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## HUSSERL AND THE ARTICLE OF ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (1927): PROJECT OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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**ABSTRACT.** The aim of this paper is the analysis of Edmund Husserl's article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, published in 1927, explaining the project of a phenomenological psychology. Between the years 1926 until 1928, Husserl makes important developments concerning the topic of Phenomenology and phenomenological psychology, presenting the *project* of a phenomenological psychology in works like "Phenomenological Psychology" (1925), "Article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica" (1927), "Amsterdam Lectures" (1928), and "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" (1954). Husserl sought to establish a strict philosophy and, at the same time formulated a rational and pure psychology, namely, a phenomenological psychology inside the philosophical phenomenology. In addition to an introduction to the Phenomenology, Husserl contrast in the *Article*, the *a priori* pure psychology as the methodical foundation whereupon may in principle rise a scientifically rigorous empirical psychology, then it's necessary to go to the proper philosophical phenomenology, understanding it in the face of psychology to genuinely think about the project that Husserl proposed. So, the importance of this study starts from the need to retake what is a truly phenomenological psychology.

**Keywords:** Psychology; phenomenology; philosophy.

## HUSSERL E O ARTIGO PARA ENCICLOPÉDIA BRITÂNICA (1927): PROJETO DA PSICOLOGIA FENOMENOLÓGICA

**RESUMO.** O objetivo deste trabalho é a análise do artigo sobre a Fenomenologia da Enciclopédia Britânica, publicado em 1927, de Edmund Husserl, explicitando o projeto de uma psicologia fenomenológica. Entre os anos 1925 até 1928, Husserl realiza importantes desenvolvimentos concernentes ao tema da fenomenologia e da psicologia fenomenológica, apresentando o *projeto* de uma psicologia fenomenológica em obras como "Psicologia Fenomenológica", de 1925, "Artigo da Enciclopédia Britânica" (1927), "Conferências de Amsterdam", de 1928, e "A crise das ciências europeias e a Fenomenologia Transcendental" (1954). Husserl buscou fundar uma filosofia rigorosa e, ao mesmo tempo, formulou uma psicologia racional e pura, isto é, uma psicologia fenomenológica dentro da fenomenologia filosófica. Além de uma introdução à fenomenologia, Husserl destaca no artigo a psicologia *a priori* pura como fundamento metódico sobre o qual pode por princípio erguer-se uma psicologia empírica cientificamente rigorosa, então, é preciso ir à própria fenomenologia filosófica, compreendendo-a em face da psicologia para pensarmos genuinamente no projeto que Husserl propôs. Assim, a importância deste estudo se dá a partir da necessidade de retomar o que é uma psicologia autenticamente fenomenológica.

**Palavras-chave:** Psicologia; fenomenologia; filosofia.

## HUSSERL Y EL ARTÍCULO DE LA BRITANNICA (1927): PROYECTO DE PSICOLOGÍA FENOMENOLÓGICA

**RESUMEN.** El objetivo de este estudio es hacer un análisis del Artículo de Husserl de la Enciclopedia Británica, publicado en 1927, explicando el proyecto de una psicología fenomenológica. Entre los años 1925 hasta 1928, Husserl

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hace avances importantes en relación con el tema de la fenomenología y psicología fenomenológica, presentando el proyecto de una psicología fenomenológica en obras como "La psicología fenomenológica" (1925), "Artículo de la Enciclopedia Británica" (1927), "Conferencia de Ámsterdam" (1928) y "La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental" (1954). Husserl trató de establecer una filosofía estricta y al mismo tiempo formuló una psicología racional y pura, es decir, una psicología fenomenológica en la fenomenología filosófica. Además de una introducción a la fenomenología, Husserl destaca en el *Artículo* la psicología pura *a priori* como una base metódica acerca de lo que puede surgir en principio una psicología empírica científicamente estricta, entonces tienes que ir a la propia fenomenología filosófica y comprenderla en la cara de la psicología y a pensar auténticamente sobre el proyecto que propone Husserl. Así, la importancia de este estudio parte de la necesidad de reanudar lo que es verdaderamente una psicología fenomenológica.

**Palabras-clave:** Psicología; fenomenología; filosofía.

## Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyze the project of a pure phenomenological psychology, in the thought of Edmund Husserl, based on the "Article for the Encyclopedia Britannica" (1927)<sup>2</sup>, in its versions in English and Spanish. The English version, translated by Richard E. Palmer, was published in 1971 (*Phenomenology – Britannica Article, Fourth Draft*. Volume 2, Issue 2), and the Spanish version, with translation by Antonio Ziri6n Quijano, published in 1990 (*El Articulo de la Encyclopaedia Britannica*), from the original, *Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel*, published in *Phänomenologische Psychologie, Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. Husserliana (Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke), Band IX, herausgegeben von Walter Biemel*.

The translation of the article of Husserl was made in a process involving a group of the Laboratory of Phenomenology and Subjectivity of the Federal University of Paraná, from a study group, being divided into closely related studies, linking graduation (extension activity, research and monograph) and post-graduation (Masters). The translation of this text is justified not only by its relevance – since it involves two of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) – but also for being a document that expresses in a condensed form, an entire project (at that time that it was in progress), and a set of ideas that would be further developed. The translation was done during the last half of 2015, based mainly in the American version – *Draft D* – and from this first version; it was able to start the study group with the help of the Spanish version.

The methodology for the study of the project of a truly phenomenological psychology was the analysis of the *Article* of 1927, for encompassing the basic concepts of phenomenology in its relationship with psychology in a more resolute way than the proposed of 1925, in *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (Husserl, 1925), for instance, when Husserl pointed out the following topics in the *Article*: the appearance of the phenomena to consciousness, intentionality, phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction and the transcendental issue of consciousness. He also discussed the psychologism in its ultimate form, and the possibility of a pure psychology or phenomenological psychology in comparison with the scientific psychology based in the natural sciences. Husserl did not summarize his theory in a single text; the *Article* is a type of "excerpt" of the phenomenological psychology project. Much as the translational difficulties could be present in this type of text, considering the expressions in the phenomenological context, specific to its terminology, it was aimed to maintain the original meaning of the work, as close as possible to the sense of world that Husserl proposed. Agreeing with the proposal not to cease the investigation, we seek so to interpret the work of Husserl without attempting to conclude the ideas on phenomenological psychology. The final version of this translation is under review for subsequent publication.

Between September and December 1927, Husserl wrote an introduction for *Phenomenology*, to be published in the 14th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* in 1929. The text of Husserl has gone through four versions (*Drafts A, B, C and D*) and two editorial summarization by other hands (*Draft E and F*). These texts as a whole are referred to as "The Article for Encyclopedia Britannica" or simply "The Article". The very final version of Husserl, *Draft D*, was never fully published in life, because the

<sup>2</sup> From now on, we are referring to this text just as *Article*.

German version appeared only in 1962. The draft D was firstly published in 1925; however, in the 14th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica it was published, under the signature of “E.Hu”, an article of 4000 words titled “Phenomenology”. However, the composition made into English by Dr. Christopher V. Salmon of Oxford, no matter how Husserl agreed, is not so much a translation as a paraphrase of the final version of the article of Husserl for the Encyclopedia Britannica, therefore, not so faithful.

Husserl, in the evolution of his ideas, defended the thesis that the complete accomplishment of a Psychology would only be possible through a Phenomenology, but his conception of Phenomenology differs somewhat from that presented in “Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy” (1913). This because one way of understanding Phenomenology can be through its relationship with Pure Psychology (Husserl, 1927/1990) – the part that we are interested in discussing here –, and also as a static transcendental philosophy and then genetic (Husserl, 1936/1989). Husserl affirmed that Phenomenology had as one of its role to propitiate the foundations for an empirical psychology, but in the 1920s, he started to assign this task not to the transcendental phenomenology, but to what he termed eidetic or phenomenological psychology. It is important to highlight that phenomenology is a way of accessing oneself, so it can be better appropriate by psychology in its methodological aspects, without becoming, however, an explanatory model of psychic reality. Therefore, it cannot be confuse the project of a phenomenological psychology, as proposed by Husserl, with the psychological stage of his thinking, not even with the several perspectives called “phenomenological” of psychology (Goto, 2008, Holanda, 2014).

Goto (2008) points out in his work the reason why phenomenological psychology arose, when Husserl saw the need to formulate a pure rational rather than experimental psychology, since he criticized scientific psychology, because this was subordinated to the laws of nature and causality/determinism, the psyche. Husserl criticized the common denominator of all scientific-natural psychologies that is the causality (Porta, 2013). Thus, phenomenology appeared as a rigorous original science capable of substantiating philosophy, empirical sciences and Psychology. Its importance can be highlighted by its critical position to science, in such a way that allows the construction of other forms of apprehension of reality where is given the relocation of the subject in a historical and worldly context (Holanda, 2014). With the publication of the *Article*, Husserl intended to provide a brief introduction for laypeople. What is new in 1927 is the way in which Husserl conceived the psychological reduction, starting to distinguish explicitly between a psychological-phenomenological-reduction and a phenomenological-transcendental-reduction, and in that period there was the final and definitive understanding and overcoming of the transcendental psychologism, themes discussed during this work.

## 1. Context of the philosopher and his work

Edmund Husserl, was a mathematician and philosopher, and was born on April 8, 1859. In 1884 he went to Vienna, where under the influence of Franz Brentano, discovered his philosophical vocation. He taught philosophy at the University of Halle in the course of Psychology, where he remained from 1887 to 1901. Husserl contradicted the naturalistic scientism and the logicism, thus having as his objective, the inauguration of a new foundation, a theory of theories, whether of pure logic or of psychology, and from there arose Phenomenology as a foundation for the sciences. Husserl taught at Göttingen from 1901 to 1916, and at that time, he advanced his studies on Phenomenology. The Göttingen period was important for the development of the phenomenological method and reduction, besides, in this period Husserl highlighted the transition from eidetic phenomenology to transcendental phenomenology (Goto, 2008). In 1916, Husserl began teaching at the University of Freiburg, where Martin Heidegger became his assistant from 1919 to 1923. The “Article” of 1927 was published at an important time for the Phenomenology, and both Husserl and Heidegger sought the joint expression of the basic character of the Phenomenology. The radicalism of the phenomenology of Husserl is based precisely on the project of reconsidering the world and subjectivity, from the suspension of all and any existence, and for this reason he affirms that the place of the transcendental is neutral, since it suspends any already established ontology; when suspending the existential thesis, he emphasizes the reduction to the conscience.

Phenomenology differs from Psychology, because it formulates its own methodology, but both have the conscience as object; both have as foundation the subjectivity and this led to a more complete study of the theme. In the years 1925-1928, Husserl made important developments concerning the theme of phenomenological psychology. Considering that Psychology could not be the basis for a transcendental philosophy, Husserl indicated Phenomenology as a possibility for a Phenomenological Psychology and this as a structure of the scientific psychology.

## 2. Brief comment on the “Article for Encyclopedia Britannica” of 1927

The *Article* revolves around three important themes for the development of the Phenomenological Psychology project of Husserl: 1) The Pure Psychology, its field of experience, its method and its function; 2) The Phenomenological Psychology and the Transcendental Phenomenology; and 3) The Transcendental Phenomenology and the Philosophy as universal science in absolute foundation. Husserl defines Phenomenology as a new descriptive method intended to provide the fundamental basis for a rigorously scientific philosophy and that will, to a consequent development, allow a reform of all sciences. However, when defining Phenomenology he says that simultaneously to it, emerged the pure/phenomenological Psychology. Thus, with this *Article*, it was revealed concepts already exposed and delimited the study of the project of the Phenomenological Psychology (Husserl, 1927/1971, 1927/1990).

### 2.1 Part One: The idea of pure psychology

In the first part of the *Article*, “Pure psychology, its field of experience, its method and function” (divided into five themes), Husserl alerts that the discovery of the psychic (Modern psychology) changes our understanding of the world, because it places our being in a different position, even if we have proximity to the animals. This because we move from the “natural attitude” that makes us to be occupied with any real or ideal objects, to an experimental view on the psyche, through reflection. Besides, he emphasizes that all experience can be subject to such reflection, as well as, effectively, all the ways in which we engage with any real or ideal object.

The task of pure psychology is the re-foundation of philosophy, providing the methodological basis for acquiring the same *status* as the scientific psychology, through the precise fixation of its fundamental concepts. The overcoming of the disadvantaged position of psychology in relation to the natural sciences is only possible by fulfilling such a task. This requires the establishment of a specific discipline, the pure psychology. It is pure while considers the psychological in its specificity and its radical difference from everything that is physical. “... The fundamental character of the psychic is the intentionality... The being of the psychic, while intentional, is nothing other than the being of the phenomenon. Thus, a pure psychology is nothing other than an authentically phenomenological psychology” (Porta, 2013, p.72).

Husserl explains that, when fully engaged in the conscious activity, we focus exclusively on something specific, such as thoughts or values, but not on the psychic experience as such, because only reflection can reveal this. Through it, instead of simply understanding directly (e.g. values), the objective elements of the psychic experience, we understand the corresponding subjective experiences to which we become “conscious” of them. For this reason, they are called “phenomena”, and their most general essential characteristic is to be like “consciousness-of”, of specific things, thoughts (judgments, reasons, consequences), decisions, and so on. (Husserl, 1927/1971, p. 2)

In this way, the essential characteristic of “phenomena” is that they are always linked to a subjectivity. The term *phenomenon*, in Husserl, assumes a different meaning, once “it is all that appears or emerges in the field of the consciousness as being something pure and absolute, and there is no mere appearance not even objective appearance” (Goto, 2008, p. 65). Husserl emphasizes that if this kingdom of the “phenomena” is shown as a possible field of pure psychological discipline, exclusively related to the phenomenon; it is understandable that the latter is characterized as Phenomenological Psychology. Besides, he weaves the fundamental character of being while consciousness, while consciousness of something, considering that all appearing is appearing of

something in relation to something; here is intentionality. This means that Husserl sought a philosophy of the “return to the things themselves”, that is, to what we can perceive freely and spontaneously, thus accomplishing the description of the appearance of the phenomena to the consciousness. Regarding the ways of appearing of the objects and the experiences of them, we do not live separately the object and the intentional act, but in the appearance of the object is contained the experience of that object that appears. Intentionality constitutes synthesis or unit, an active and passive constitution. When perceiving a cube, for instance, no matter how there are variations in the modes of appearance, we will have consciousness of the cube while perceived-cube. In the phenomenological method, the analysis of the intentionality of consciousness contemplates the relationship between subject and world, that is, Husserl achieved this conclusion through the discovery of “the a priori of the universal correlation”, which has as central idea the conception that subject and object are inseparable (Goto, 2008).

Husserl in the *Article* of 1927 assures that although the experience of the other is not immediate as mine (oneself), both are experiences, in which the task of also making phenomenologically understandable the psychic life of the person and the community with all the intentionalities that refer to it, arises. The question is: how can we differ the external experience of the world from what is purely psychic, as a closed field of being, so that the phenomenological experience is possible? Husserl explains that a particular method of access is necessary for the pure phenomenological field: “the method of the phenomenological reduction”, thus being “the fundamental method of pure psychology, the assumption of all his specifically theoretical methods”. (Husserl 1927, 1971, p.4) Thus, Husserl plans for Philosophy the possibility of getting rid of the obscurity, through the phenomenological method taken to its extreme consequences, the “return to the things themselves”, the return to consciousness. It is necessary for this the consistent *epoché* of the phenomenologist in the sense of thematizing the pure conscience, because it is a suspension of our natural attitude and this attitude overshadows from the very beginning our contact with the things that are evidently apodictic (Goto, 2008). That is, according to Husserl, this is a question of excluding from the phenomenological field the real world that exists for the simple and absolute subject; “... but in its place the world is presented as that given in the consciousness (perceived, remembered, judged, thought, valued, etc.) “as such, the “world in brackets”...” (Husserl, 1927/1971, p.4).

From this, Husserl observes that the method of the phenomenological reduction is constituted in accordance with the double aspect of the phenomenological descriptions, the noetic-noematic analysis. It is with the identification of the nature of the intentional consciousness and the constitutive nature of the intentional objects that we can reach the full meaning of the appearance of the phenomena. That is, in the subject-object correlation we find two poles in the subject, one characterized by the act that aims (noesis) and the pole of the thing aimed (noema). In relation to the foundation of Phenomenology, about the question of Husserl of how it is possible for the cognizing subject to reach, with certainty and evidence, a reality that is external to him? Through *noesis*, which are the acts of giving by which consciousness targets a certain object in a certain way, and the content or meaning of these objects targeted is the *noema* (Whitehead, 2015). Besides, Husserl (1927/1971) pays attention to another importance of the reductive method, when this is transferred from the experience itself to the experience of the others, insofar as it can be applied to the psychic life predicted of the other and to perform the corresponding “in brackets” and the corresponding subjective description of the “how” of its appearance and what is appearing (“noesis” and “noema”) (p.5).

Husserl moves to the thematic of the eidetic reduction, in which the change of polarization from thing-pole to self-pole is evinced, causing phenomenology to be redirected analytically from the object to the transcendental ego. The transcendental reduction raises the passage from the natural to the phenomenological attitude, since the eidetic reduction emphasizes the capture of the essence of the phenomena and the constitution of the senses of the world, that is, what Husserl called reduction for the essences. Thus, if the phenomenological reduction planned a means of access to the phenomenon of the real and also potential inner experience, Husserl affirms: “... the method based on it of “eidetic reduction” provides the means of access to the invariant essential structures of the purely psychical sphere in its entirety” (Husserl, 1927/1971, p.6). Phenomenological psychology must be established as an “eidetic phenomenology”, and then directed exclusively to the essential and invariant psychic forms. Therefore, phenomenology concerns the science of essences, so that as a science a priori, developed

rigorously and systematically, it seeks to reformulate methodologically Philosophy and Science. In approaching eidetic phenomenology, Husserl affirms that it is through the understanding of the essence – understood as all that is present in each phenomenon, that is, essences (*eidōs*) are the characteristic forms of the appearance of the phenomena, “*eidōs* is pure possibility (Ideality)” (Goto, 2008, p.82) – that a science of the phenomenological type is possible. “To all singular and concrete experience, that is, to all <phenomenon> or data clear to consciousness, essences (*eidōs*) thus are corresponding, through which the experiences, data or phenomena are situated and ordered in a <region>, which represents the supreme generic unit relative to these experiences, phenomena or data.” (Carvalho, 1965, pp. 55-56)

In concluding the first part of the *Article* of 1927, Husserl points out that the phenomenologically pure psychology is necessary as a foundation of the “exact” empirical psychology, he is taking as a model that of the pure exact sciences of physical nature. However, there are differences with respect to the *a priori* of each: the methods of natural science and psychology are essentially differentiated, but there is a necessary common ground: that psychology, as any science, can only extract its “rigor” from the rationality of what is in conformity with its essence.

For phenomenology to be a “first philosophy”, as Husserl called it, it was not enough only the eidetic reduction, which seeks to understand the *a priori* as *eidōs* (essence) and that will constitute the process of knowledge of things and of oneself, but it “was necessary to access other levels until reach the pure or transcendental layers; layers that would guarantee the construction of the new “science” projected by Husserl” (Goto, 2008, 84). And, for the systematic construction of a phenomenologically pure psychology, it is necessary, in synthesis, to describe the peculiarities universally belonging to the essence of an intentional psychic process, which refers to a “self” as a subject of beliefs, as a personal matter of habits, of an acquired knowledge, of certain qualities of the character. Thus, it also demands the exploration of intentional psychic processes, in consonance with the exploration of the syntheses of consciousness in which the intentional processes are pertaining, and the demonstration of the description of the essential characteristics of a universal stream of consciousness.

Finally, Husserl (1927) differentiates the static from the genetic phenomenology, since the descriptive-static analysis of the essences leads to problems of genesis. Thus, by elaborating the project of a pure phenomenology and succeeding the reflexive analysis of the phenomena, in order to apprehend its essence by the eidetic intuition, Husserl intended to make explicit the intentional acts and their contents. When designing the *static phenomenology*, Husserl sought to ground not only intentional consciousness, but also “the form or modes of given things (meanings)” (Goto, 2008, p.88). However, the analysis of the intentional phenomenon was done from the static point of view and for this reason, he did not want to justify the genesis of this phenomenon. Husserl affirms in the *Article*, that on top of the first *static phenomenology* it will be built at higher levels, a *genetic phenomenology*. In addition to the phenomenon, it will deal with the genesis of passivity as the first founding genesis, in which the “self” does not participate actively. In this sense, the eidetic theory will also deal with the purely psychical, that is, the “Self”, within the invariant structural forms of consciousness that exists “as personal ‘self’ and is self-conscious in continuous habitual validity as something that is always changing” (Husserl, 1927/1971, p. 7). In this changing from the static phenomenology to the genetic, it is interesting to point out that, as Goto (2008) highlights, many phenomenologists and psychologists who are based on phenomenology are restricted to the descriptive-static level of phenomenology. For this reason, they must be aware of the flexibility of the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl and its various levels, to comply with that the author proposed, since phenomenology should not be conceived as a new approach to psychology but as an epistemological assumption.

## 2.2 Part Two: From transcendental phenomenology to phenomenological psychology

In this section, entitled “Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology”, also divided into five themes, Husserl first deals with the so-called transcendental turn of Descartes and the psychologism of Locke, because the idea of purely phenomenological psychology, in addition to reform the empirical psychology, leads us back to these authors, since the transcendental problem has its origin with them:

The method of doubt of Descartes was the first method of exhibition of the “transcendental subjectivity” and his ego-cogito led to his first conceptual formulation. In Locke, the transcendently pure men of Descartes are turned into a human soul, whose systematic exploration through the inner experience engages Locke by a transcendental-philosophical interest. Therefore, he is the founder of psychologism as a transcendental philosophy founded through a psychology of inner experience. The destiny of scientific philosophy depends on a radical overcoming of every trait of psychologism, an overcoming that not only exposes the initial contradiction of psychologism, but also does justice to its transcendently significant core of truth. (Husserl, 1927/1971, p.8)

From the beginning, Husserl combats psychology as a fundamental philosophical discipline and refutes the psychologism in “Prolegomena for a pure logic” of 1900, because it is derived from certain projects of empirical psychology; thus, it cannot be generalized to every psychological project (Porta, 2013). If, in 1900, Husserl combats the logical psychologism derived from the empirical psychology; as of 1906, after the transcendental turn and the discovery of the transcendental reduction, the author starts to combat the transcendental psychologism in its various forms. “Psychologism has a “transcendental motivation” or possesses a “core of transcendental truth” because it correctly assumes that every object must necessarily constitute in consciousness” (Porta, 2013, p.63). During the 1920s, Husserl developed the project of a pure psychology; in 1925, he conceived a reduction properly psychological and elaborated the psychological route for the transcendental reduction. It is relevant to this work the explanation, in 1927, of a final understanding and overcoming of transcendental psychologism, in its most refined form. (Porta, 2013; Balbotín, 2015)

To Husserl, the transcendental reduction is the suspension on any knowledge to stop at the pure consciousness. It refers to a transcendental self, not personal-empirical, as a being who knows, feels, desires, etc. This transcendental self is not a self dissociated from the object, but the one that manifests himself in all his acts as intentionality. From the transcendental turn, the combat against psychologism no longer consists in distinguishing between ideal objects and psychological subjects, but in the distinction between psychological and transcendental subjectivity (Porta, 2013). Besides, it is only through the reduction that it is possible to overcome the psychologism, because it is a method for the intuitive access to the transcendental subject. What changes in 1927 is that Husserl perceives that psychologism rests on an authentic evidence, so it can only be rejected in a descriptive-intuitive way. That is, it rests on the perception of the identity of the psychological subjectivity and the transcendental subjectivity, and this parallel can only be perceived when the program of pure psychology is fully developed. Therefore, Porta (2013) states, this full development is a necessary condition for the definitive understanding of the transcendental psychologism.

From the beginning, Husserl aims at overcoming the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism and, with respect to the transcendental problem, points out that the meaning and validity of all known objectivity in the immanence of the subjectivity and identified at the core of a subjective process of foundation, should be questioned. Husserl explains that after the suspension of the natural attitude the theoretical interest is directed to a new cognitive attitude, to determine the intelligible structures that go beyond the merely observable, the empirical, in which all sense that the world has for us (which we now have consciousness), within the interiority of our own perception, is a conscious sense and is formed in our subjective genesis. This means that the world, according to Husserl, “has been related to the subjectivity of the consciousness, in whose life of consciousness is presented precisely as “the world”, in the sense it now has, then its mode of being in its totality acquires a dimension of unintelligibility or questionability.”(Husserl, 1927/1971, p.9)

When Husserl asks how to elucidate the consciousness itself, since it requires clarification regarding this world that appears to us, and that only subjectively reaches validity, that is, the “world” that becomes known in it, he affirms that it is precisely as understood by us, and only in us that the world gained and can gain its sense and validity. The problematization arose when Husserl perceived that consciousness could not be reduced only to the empirical self, described by the empirical psychology, which investigates the *psyche* integrated to the psychophysical nature (in the natural attitude) and does not guarantee apodicticity. However, it should seek the absolute foundation of consciousness to be reduced even more to reach the transcendental level, that is, “the level of the pure

consciousness or as a condition of transcendental possibility (necessary and absolute)” (Goto, 2008, p.89). Husserl reaches the eidetic exploration, by perceiving that in order to reach the sense of the phenomenon for all the consciousness, that is, the intersubjective sense, it is necessary to return to the intentional consciousness. He explains that “the idea of a pure phenomenological psychology showed the possibility of discovering, through a consistent phenomenological reduction, what belongs to the very essence of the conscious subject in eidetic universality, according to all its possible forms” (Husserl 1927, 1971, p.10)

Husserl points out that, even as an eidetic phenomenologist, the psychologist is transcendently ingenuous, because he explores the psyche through phenomenological reduction, which serves as psychological only to obtain the psychic aspect in animal realities in its own pure essentiality and its own purely specific interconnections, and pays attention to the fact that psychology, in all its empirical and eidetic disciplines remains a “positive science”. Therefore, the transcendental question, in its universality, includes the entire kingdom of transcendental ingenuity and calls into question every possible world simply alleged in the natural attitude. Consequently, all the positive sciences and all their various zones of objects must be submitted transcendently to an *epoché*. Therefore, the subjectivity and the consciousness that the transcendental issue recurs cannot be only the sense of consciousness and subjectivity of which psychology deals with. It arises the question that, would we then be psychologically dual beings?

The transcendental subjectivity, which is investigated in the transcendental problem, and which is presupposed by the transcendental problem as an existing basis, is none other than “I myself” and “we ourselves” again; however, not as those found in the natural attitude of the everyday life or the positive science, perceived as components of the objectively current world before us, but as subjects of the conscious life, in which this world and all that is present for “us” – “becomes” through certain apperceptions. (Husserl, 1927/1971, p.11)

Thus, Husserl explains that we have access to the transcendental subjectivity through the transcendental experience, and as the psychic experience requires a reductive method for purity, the same is true for the transcendental. Therefore, to begin to understand the “transcendental reduction”, it must be understood that it starts from the psychological reduction and operates in the same way through a certain *epoché*. According to Husserl, if the transcendental relativity of all possible worlds requires a universal *epoché*, this also postulates a “putting in brackets” of pure psyches and the pure phenomenological psychology related to them, and through this they are turned into transcendental phenomena. Consequently, the transcendental phenomenologist through his universal *epoché* reduces this pure psychological element for pure transcendental subjectivity, for who executes and places within himself the apperception of the world, thus, for him, which through a prior and universal decision of his will instituted in himself the habit of the transcendental “putting in brackets”, it is inhibited once and for all this “worldliness” of the consciousness, common in the natural attitude.

Husserl continues to develop the transcendental problem in the work *Crisis of the European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology*, of 1936, better known as *Krisis*, proposing a new investigation to reach the transcendental subjectivity as such. From this, before returning to the topic of psychologism, Husserl shows the other as another that cannot be present in my consciousness in the same way as the other entities of the world, that is, the other is the stranger of the self. The reflection is directed beyond the egology to the transcendental intersubjectivity. Husserl affirms that every transcendent obtains its existential sense as belonging to something only in a relative sense and incomplete by it, that is, as a sense of an intentional unit that is in fact transcendental giving of sense. Only the phenomenological psychology is capable of performing the intentional analysis in the full sense (Porta, 2013). It is also important to consider the fact that the phenomenological reflection of Husserl reaches the concept of intersubjective reduction, from which it is interpreted the self as a subject of habits and the intersubjective community as a community of persons, that is, in the pure form and concretely understood, which is also a community of pure “persons” acting in the intersubjective sphere of the pure life of consciousness (Husserl, 1927/1971).

Returning to the topic of psychologism, in order to conclude this second part, Husserl ensures that the propaedeutic utility of the preliminary project of a pure psychology for a rise to the transcendental



phenomenology still needs clarification, because when the true meaning of the philosophical-transcendental problem and the transcendental reduction is unveiled, it (pure psychology) will, in the possession of the transcendental phenomenology as a mere reversion of its doctrinal content in transcendental terms. In this way, only the definitive overcoming of the transcendental psychologism presupposes the full development of the phenomenological psychology. However, only from the transcendental phenomenology is that the full constitutive analysis is possible, since the transcendental psychologism in its definitive version is only possible after the pure psychology, which makes possible to conclude that transcendental phenomenology can overcome psychologism in an absolute way because only transcendental phenomenology is able to give to psychologism its ultimate form (Porta, 2013). The novelty is that transcendental psychologism in its purest form can only be overcome through reduction by way of psychology in the way in which this was conceived in 1927.

We know that through the phenomenological reduction it is reached in a reflexive way the knowledge of the self as the original source of all the knowledge of the world. Since the beginning, Husserl had as his goal to seek an ultimate foundation to all the philosophical argumentation in the consciousness of the transcendently thought-out self. To prove the thesis that the refined transcendental psychologism can only be definitively overcome by the path of the phenomenological psychology, he clarifies that the reduction occurs in two steps, as a double reduction: a psychological-phenomenological reduction and a phenomenological-transcendental one. Thus, only the route through psychology is presented as a reduction applied specifically to the subjectivity, that is, in what is really the essential: the subjectivity itself (final version). (Porta, 2013)

### 2.3 Part Three: Transcendental phenomenology as a universal science

In the last part of the *Article*, entitled “Transcendental Phenomenology and Philosophy as Universal Science with Absolute Foundations”, Husserl complements that the transcendental phenomenology, systematically and fully developed, is *eo ipso* an authentic universal ontology. It is itself a science of foundations to all and any other knowledge, “a science a priori of all conceivable beings” <Seienden>” (Husserl, 1927/1971, p 14). The philosopher explains that the very function of the method to achieve a fully reasoned universal science demands an infinite task of establishing the complete universe of the *a priori* in its transcendental self-reference and, therefore, in its autonomy and perfect methodological clarity. Thus, phenomenology becomes “first philosophy” by radical self-reflection and, for this reason, universal. In the fully reflective attitude, the philosopher will observe things in their original and immediate pureness, letting himself be guided exclusively by them. Such a first philosophy is phenomenology as the eidetic descriptive science of the transcendental pure consciousness.

In the final part of the *Article*, Husserl explains that in the Phenomenology, the rational problems of any type have their place; hence, it encompasses the problems philosophically significant, such as the metaphysically teleological, the ethical problems, and the problems of the philosophy of history. In speaking about the philosophical antitheses, such as the oppositions – rationalism and empiricism, relativism and absolutism, subjectivism and objectivism, ontologism and transcendentalism, psychologism and anti-psychologism, positivism and metaphysics, or the teleological interpretation and causal interpretation of the world – Husserl steps into the transcendental experience, in which an *a priori* ontology with its necessary structuring of a possible world, described at the phenomenological level in its modes of giving of sense and foundation of being, can be established. Husserl points out that subjectivism, for instance, can only be overcome by its most universal and consistent form, that is, the phenomenological resolution comes from the transcendental sphere, in the most universal form of an investigation about the essences that is related uniformly to the transcendental subjectivity, in its transcendental orientation. The subject-object polarity, together with the world structured by it, can only be elucidated originally through the radical suspension of what the poles, naturally considered, imply, integrating them in all aspects into the transcendental dimension (De Nigris, 2015) . In addition, Husserl contemplates the discussion about psychologism, by grounding the laws of the thought in a psychological constitution; this in a type of return to naturalism, would be taking the “laws of thought” as empirical generalizations, therefore, this naturalistic movement would discredit the pretension of universality of what would happen in the very sphere of the philosophical thought. In addition, because

of this process of growth of the naturalism, a crisis in philosophy would be established and that, in turn, would be a crisis of the philosophical foundations. Husserl already seems to introduce this reflection about the crisis of the sciences, which will also reflect in the *Cartesian Meditations* and in the work *Crisis*, besides the article for the Britannica. In *Crisis*, Husserl asks why sciences fail, asking for the origin of this crisis and also discusses the mathematization of the world of life, as well as elaborates an ontology of the world of life in which he tries to overcome the antagonism between the objective-naturalist and the subjective-transcendental of the modern thought (Husserl, 1936/1989).

The thinking of Husserl underwent a long and profound evolution. In the period of Halle (1887-1901) he wrote the *Investigations*; In the period of Göttingen (1901-1916) he elaborated his pure phenomenology and produced the *Ideas*; later, in Freiburg (1916-28), he produced phenomenology as a new transcendentalism or idealism characterized in *Cartesian Meditations*. In recent years, already retired from the University, he reflected about the crisis of the sciences as an expression of the crisis of the contemporary culture. Husserl will later direct the discussion to the concept of Life-world (*Lebenswelt*), which serves for a radical criticism of the sciences. He considered the world-life as a new starting point on the way to transcendental phenomenology, especially for transcendental subjectivity. In 1936, the first and second part of *The Crisis of the European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology* were published in Belgrade due to the prohibition of his works in the Germany of Hitler, and it was only in 1954 that this work was published in its entirety. Husserl died in April 1938, at the age of 79.

### Final considerations

Husserl had, in the *Article*, the objective of conceiving a pure or phenomenological psychology, when it was given in the phenomenology the need for a psychological road to the study of subjectivity. However, psychologism, scientific and naturalistic psychology, did not encompass his aims, because they failed to cope with the unreal world of the essences, and he was unable to provide the elements that constitute an absolutely founded knowledge, so he sought in his theory a “first philosophy”, in an authentic and genuine way, which would allow a step backwards of the path already established by science, elaborated by the phenomenological method.

He criticized the major philosophical systems, not only in the *Article* of 1927, but also in the periods from 1925 to 1928 and then between 1934 and 1937, in which he studied the project of the phenomenological psychology, also opposing the psychologism, not accepting the theories that disregarded the proper nature of the psyche. According to his ideas, phenomenology is the science that investigates the intentional experiences, that is, everything that appears to consciousness in all its possible significations. He presents the notion of phenomenon as something pure and absolute, that is, this must be considered in its appearance in itself. With the appearance of the phenomena, also appear the things and the world, from our acts of consciousness. Husserl then presents the intentional consciousness, from Brentano, however, reformulating it, in the sense that all consciousness is consciousness of something, is a aiming at something that is directed at the objects. Hence, this is subjective and refers to the being of consciousness itself, beyond a psychological consciousness. From these concepts, in the midst of the crisis of reason, in which philosophy went through a phase without scientific credibility, Husserl instituted a new method of philosophizing, in the sense of “return to the things themselves”, to eliminate the knowledge that is established and let see things as they appear. For this reason, it is called method of phenomenological reduction, by suspending the assumptions that prevent to see the thing itself. It is a question of suspending the natural attitude, which we have with the world on a daily basis, with freedom and spontaneity to accomplish the *epoché* and move to the phenomenological attitude. Such an attitude does not seek to question the existence or validity of the things of the world, but seeks a contact with the things evidently apodictic, to reach their essences. Husserl presents the eidetic reduction, to have access to the essence of each phenomenon.

In this sense, moving on to a new phase in his investigation. Husserl contemplates this theme in the *Article* of 1927, when explaining that in the process of objectification is contained the process of

subjectivation. By grounding this process, he reaches the synthesizing center, the “Ego”, interested in going beyond, to the sphere of the transcendental ego. This because, according to the author, it is only when transcendental is reached that phenomenology can be considered as the first philosophy. Then, he began the study of the phenomenological-transcendental reduction, with the intention of describing the pure consciousness. Therefore, pure psychology implies a conversion of the object-oriented lived, making the lived themselves in investigated objects, and concerns the transcendental philosophy to improve an unrestricted *epoché* in relation to the world, validating only the pure subjectivity.

What was interesting to discuss in the *Article* was also the theme referring to the elements that compose the so-called phenomenological psychology, regarding the methodical intention of Husserl to formulate a new method, pure and true, in an attitude of renunciation of the philosophical systems, keeping in mind that, in order to achieve a “perennial” philosophy, reality must be confronted and investigated, even if confuse. We understand that Husserl objectified with the *Article* an introduction to Phenomenology, so in this *article* it is not so clear the study and development of the transcendental phenomenology and consequently the transcendental subjectivity. In this way, Husserl revises these concepts in *Crisis*, in which the author in addition to study modernity in relation to temporality assumes transcendental phenomenology as the only possibility for philosophy to win the statute of the absolute reason, since for him Philosophy is the *Science*. For future studies, there is a need to deepen this concept. In his debates, Husserl discusses this theme with Heidegger, and he points out that when Husserl affirms that there is a “separation” between a subjectivity that is part of the world and a transcendental ego that, firstly, will always be “outside” the world, this status of “Transcendental” becomes confuse. In this sense, Heidegger disagrees with the founder of phenomenology as to what the “mode of being” of this “transcendental” subjectivity would be.

We believe that the study of the theme is relevant because it is possible to identify the elements that compose a psychology authentically phenomenological, in the conception of Husserl, in addition to agree with the need to investigate the theme, as the author emphasized. Our concern with the theme was not only of personal interest in studying more the bases of Phenomenology and its foundations for all sciences, which triggered the Phenomenological Psychology – perhaps even today not understood in its original project – but also of our admiration – the “astonishment”, the Socratic *thaumázein* that inaugurates the philosophical attitude, as “pure interest in knowledge” – with the concern of Husserl to study the phenomenon in its totality and concreteness, in the point where, by postulating phenomenology, he opposes to naturalism, reductionism and scientism, in a posture of questioning of these knowledge in his philosophical research. Husserl works with concepts whose range and complexity should be incorporated in the academic discussions, not only in the courses of psychology, but also in the professional positioning in general, taken as an intellectual attitude; so we believe that his works must be translated in order to increase the accessibility to them.

This brief comment on the *Article* of Husserl was intended to contribute to the access to Phenomenology, as well as to expand the understanding of his theory. As we observed, it was intended to maintain the original sense of the work, approaching the maximum possible to the sense of world that Husserl proposed. Phenomenology has been retaken by contemporary specialists, due to the need to understand its contributions and possibilities. This reality is perceived by the growing number of events, books, publications that reveal the interest of professionals and researchers by the contributions of phenomenology, whether as a foundation or a method.

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