazilian army was the first in South America to accept women. They had to have a bachelor’s degree and were admitted by competitive examination into the Army’s School of Administration in Salvador for a one-year course leading to the rank of first lieutenant. They were part of the Army’s *Quadro Complementar de Oficiais* and assigned to managerial duties, often in Brasília. Gradually the opportunities for women in the military are expanding. In 1991 the Navy and Air Force had about 3,200 female officers and enlisted. In 1996 the Air Force began taking women into its academy.⁷⁸ Soon all three service academies will have female students.

Air Force Academy Pirassununga

Upon entering the Pirassununga academy each new class goes through six months of basic training that involves field exercises, a parachute jump, instruction in

⁷⁴ There are Colegios in Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Campo Grande, Fortaleza, Juiz de Fora, Manaus, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and Santa Maria. They enroll some 15,000 students in 6th through 9th grades and high school. While the students wear uniforms they do not receive military training, yet each of these schools have officers, usually temporary officers, on the faculty. The cost of the Colegios is divided between the army and the Ministry of Culture and Education (MEC), the military personnel being paid by the army. Of the *Alunos* entering the army preparatory school at Campinas about 25% come from the Colegios Militares. <http://www.aman.ensino.cb.br/>; <https://www.mar.mil.br/en/>; http://www.cb.mil.br/pt_PT/web/ingresso/colegios-militares.

⁷⁵ http://www.afa.aer.mil.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27&Itemid=233

⁷⁶ *Instituto Militar de Engenharia* (IME) in Rio prepares non-combat engineers who become commissioned officers and the *Escola de Saúde do Exército* provides one year course to turn civilian medical school graduates into army medical officers. Both accept women and such officers can reach general’s rank.

⁷⁷ The centers in Rio de Janeiro, Recife, São Paulo, and Porto Alegre seem to be particularly active. <http://www.cporj.ensino.cb.br/>.

⁷⁸ Rex A. Hudson, ed. *Brazil: A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1998), pp.399-400.

military practice and doctrine, in addition to physical conditioning and academic study. Of 2014's class (*turma*) of 163 cadets, 9 prepared for infantry, 23 for quartermaster, and 124 for pilot status. There were 4 women and 7 foreigners in that year's class. At the end of basic training the class receives the short sword (*Espadim*) that in the Air Force represents command and nobility. This is somewhat similar to the custom at *Aguilhas Negras* but without its depth of historical symbolism.⁷⁹ From the moment they receive the *Espadim* they are officially in the Air Force, so it is a time of emotion, accomplishment, and pride. Each class takes a symbolic name and composes a war chant or shout.

After four years at Pirassununga the cadets are commissioned *Aspirantes-a-Oficial* and receive two bachelor's degrees, one in Administration, with emphasis on public administration, and one in Aeronautical Science, with qualification in Military Aviation, or Logistical Science (aeronautic quartermaster), or in Military Science, with qualification in Aeronautic infantry. The stress in their education has been on how to command and lead.⁸⁰

Escola Naval

The Navy asserts that its school is the oldest military school in Brazil. It was transferred from Portugal when the royal family fled the French invasion in 1808. While that provides a certain color to its past it has been in its current location since 1938. It was on an island but the building of Santos Dumont airport tied it to the shore. Like the other service academies the *Escola Naval* stresses creation of close ties among

the members of each class or *turma* so that they become friends who encourage, stimulate, and assist one another. The student body is called the Corps of *Aspirantes*. And as at the other schools regular officers are in charge of the school's student units, but here the battalions, companies, and platoons have student-officers (*Oficiais-Alunos*) as commanders who work under the guidance of the regular officers.

In the first year the newcomers learn how to survive at sea and in the jungle. The 38 males in the class (*turma*) of 2014 could opt to become a naval officer or an officer in the *fuzileiros navais*, the Brazilian marines; but the 12 females in the class only had the option of becoming naval quartermasters. This was the first year that women were accepted into the naval school, if with restricted options.⁸¹ The *Escola Naval* also follows the custom of presenting an *Espadim* to the students as symbolic of their status. It is significant that the class of 2014 had four Lebanese, one Nigerian, and one Senegalese.

Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN), Resende, RJ and the Escola Preparatório de Cadetes do Exército (EsPCEx) Campinas, SP

Brazil has had a military school since the transfer of the royal court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1808. But its various physical moves and inconsistent policies and traditions prevented the creation of a long-lasting tradition of officer preparation until the opening of the

⁷⁹ For the history of the *Espadim* see Hiram de Freitas Câmara, *Marechal José Pessoa: A Força de um Ideal* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército, 2 ed. Rev., 2011), pp.102-107; McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria*, pp. 417-418, 545, note 27.

⁸⁰ Cf. <http://www.fab.mil.br/acoeseprogramas>

⁸¹ <http://jeconcursos.uol.com.br/portal/noticia/concursos/concursos-Marinha-50504.html> . This announced the opening for women.

Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras in 1944.⁸² The academy boasts well-appointed barracks, classrooms, library, auditorium, and sufficient grounds of varied terrain (67 Sq. Km) that permit realistic field training. The Cadet Corps has about 1500 cadets divided across its four-year course of study.⁸³ Unlike West Point, where cadets make their branch selection at the end of their four years shortly before commissioning as 2nd Lieutenants, at *AMAN* they make that choice at the start of year two and so the study program has three years of emphasis on training for the selected branch. In another comparison with West Point, the cadets at *AMAN* do not hold cadet ranks (e.g. Cadet Sergeant through Cadet Captain), but they rotate through various short-term command functions. They are solely classified by year first through fourth. Each cadet unit is under the command and tutelage of a regular officer. Possibly this is a long-term response to the cadet rebellions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Certainly it means that leadership is taught very differently in the Brazilian and American armies.⁸⁴

There is a lot of emphasis on adjusting the cadet's personality to academy and army life. In the dining hall the tables are round and so

cadets must look at each other during meals. The barracks rooms have beds, desks, and wardrobes for six cadets. The Caxias *Espadim* plays an interesting symbolic role in blending the new cadets into the Corps. Cadets do not keep the *Espadim* as personal property. With appropriate ceremony the fourth-year cadets pass theirs on to the incoming class. The receiving cadets say "I receive the Caxias saber as the very symbol of military honor."⁸⁵

There has been a recent significant change in the linkage between *AMAN* and the preparatory school in Campinas. In the past the majority of entering cadets were graduates of one of the *Colegios Militares*, along with a number of graduates of civilian high schools admitted by competitive examination, and some from the preparatory school. As of 2012 all those accepted for *AMAN* spend a year at Campinas going through a type of basic training and taking academic courses that used to comprise the first-year course at *AMAN*.

This means that the entrance into a career as an army officer has been moved from *AMAN* to *EsPCE*, whose mission is to insure a new level of uniformity in the preparation of those going on to the academy. The preparatory

⁸² The first military school in Rio de Janeiro dated from 1811. The most famous one in Rio was Praia Vermelha which closed after a rebellion in 1904. It was succeeded by the Escola Militar de Realengo from 1911. The commander of that school, General José Pessoa Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, who had served in the French army in World War I, was responsible for the creation of the new academy, initially called "Escola Militar de Rezende." In 1951 the institution was renamed the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras*. For description of Realengo and the struggle to create Agulhas Negras see McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria*, pp. 345-349. For the naming of the school see Hiram de Freitas Câmara, *Marechal José Pessoa: A Força de um Ideal* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército, 2 ed. Revised, 2011), pp.203-209.

⁸³ *AMAN* was physically expanded in 1988 and for a while its enrollment jumped from 300 to 400. In 1996 a large class of 600 became *Aspirantes*, which caused space problems for the later courses at *Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais* and *ECEME*. In recent years the graduating class (turma) has been around 300. Thanks to Col. Sergio Muniz Costa for the data.

⁸⁴ General Vernon Walters once told me that he thought that *AMAN* produced better lieutenants than West Point, but that West Point produced better generals.

⁸⁵ Hiram de Freitas Câmara, *Marechal José Pessoa: A Força de um Ideal* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca do Exército, 2 ed. Rev., 2011), p.106. See note 46 above for more on *Espadim*. On creating "traditions" see Celso Castro, "Inventando traduções no Exército brasileiro: José Pessoa e a reforma da Escola Militar," *Estudos Históricos*, N. 14, (Jul.-Dez. 1994), pp 231-240. In the ceremony the cadets receive the *Espadim* from a relative, which is the army's way of highlighting the role of family.

school's 520 "*Alunos*" are organized into three companies of five platoons each (35 to a platoon). Classes at the school are scheduled by platoon, so each class has 35 students. The atmosphere will change somewhat in 2015 when an additional company of female *Alunas* will be added. Female bathrooms and sleeping quarters are now [2013] being installed. Each company has its own *ala* (wing) of three floors. Classrooms are on the first floor and living quarters are on the top floor, with bunks arranged by platoon. On that floor too there is a large open space for company assemblies and exercise. The barrack-like bathrooms are communal. There is strict control over cell phones and use of social media. Behavior is rated as 10 % of the final grade. The objective is to produce a "passion" for the army via "*Rigor Fraternal*." There is a list of 11 attitudes that are stressed in judging the *Alunos*. The dining hall has the same round tables found at *AMAN*. *Alunos* march into meals in formation, breaking ranks at the entry while shouting ***Brasil! Acima de Tudo!!*** (Brazil Above All!). The library is small, about 3,000 volumes, and is not topically extensive; however there were half-dozen computers available for *Aluno* use.

By making Campinas the requirement of entry into *AMAN* the Brazilian army's officer course now takes five years (instead of the previous four). When asked if the added year would diminish the appeal of an army officer career, the school's leaders emphasized that they wanted *Alunos* who had a "vocation" for army life. Back in 1986 the then minister of the army Gen. Leônidas Pires Gonçalves told me that he wanted, indeed preferred, those who had such a vocation. That idea has now been built into the structure of officer education. How successful

this will be remains to be seen. But recalling that a high percentage of those entering the career are children of lower-ranked army personnel it is possible that the added year might not dissuade those paternally influenced. It is noteworthy that the Air Force and Navy are not following the army's lead. This is something very new and deserves the attention of researchers. Currently about 450 *Alunos* (out of the 520 total) go on to *AMAN* and complete the course to commissioning as *Aspirantes ao Oficiais*.

The *EsPCE* faculty is a mix of retired officers and "temporary" officers, who are really civilians with academic training, who are given lieutenants' rank. The temporary officers teach courses in the sciences, math, and history. Candidates gain entry to the preparatory by examinations, prepared and corrected by the school's faculty.⁸⁶

Now that the preparatory has taken over the instruction that had comprised the first year at *AMAN*, the curriculum at the academy is being adjusted to use the freed-up space. Completing that first year at *AMAN* presumably the cadets will still make their branch selection. They will move into quarters composed entirely of their peers in the selected branch.⁸⁷

Current Perspectives on the Armed forces

Air Force

The Air Force has a strategic plan for the period 2010-2031 so it is earnestly looking ahead. The Air Force plans new bases in the western Amazon to support the Army's frontier platoons, to extend radar coverage to eliminate current gaps in the system, and to work with the Navy in support and surveillance activities to

⁸⁶ Exams are given in 35 locations throughout Brazil.

⁸⁷ My thanks to Lt. Col. Durval Lourenço Pereira for hosting my visit to Campinas and to Col. Jorge Antonio Smicelato, then *EsPCE* commander, and his staff for responding to my questions and providing a thorough tour of the facilities on June 20, 2013.

protect the off-shore oil deposits.⁸⁸ The plan makes frequent references to the necessity to protect Amazonia, insuring that the landing fields, supporting technology and communications are functional in a combat situation. The plan lays out these objectives for the air force: (1.) promote security of air traffic control; (2.) contribute to the formation of national policies regarding aerospace programs; (3.) establish, equip, and operate the aerospace infrastructure; (4.) operate the *Correio Aéreo Nacional* (air mail) as it has since the 1920s; (5.) protect against all types of illegal air traffic, such as illicit movement of drugs, arms, munitions and people. In brief, this means maintaining sovereignty over national air space to defend the *Pátria*. The strategic plan notes that Brazil's civil aviation fleet is necessarily a major component in national mobilization and so good relations with the civilian companies is an air traffic control issue.

To fully understand the air force's capabilities we need to know more about recruitment at all levels. In June 2013, in Natal (Rio Grande de Norte) along the highway from the air field there were large banners advertising for volunteers to become sergeants. The major feature of the banners was the monthly salary the volunteers would receive. Presumably only highly qualified civilians would be hired.

The Brazilian Air Force (*FAB*) is the largest in Latin America with some 50,000 personnel flying about 600 aircraft. It has its origin in the army's air arm in the 1920s and gained its separate service status in 1941. It is organized into four functional commands: 1st Air Force: advanced fixed and rotary wing instruction; 2nd Air Force: Marine patrol, search

and rescue, helicopter transport tasks and Naval support; 3rd Air Force: is the core combat command. It has all the fighter, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft; 5th Air Force: transport missions. I have not discovered why there is no 4th Air Force. The Brazilian mix of aircraft will soon include the Swedish Gripen NG as its main fighter craft. *Embraer* in close collaboration with the air force has produced the new KC-390, a tanker and transport aircraft that will become the backbone of the nation's military airlift fleet. The air force plans to begin taking delivery of the first of 28 transports in 2016. *Embraer* views the KC-390 as "the greatest technological challenge" that the company has ever faced. It has orders from other countries for 32 of the new craft.⁸⁹

A visit to the Air Force's principal training facility at Parnamirim Field, Natal in June 2013 allowed me to see flight training in operation. I thought it was curious that arranging the visit required approval from Brasília, even though the base is open to local school groups. It may have been because I am a foreigner, but a local newspaper reporter from Natal was denied permission to accompany me. The lack of openness is odd given the military's desire to improve its public image. The base was the largest American aviation facility outside the continental United States during World War II. A majority of the buildings, hangars, etc. were American-built and are still in use and holding up well.⁹⁰

Navy

The Navy's fleet, based mostly at Rio de Janeiro, consists of some 100 vessels, including British-built frigates, Brazilian-made Corvettes, and German-built diesel-electric powered

⁸⁸ See the appendix for a map of air bases and regional commands.

⁸⁹ Dan Parsons, "Embraer KC-390 takes maiden flight," *Flight Global*, 3 February 2015.
<http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/embraer-kc-390-takes-maiden-flight-408635/>

⁹⁰ Thanks to Rostrand Medeiros for arranging and hosting my visit to Natal, June 27-28, 2013.

submarines. Its sole aircraft carrier the *São Paulo* is the refurbished *Foch* (launched in 1963) acquired from the French Navy in 2000. Very aware of the difficulties of patrolling its gigantic maritime space from Rio, the Navy is planning a second squadron to be based at Belém, which would serve as a link between its Amazonian and Atlantic zones. With the 2008 discovery of oil in the pre-salt depths of the sea it has created a project with France to build a number of submarines, including an Atomic powered one. This last project has puzzled some commentators and raised concerns that it might destabilize regional equilibrium and arouse anti-Brazil sentiment.⁹¹ The exact utility of a nuclear submarine for Brazil appears questionable, but its policy makers believe that it will make it the leading naval power in the South Atlantic, if not the whole Southern Hemisphere.⁹² It certainly would announce the beginning of a new era of global prominence for Brazil. Brazilian policy makers are concerned about the possible spread of piracy from the coast of Africa and about West African countries (e.g. Guinea-Bissau) being trans-shipment points for Andean-produced drugs. Looking further south Brazil has an active research station in Antarctica and wishes to extend its strategic reach to the frozen but potentially resource rich continent.

Brazil wants to be the major naval power in the South Atlantic and wants its shipbuilding capacity to contribute to the expansion of its future economic growth. The Navy has the

double focus of operations on the high seas along the coast and in the South Atlantic in what it terms *Amazônia Azul*.⁹³ Brazil is mobilizing its marine scientists to conduct studies of the sea bed to determine how far out the continental shelf extends. If the shelf goes beyond the 200 mile seaward boundary Brazil can extend its territorial seas up to 350 miles off the coast. It is possible that Brazil's territorial seas could be larger than Amazônia. The Navy is using the term *Amazônia Azul* as a way of alerting Brazilian society to the strategic and economic importance of the immense territorial sea. It is also a clever public relations gambit to associate high seas activity with a label long tied to national defense. Close to 95% of the nation's commerce, something like US\$170 billion in trade comes and goes by sea. A majority of that trade is carried by foreign ships, a situation the Navy wants to see changed by further development of the country's maritime industries.

The Navy has not been enthusiastic about a vast riverine mission, but considering that Amazônia has something like 30,000 miles of navigable waterways and ocean craft can go all the way to Peru, the demand for the Navy's attention has been great. It will increase the number of its riverine craft and devote more attention to the region. Such action also has budgetary benefits. Moreover the highlights of its own combat history were in the riverine campaigns in the war with Paraguay.

The Navy's long and intimate experience

⁹¹ Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza, "Brazil in the South Atlantic: growing protagonism and unintended consequences," NOREF, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Policy Brief (May 2013) http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/7f8201c01207875357d3052f3dbe3965.pdf; Maurício Moraes, "Submarino nuclear pode desequilibrar região e gerar sentimento anti-Brasil," *BBC Brasil* (19 de julho, 2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2011/07/110718_submarino_brasil_america_do_sul_mm.

⁹² For a history of the atomic submarine project see João Roberto Martins Filho, "O Projeto do Submarino Nuclear Brasileiro," *Contexto Internacional*, Vol. 33, No.2 (Julho-Dezembro 2011), pp. 277-314. Paul D. Taylor, "Why Does Brazil Need Nuclear Submarines?" *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute* (June 2009), Vol. 135/ 6/1, 276. <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/why-does-brazil-need-nuclear-submarines>

⁹³ Paul Priyce, "The Brazilian Navy: Green Water or Blue? *ISN, ETH Zurich*, 19 January 2015. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=187085>

with the United States Navy gives its views on relations a more mellow tone. The U.S. Navy had a Naval Mission in Brazil from 1922 to 1977. During World War I Brazilian officers served on American warships, during World War II the two navies cooperated closely in combatting Axis submarines, and during the Naval Mission years American officers taught in the Brazilian Navy's schools.

Naval Geopolitics

In the last decade Brazil has worked toward closer relations with the West African countries. It had long participated in the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), most of whose members are African. In 1986, over the objections of the United States and doubts of European states it formed ZOPACAS (Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic) that united in a pact of maritime cooperation the South American and African states that front on the South Atlantic.⁹⁴ More recently Brazil has been seeking to create a "good will belt" around the South Atlantic by providing naval training, vessels, increased trade, and scientific assistance in studying continental shelf and undersea resource potential. In the process it is spreading the idea of a common South Atlantic region that should be developed and defended by the region's states. The Brazilian discourse objects to NATO involvement in the region, but at the same time Brazil cooperates in, and depends upon, defense

projects with NATO countries. Sponsoring a South Atlantic identity is a logical outgrowth of establishing closer ties with the African states reaching back decades. By doing so Brazil is increasing the space where it can project its influence. It is building on its relations with South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal to draw them and the smaller states into a defensive grouping. Brazilian foreign and defense policies are much more closely focused than in the past. Partly Brazilian policy aims at securing African support for attaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.⁹⁵

Its good will efforts have included developing Namibia's navy since 1994 via officer and cadet training, construction of vessels and providing various types of logistical support; selling Super Tucano aircraft to Angola, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania; and joint weapons development with South Africa, as well as undersea mineral prospecting with Nigeria.⁹⁶ The navy has also claimed a role for itself in United Nations peace-keeping work. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (FTM-UNIFIL) is commanded by a Brazilian Rear Admiral, who leads a fleet of nine ships provided by six nations. This peacekeeping mission aims to suppress arms and munitions smuggling into

⁹⁴ *Zopacas* involves the three Brazilian armed forces. There appears to be some hesitation about making a major effort to cement ties between the Brazilian army and the armies of Africa. There is a useful study: Major Carlos Alexandre Geovanini dos Santos, "As ações do Exército Brasileiro em apoio á política externa brasileira voltada para a África subsariana." (Rio de Janeiro: Tese (Doutorado em Ciências Militares) Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército, 2014), pp. 107, 112, 128, 132, 140-142, 150-151. The author sees a vast distance between the two sides.

⁹⁵ Adriana Erthal Abdenur & Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, "O Brasil e a cooperação em defesa: a construção de uma identidade regional no Atlântico Sul" *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 57 (1): pp.5-21.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400101> .

⁹⁶ For a discussion of Brazilian policy toward Africa and the South Atlantic see the BBC interview with Minister of Defense Celso Amorim BBC-Brasil, "Pirataria e terrorismo na África podem afetar Brasil, diz Amorim" 8 Maio 2013
http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2013/05/130502_amorim_entrevista_pai_jf

Lebanese territory from the Mediterranean.⁹⁷

General Staff Planning for the future of the Brazilian Army

The General Staff has developed “Strategic Projects” that have the overall goal of transforming or modernizing the army.⁹⁸ In summary they aim at gaining more control of Brazil’s frontiers (*SISFRON*) via satellite observation, mapping, and integrating the army’s emergency responses more intimately with those of civilian agencies. One of the related projects is in Cyber Defense to protect against cybernetic attacks. A project labelled *Guarani* seeks to transform motorized infantry and cavalry units into mechanized ones by modernizing existing units with the new *Guarani* vehicles. These are wheeled armored cars, whose production will also contribute to the growth of Brazil’s defense industry. Similarly contributing to that industry is the Air Defense Project which proposes to fabricate various ground-to-air weapons and the *Astros 2020* Project to create long-range tactical cruise missiles. A final project, *ReCop*, aims at maintaining a reasonable level of operational capability by addressing the need for continuous updating and adopting the latest innovations in

equipment and training.⁹⁹

The Army’s Center of Planning in the General Staff focuses on developing doctrine for future situations. Among other things the planners think in terms of image creation that would discourage foreign incursion by *FARC*-like guerrilla forces from Colombia. The Agata border operations are to some extent part of this image creation idea. They are also envisioning an enhanced role in United Nations peacekeeping missions that could have a wide-variety of objectives. To be ready they are considering three-types of forces: a general purpose expeditionary force; a peace-keeping or enforcement force; a humanitarian outfit to respond to disasters.¹⁰⁰ The army’s peace keeping experience in Haiti since 2004 is serving as a model for future operations.¹⁰¹ All of these necessarily involve preparation and training of air and naval transport, inter-service cooperation, and considerable development of logistical capabilities.¹⁰²

Reputation and Shaping History

Memory of the years of military-dominated government from 1964 to 1985 is still very strong in Brazil. The armed forces have

⁹⁷ “Seminar Discusses Brazilian Armed Forces’ Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions”, *Diálogos: Digital Military Magazine, Forum of the Americas*, 11/26/ 2014. http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/2014/11/26/feature-02. The Brazilian vessel is the flagship of the force. “Brazilian Navy Places New Ship at the Forefront of Peace Mission in Lebanon,” *Diálogos: Digital Military Magazine, Forum of the Americas*, Feb. 12, 2015. http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/2015/12/02/feature-05.

⁹⁸ My gratitude to General Sergio W. Etchegoyen for arranging a very productive visit to the army’s general headquarters on June 24, 2013.

⁹⁹ Thanks to General de Divisão Luiz Felipe Linhares Gomes for discussing the strategic projects with me on June 24, 2013. There is a project summary in “Projectos Estratégicos do Exército Brasileiro,” *Military Review* (Edição Brasileiro), Jan-Fev, 2013, pp. 39-41. **ReCop** stands for “Recompletamento Operacional” or Operational Replacement.

¹⁰⁰ From conversation with the staff of the *Centro de Planejamento* on June 24, 2013.

¹⁰¹ Kenneth Maxwell, “Brazil’s Military Role in Haiti,” *SLD (Second Line of Defense)* 6/19/12. <http://www.sldinfo.com/brazils-military-role-in-haiti/>. Brazil’s participation in such UN missions goes back to the 1950s.

¹⁰² An example of the current inter-service joint training is the Operation *Lançador*. <http://www.brasil.gov.br/defesa-e-seguranca/2013/09/lacador-fab-e-comandos-do-exercito-atnam-em-conjunto> ; <http://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/exercicios-e-operacoes/63-operacoes-conjuntas-1/72-operacao-agata> .

stopped commemorating the "Revolution of 1964" and have demonstrated that they are subordinate to the elected civilian leadership. This was notable because the president in 1913, Dilma Rousseff in her youth was part of the armed resistance, and had been arrested and tortured by army personnel. The process of re-establishing democratic rule had been slow and difficult. The military regime had not been defeated or completely destabilized rather it sought to liberalize the political situation because of infighting among military leaders over the nature of the regime and over control of it. And, of course, it was losing popular support. At its heart the internal debate within the military was whether the "Revolution" of 1964 was a time-limited surgical operation to correct a left-leaning government, or whether those events had created a long-term regime of command and control.¹⁰³

In the armed forces the officers who followed the thinking of General Humberto Castello Branco viewed the intervention in 1964 as a short-term clean up, while those who lined up behind Generals Costa e Silva and Medici saw it as a long-term venture. Ernesto Geisel, who became president in 1974, was one of Castello's men. Geisel was "not a democrat, he was a lover of order..."¹⁰⁴ He wanted to institutionalize the "Revolution" by creating a Brazilian political model with two parties in a Congress dominated by the government party (*Arena*), but as time

passed he saw that this would not work. He aimed at a transition that would be slow and carefully controlled.

By the mid-1970s key officers were thinking that the "revolution" should have ended in the Medici period. It lost its momentum and maybe its reason for being. Such officers thought that it had been an error not to have given the necessary emphasis to social development, that is, housing, education, health care, and wages. The regime simply went on for too long, and worse, "it was a disaster for the Revolution to have Figueiredo as the last president." He was unprepared for the job and did not work at being president.¹⁰⁵ The most consistent argument in the military for why the regime lasted so long was to blame subversive action. However, General Leonidas Pires Gonçalves insisted that "transition was always in our spirit." And that "those that think we wanted to stay in power don't know the ideas of the Revolution, the spirit with which the Revolution began." He did admit that late joiners, who he called mediocrities "adored power and transformed themselves into great revolutionaries simply because they benefitted." Rather than being forced out he asserted that the direct elections movement (*Diretas-Já*) occurred "because we let it."¹⁰⁶

The Amnesty movement began as a civilian affair aimed at letting the political exiles return home. How exactly it became a refuge for

¹⁰³ Civilian figures played influential roles in this debate, Afredo Buzaid, minister of justice in the Medici government, argued at the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) in July 1970 against setting any time limit: "*uma revolução em marcha é uma revolução sem termos*." *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro), July 4, 1970. Roberto Campos, minister of planning in the Castello Branco government, argued against such an idea in a speech at the ESG on September 19, 1971: "*Instituições Políticas nos países em desenvolvimento*". For a full analysis of the internal military debate see Aloysio Castelo de Carvalho, "Os militares na liberalização do regime autoritário brasileiro (1974-1985)," *Militares e Política*, No. 9 (jul-dez 2011), pp. 83-104. <http://www.lemp.ifcs.ufrrj.br/revista/>.

¹⁰⁴ Celso Castro & Maria Celina D'Araujo (organizadores) *Dossiê Geisel* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2002), p.26.

¹⁰⁵ Oral history interview with General Carlos Meira Mattos in Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, Maria Celina D'Araujo, Celso Castro (Eds), *A Volta aos Quartéis: A Memória Militar Sobre a Abertura* (Rio de Janeiro: Dumara, 1995), pp. 143-149. Other interviewees made similar comments.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-177. General Leonidas was minister of the army under President José Sarney.

the violators of human rights needs further study. In 1979 the Joao Batista Figueiredo government declared a general amnesty that covered the agents of repression but it allowed for the return of exiles and permitted purged politicians to stand for election.¹⁰⁷ Amnesty prior to judgement and conviction wiped away the crimes of the agents of the state, but left the murdered and tortured without legal status. The question was how could state agents be amnestied for crimes that they were not charged with committing and that the military governments would not admit had occurred? In 1995, to make the matter more complex and confusing a law provided compensation for families that had lost loved ones. This was the first time that the Brazilian state accepted responsibility for the illicit acts post-1964.¹⁰⁸ In April 2010 the Brazilian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the amnesty law ruling that it prohibited prosecution of those from both the government forces and the armed resistance, but then in December of that year the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the law was illegal. The Inter-American court asserted that the "Amnesty" clashed with the treaty obligations that Brazil assumed under the OAS American Convention on Human Rights. It ordered Brazil to investigate gross violations of human rights.

While this legal controversy dragged on, there was also a slow movement to establish a

truth commission to examine the repression. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed the idea in December 2009, but dropped it when the minister of defense and the three service chiefs threatened joint resignation. In the next administration of Dilma Rousseff the mood had changed enough for the Congress to approve the creation of a commission in September 2011. The *Comissão Nacional da Verdade* was to investigate human rights violations from 1946 to 1988, with emphasis on the military years (1964-85). The commission of seven members completed its work in two years. Supposedly it was to have access to all government documents and could call victims and accused individuals to testify, but it could not compel them to appear. Then in March 2012 federal prosecutors charged Colonel Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra and civilian police chief Dirceu Garvina, with the 1971 disappearance of a union leader. The prosecutors argued that the amnesty law did not apply because victim's body was not found so the case remained open and continued beyond 1979. Even the failed bombing attempt on the Rio Centro in April 1981 reappeared on a court docket in 2014 because it occurred after the 1979 amnesty limit. There was enough investigation and publicity to establish that army agents were responsible, even though the case eventually ended up being archived, it was a step toward justice.¹⁰⁹ The commission was met with hostility and lack of compliance by the armed

¹⁰⁷ Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp.211-212. She said that those involved in the armed struggle and who were charged with "blood crimes" were not covered by the amnesty. But other sources say it was "total and unrestricted amnesty." Paulo Coelho Filho, "Truth Commission in Brazil: Individualizing Amnesty, Revealing the Truth," Yale Review of International Studies Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 2011-12), pp. 47-60. <http://yris.yira.org/tag/brazil>.

¹⁰⁸ Renato Lemos, "Anistia e crise política no Brasil pos-1964," Topoi (Rio de Janeiro, dezembro 2002), pp. 287-313. http://www.revistatopoi.org/numeros_anteriores/topoi05/topoi5a12.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ Chico Otavio, "Riocentro: acusados responderão por a tentativa a bomba pela primeira vez Justiça Federal aceita denúncia contra cinco militares e um ex-delegado Juiza entende que os crimes, ocorridos há 33 anos, não prescreveram", O Globo, (Rio) Maio 15, 2014. <http://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/riocentro-acusados-responderao-por-atentado-bomba-pela-1-vez-12493109>. Rádio Brasil Atual, "Ministério Público denuncia três generais por atentado do Riocentro, em 1981. ditadura" (São Paulo) 17/02/2014. <http://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/cidadania/2014/02/ministerio-publico-denuncia-tres-generais-por-atentado-do-riocentro-1981-1246.html>.

forces.¹¹⁰ The officer corps, especially retired officers, considered the Truth Commission a witch hunt to get revenge. "From the army of Caxias there would be no apologies. We always declared our conviction that we saved Brazil."¹¹¹ They objected to some of the individuals appointed to the commission and its state-level branches. The officers wanted official repression to be equated with the armed actions of their opponents. They criticized a recent statement of Minister of Defense Celso Amorim that the armed forces had violated human rights during the military period. The president of the Clube Militar, retired General Gilberto Pimentel, declared that the commission should have treated both sides impartially because "there were dead on our side too and human rights are for everyone."¹¹² The emotions were and are often raw and angry.

Now thirty-one years after the return to democratic rule the Brazilian armed forces face the ethical and moral dilemma of how to deal with the realities of those military years. The real problem is not the seizure of power or even the long years of political control. It is the repression

that the country suffered including the use of disappearance, murder, and torture as instruments of control. The reality of mistreatment of political prisoners is well documented in the military's own judicial records, but there is little institutional willingness to acknowledge what was done.¹¹³ This stand-off has gone on since 1985. That year the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo published *Brasil: Nunca Mais* written by priests and laymen who had acquired more than a million pages of military court records containing the names of victims and their torturers and details of their experiences. At the time the editors decided to delay publishing the names of 444 torturers so as not to appear to be interfering in upcoming elections.¹¹⁴ As the stories of death and disappearance became better known, the consensus on mutual forgetting slowly fragmented. The army's version of events was best presented in a series of interviews with 247 officers and civilians published in 2003. The interviews provided a virtual 'who's who' of those supporting the 1964 movement and the subsequent governments, and their publication was intended as a response to the criticisms of

¹¹⁰ The military chiefs effectively refused to cooperate with the national truth commission. The commission pointedly asked for information in a specific number of cases in which DOIs operated in named armed forces facilities. The response was that Defense officials could not say one way or the other. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/08/1500060-comissao-pede-esclarecimentos-sobre-negativa-de-torturas-e-mortes-na-ditadura.shtml>.

¹¹¹ Twenty-seven high-ranking retired generals issued a "manifesto" saying that "Do Exército de Caxais não virão (desculpas)! Nós sempre esternaremos a nossa convicção de que salvamos o Brasil." <http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,manifesto-de-generais-de-alta-patente-da-reserva-ataca-comissao-da-verdade,1566674>.

¹¹² Tânia Monteiro & Wilson Tosta, "Militares repudiam relatório da comissão," O Estado de São Paulo, 10 Dez 2014 <http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,militares-repudiam-relatorio-da-comissao,1605184>.

¹¹³ Thomas E. Skidmore, *The politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 125-135. Kenneth P. Serbin, *Secret Dialogues: Church-State Relations, Torture, and Social Justice in Authoritarian Brazil* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000) and the testimony of a state-employed assassin Claudio Guerra, *Memórias de uma Guerra Suja* (Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 2012). The commission's final report was delivered on Oct 12, 2014. <http://www.ebc.com.br/cidadania/2014/12/relatorio-completo-da-comissao-da-verdade>.

¹¹⁴ *Brasil: Nunca Mais* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1985). The *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio) and *Folha de São Paulo* (Nov. 22, 1985) did not hesitate to list the names of the 444 torturers. The introduction to *Brasil: Nunca Mais* emphasized that it was not the intention of the project to "organizar um sistema de provas para apresentação em qualquer Nuremberg brasileiro." Nor did it wish to stimulate a demand for revenge, noting that "the Brazilian people were never motivated by sentiments of revenge." Rather it was a call to conscience to eliminate torture "of any type, for any crime, for any reason." (p. 26-27).

regime opponents. Those interviewed affirmed that from the outset they supported the civil-military regime.¹¹⁵ After 1985 the struggle was to influence the memory of the nation.¹¹⁶

Probably the case that holds the most interest is that of the conflict in the Araguaia region's section known as the *Bico do Papagaio* in the eastern Amazon. Members of the Communist Party of Brazil began moving there in 1966 with the intention of establishing a base for guerrilla war and eventually a liberated zone. Some of them had been trained in China, at least one had been involved in the communist uprising of 1935, and another was an army CPOR-prepared reserve lieutenant. In total there were 107 guerrillas and some locally recruited *campesinos*. In April 1972 the army discovered their presence and the game was on. The initial massive infusion of regular troops

was not successful so the army replaced them with carefully selected secret personnel operating in civilian dress with false names and light arms. The rule of law was set aside for the laws of the jungle. They used guerrilla-style tactics against the guerrillas. By the end of 1974 there were no more guerrillas in Araguaia. Orders from Brasília were that none should be allowed to leave the region alive. A number were executed well after their capture. Those officers overseeing and conducting the operations in Araguaia wanted to keep the executions secret even within the military services. The families of the executed still await their remains.¹¹⁷

The closing of the ranks to protect the military institutions is understandable to a certain extent, but the documented history of what took place is not going to disappear. As General Octavio Costa observed "most military

¹¹⁵ General Aricildes de Moraes Motta (coordenação Geral), *1964 – 31 de março: o movimento revolucionário e a sua história* 15 vols (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioetca do Exército Editora, 2003); for an analysis of this publication see Eduardo dos Santos Chaves, *Memórias sobre a Ditadura Civil-Militar: Discutindo o Colaorionismo*, *OPSSIS*, Catalão, v. 12, n. 2, (jul./dez. 2012), pp. 125-150

¹¹⁶ Aline Prado Atassio, "A batalha pela memória: os militares e o golpe de 1964" (Dissertação de Mestrado: PPG de Ciências Sociais. Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2009).

¹¹⁷ There are brief biographies of the guerrillas, including the manner of death, in Hugo Studart, *A Lei da Selva, Estratégias, Imaginário e Discurso dos Militares Sobre a Guerrilha do Araguaia* (São Paulo: Geração Editorial, 2006), pp. 355-383. Of the 107 total, 64 were killed, 18 "location unknown" likely killed, 15 arrested and survived, 7 had deserted, 2 committed suicide, 1 was eliminated by his colleagues for adultery. The army apparently suffered 6 dead, 8 wounded. There is some question about the exactness of these numbers. The Communist Party of Brasil said that 75 were killed, an army source says 85. (Ibid. pp. 33-34) To identify them the soldiers photographed the bodies. On the desire and methods to keep the executions secret, see p.51. The military personnel who helped Studart with his research were insistent that he keep their identities secret. Also important for understanding Araguaia is Elio Gaspari, *A Ditadura Escancarada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp.400-464. His chapter is aptly named: "A floresta dos homens sem alma." It is not clear from which level of the army the take-no-prisoners order originated. But when Geisel took office in 1974 he knew what was happening, see Gaspari, pp. 402-404. There is an illuminating biographical study of one of the officers in the Araguaia repression Sebastião Rodrigues de Moura, known as Major Cúrio: Leonencio Nossa, *Mata! O Major Curio e as guerrilhas no Araguaia* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012). Curio told the author that Minister of the Army Orlando Geisel ordered him "not to return until he had gotten the last of them." ("Não volte sem pegar o ultimo deles"), p. 19. Cúrio would become something of a legend in the region for bringing a degree of order during the gold rush to the *Serra Pelada* in the south of Pará state in 1980. Erich Follath and Jens Glusing "Brazil's Heart of Darkness: Notorious Rebel-Killer May Finally Face Justice" *Spiegel Online International*, April 25, 2013. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/notorious-killer-of-rebels-de-moura-might-face-justice-in-brazil-a-895471-2.html>. A survivor who managed to slip out of the region and led a clandestine life until recently has turned up: Matt Sandy, 'Sole survivor' recalls jungle conflict with military in Brazil, *BBC News*, 17 January 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35251124>. He is Micheas Gomes de Almeida, known as *Zezinho*. See Studart, *A Lei da Selva*, p. 382. There is a very helpful and detailed analysis of Araguaia operations in Vivien Ishaq, Pablo E. Franco, & Tereza E. de Sousa, *A Escrita da Repressão e da Subversão, 1964-1985* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2012), pp.161-165. It stated that 17 guerrilla fighters survived, see p. 165.

had nothing to do with what happened (...) the vast majority did not leave the barracks and stayed there fulfilling purely professional military duties. (...) but what happened was that all the military (...) were tossed into the common grave with DOI-CODI and the intelligence services.” He feared that the attitude of blaming all the military would persist “for many years and many generations.”¹¹⁸ The Brazilian Armed Forces are shielding a small minority of their predecessors at the expense of the current reputation of their institutions. The immense pain of relatives and friends on all sides who lost loved ones needs to be alleviated. Once that is done the armed forces can get on with building institutions committed to preserving Brazil’s democratic society. Continued denial will make the future less bright, especially because it will distort the education of future Brazilian officers.

The Brazilian Armed Forces have the manpower, organization and experience to handle their current missions. They are avoiding involvement in politics. They want to be respected internally and internationally as professional forces dedicated to projecting national power so as to increase Brazil’s stature in the world. They have gone a long way toward hardening the nation’s soft power, but whether the country has the political will to continue to build up and expand its armed forces is an open

question. Critics would ask why have a strong military if threats to national security seem nebulous? What had appeared possible a couple of years ago is now in doubt because Brazil fell into a recession in August 2015 which was predicted to continue through 2016.¹¹⁹ The *Real* has fallen markedly against the U.S. Dollar. Added to the shocking *Petrobras* scandal and widespread disenchantment with President Dilma that led to her impeachment there are now the tensions produced by the cuts in federal spending for health, education, and city services that are especially felt by the poor and middle classes.¹²⁰ Some analysts predict that recovery may extend as far as 2023.¹²¹ The discovery of the massive corruption involving many congressmen and private businessmen in the Lava-Jato investigations has undermined Brazilian politics nearly to the point of making the government illegitimate. How the current economic-political crisis will affect the Armed Forces is simply unknown. Even so the Armed Forces are accustomed to tight budgets and are good at finding ways to adapt to the lack of money. The purchases of jets and the construction of the atomic submarine will go forward thanks to the laying aside of funds for those projects. More likely the construction of new frontier platoon posts will be delayed. It is perhaps well to recall the comment by a British ambassador more than a century ago that “in

¹¹⁸ Oral history testimony of General Octavio Costa in Glauco Ary Dillon Soares, Maria Celina D'Araujo, Celso Castro (Eds), *A Volta aos Quarteis: A Memória Militar Sobre a Abertura* (Rio de Janeiro: Dumara, 1995), p.141. On the DOI-CODI, military intelligence units, see Michael L. Conniff & Frank D. McCann, eds., *Modern Brazil: Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), pp.266-269.

¹¹⁹ Jerin Mathew, "Brazilian economy falls into recession with 1.9% contraction in second quarter," *International Business Times*, August 29, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/reporters/jerin-mathew>.

¹²⁰ Simon Romero, "Brazil: Protest Over Higher Bus Fares Erupt in 3 Cities," *New York Times*, Jan.8, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/world/americas/brazil-protest-over-higher-bus-fares-erupt-in-3-cities.html?_r=0. Although the 2016 budget has not yet been approved, it appears that already voted funds are secure.

¹²¹ Monica de Bolle, "Too Soon for a Rally: Brazil's Long Road Ahead", *Real Time Economic Issues Watch*, March 9, 2016, Peterson Institute for International Economics. <http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=5455>. The author commented that "Brazil has never faced a crisis as all-encompassing and severe. ... there are no benchmarks by which to gauge current problems, making it extremely difficult to adequately identify the conditions under which a sustained economic improvement could be attained."

Brazil ... the unexpected always happens....”¹²²

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¹²² Ambassador William Haggard to Foreign Minister Edward Grey, Petropolis, July 1, 1912, in Brazil, “Annual Report 1911,” p. 8; Foreign Office: Confidential Print 1912, The National Archives (United Kingdom).Kew.

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CM /Sede	RM/Sede	Jurisdição	Div Ex	Brigadas
CMA Manaus-AM	8ª RM Belém-PA	Pará Amapá Maranhão (parte) Tocantins (parte)	8ª (Belém-PA)	23ª Bda Inf SI – Marabá – PA
	12ª RM Manaus-AM	Amazonas Acre Roraima Rondônia		16ª Bda Inf SI – Tefê-AM
				17ª Bda Inf SI – Porto Velho-RO
				1ª Bda Inf SI – Boa Vista-RR
				2ª Bda Inf SI – São Gabriel da Cachoeira - AM
CMNE Recife-PE	6ª RM Salvador-BA	Bahia Sergipe	7ª (Recife-PE)	
	7ª RM/7 DE Recife-PE	Rio Grande do Norte Paraíba Pernambuco Alagoas		7ªBda Inf Mtz—Natal-RN
				10ª Bda Inf Mtz – Recife-PE
	10ª RM Fortaleza-CE	Ceará Piauí Maranhão (-8 RM)		
CMO Campo Grande-MS	9ª RM Campo Grande-MS	Mato Grosso do Sul Mato Grosso		13ª Bda Inf Mtz – Cuiabá-MT
				18ª Bda Inf Fron - Corumbá-MS
				4ª Bda C Mec- Dourados-MS
CMP Brasília	11ª RM Brasília-DF	Distrito Federal Goiás Tocantins (-) Triângulo Mineiro*		Brigada de Operações Especiais - Goiânia -GO
				3ª Bda Inf Mtz- Cristalina - GO
CML Rio de Janeiro	1ª RM Rio de Janeiro-RJ	Rio de Janeiro Espírito Santo	1ª (Rio de Janeiro-RJ)	Bda Inf Pqdt – Rio de Janeiro-RJ
	4ª RM Belo Horizonte - MG	Minas Gerais (- Triângulo Mineiro)		9ª Bda Inf Mtz – Rio de Janeiro-RJ
				4ª Bda Inf Mtz – Juiz de Fora-MG
CMSE São Paulo	2ª RM São Paulo -SP	São Paulo	2ª (São Paulo-SP)	11ª Bda Inf L (GLO) - Campinas-SP
				12ª Bda Inf L (Amv) - Caçapava-SP
				CAvEx - Taubaté-SP
				1ª Bda AAe - Guarujá-SP
CMS Porto Alegre-RS	5ª RM/5DE Curitiba-PR	Paraná Santa Catarina	5ª (Curitiba-PR)	15ª Bda Inf Mtz – Cascavel –PR
				14ª Bda Inf Mtz – Florianópolis-SC
				5ª Bda C Bld – Ponta Grossa-PR
	3ª RM Porto Alegre-RS	Rio Grande do Sul	3ª (Santa Maria-RS)	6ª Bda Inf Bld – Santa Maria - 3 DE
				1ª Bda C Mec – Santiago – RS – 3 DE
				2ª Bda C Mec – Uruguaiana-RS – 3 DE
				3ª Bda C Mec – Bagé- RS -6 DE
				6ª (Porto Alegre-RS)

Quadro 2.1 - Organizações Militares operacionais por Comando de Área e Região Militar - 2007

*Triângulo Mineiro: área limitada a leste pelos Municípios de Araguari, Indianópolis, Nova Ponte e Uberaba.

Fonte: KUHLMANN, Paulo Roberto Loyolla. *Exército Brasileiro: estrutura militar e ordenamento político. 1985 - 2007*. 2007, 182p. Tese (Doutorado em Ciência Política) Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2007.

SIGLAS

CMA - Comando Militar da Amazônia
CMNE - Comando Militar do Nordeste
CMO - Comando Militar do Oeste
CML - Comando Militar de Leste
CMSE - Comando Militar do Sudeste
CMS - Comando Militar do Sul
Bda - Brigada
Inf - Infantaria
C- Cavalaria
AAAc – Artilharia Anti-Aérea

Bld – Blindada
C Av Ex- Comando da Aviação do Exército
Fron - Fronteira
L - Leve
Mec - Mecanizada
Mtz - Motorizada
Op Esp - Operações Especiais
Pqdt – Pára-quedista
SI - Selva
GLO - Garantia da Lei e da Ordem

Fig. 6 Distribution of Army Units throughout Brazil

Source: KUHLMANN, 2007, p. 182



Fig. 7 Brazilian Air Force Bases/Stations. The map shows the Brazilian Air Force locations in 2004 including Air Bases, the Command structure, COMAR (Comando Aéreo Regional - Regional Air Command), the Air Space control, and the CINDACTA (Centro Integrado de Defesa Aérea e Controle de Tráfego Aéreo - Integrated Center of Air Traffic Control and Air Defense).

Source: www.milavia.net/airforces/brazil/fab_bases.htm

