

SCHREBER AND THE WRITING: TRANSCRIPTION OF DELIRIUM AND ITS EFFECTS IN STABILIZATION¹

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ABSTRACT. From the paradigmatic Freudian case based on Schreber's book, the present article highlights the importance, for the author, of the writing and especially the subsequent publication of his auto biographical book *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (1905/1984). The emphasis of this article will be on both the writing activity of the author of his *Memoirs*, including his repercussion in the field of psychoanalysis from the interpretation in Freud and Lacan, as well as on the intention to make it public. Both works, the activity of writing and publishing the book, will be articulated to the concept of substitution in the teaching of Jacques Lacan. Thus, the hypothesis of this article is that both the writing of delusion and its publication reinforced his delusional stabilization. The former, denominated here as transcription of delirium, worked as support to his personal image while the latter, referring to making his work public, worked as supports for his own name.

Keywords: Schreber; writting; stabilization.

SCHREBER E A ESCRITA: TRANSCRIÇÃO DO DELÍRIO E SEUS EFEITOS DE ESTABILIZAÇÃO

RESUMO. A partir do paradigmático caso freudiano, baseado no livro de Schreber, o artigo destaca a importância, para o autor, da redação e sobretudo a posterior publicação do seu livro autobiográfico *Memórias de um Doente dos Nervos* (1905/1984). A ênfase do artigo recairá tanto na atividade de escrita do próprio autor de seus *Memórias*, incluindo sua repercussão no campo da psicanálise a partir da interpretação de Freud e Lacan, quanto à intenção de Schreber torná-la pública. Ambos os trabalhos, a atividade de escrita e publicação do livro serão articulados ao conceito de *suplência* no ensino de Jacques Lacan. A hipótese do presente artigo é a de que tanto a escrita do delírio como a posterior publicação funcionaram como reforços na sua estabilização delirante. A primeira denominada aqui como transcrição do delírio funcionou como apoio à sua imagem pessoal e a segunda referente a tornar pública sua obra que funcionou como sustento de seu nome próprio.

Palavras-chave: Schreber; escrita; estabilização.

SCHREBER Y LA ESCRIT: TRANSCRIPCIÓN DEL DELIRIO Y SUS EFECTOS DE ESTABILIZACIÓN

RESUMEN. A partir del caso freudiano paradigmático basado en el libro de Schreber, en el artículo se subraya la importancia para el autor, de la redacción y la posterior publicación de su libro auto-biográfico *Memorias de un enfermo de nervios* (1905/1984). El énfasis del artículo será ubicado tanto en la actividad de escribir del propio autor sus *Memorias*, agregando ahí la repercusión de esa obra en el campo del psicoanálisis con la interpretación de Freud y Lacan, cuanto la intención de Schreber tornarla pública. Los dos trabajos la actividad de escrita y publicación del libro serán articulados al concepto de *suplencia* en la enseñanza de Jacques Lacan. La hipótesis del presente artículo es la

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de que tanto la escrita del delirio como la publicación sirvieron como refuerzos en su estabilización delirante. La primera llamada acá de transcripción del delirio funcionó como apoyo a su imagen personal y la segunda referente a tornar publica su obra funcionó como apoyo a su nombre propio.

Palabras-clave: Schreber; escrita; estabilización.

Introduction

Daniel Paul Schreber was a famous patient analyzed by Freud from the autobiographical book *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (1905/1984). In his book dedicated to Schreber, *Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Paranoid Delusions)* (1911/1969), Freud reveals that he himself had never met Schreber personally and only had access to his story through his book.

The content of the book written by Schreber contains in utmost detail a description of the phenomenology concerning the psychotic experience³ that crossed him. This crossing was lacerating and from the beginning it produced strong effects of reformulation and rupture with his previous life.

The originality of the Freudian reading of the *Memoirs* is linked to the fact that Freud was fascinated by the rich and complex delirious plot and allowed himself to enter into it, reconstructing all its associative ties. This Freudian stance determining his originality was against the current of his time and did not reduce Schreber's delirious production by interpreting it as a sign of his eccentric pathology. This is what Lacan (1955-56/1988) calls Freudian's "genious":

it's the genius of the linguist who sees the same sign appear several times in a text, begins from the idea that this must mean something, and manages to stand all the signs of this language right side up again (p. 20).

The reconstruction of all uses of Schreber's language, a product of Freud's work, is analogous, according to Lacan, to the translation of Schreber's foreign language, in this case the translation of his "fundamental language", as named by himself (Schreber, 1905/1984, p.20).

In this way, Freud gives the plot the dignity of being an authentic expression of a subject in his reinvention of himself, after the cataclysm of the irruption of his psychotic frame. In his terms:

The psychoanalyst, in the light of his knowledge of the psychoneuroses, approaches the subject with a suspicion that even mental structures so extraordinary as these and so remote from our common modes of thought are nevertheless derived from the most general and comprehensible of human impulses; and he would be glad to discover the *motives* of such a transformation as well as the *manner* in which it has been accomplished. With this aim in view, he will be eager to go more deeply into the details of the delusion and into the history of its development (Freud, S. 1911/1969-80, p. 28). [*italic emphasis added*]

What Freud announces here is of paramount importance, for he values these "extraordinary structures of thought" to the point of assuming that they can be taken as a legitimate production of a subject, as well as that they could shed light, in counterpoint, on our normal operation. Lacan follows in the footsteps of Freud but emphasizes what Freud also somehow isolates with respect to the disorders of language:

With the help of what Dr. Schreber tells us in the *Memoirs*, we must now endeavour to arrive at a more exact view of his theologico-psychological system, and we must expound his opinions concerning *nerves*, the *state of bliss*, the *divine hierarchy*, and the *attributes of God*, in their manifest (delusional) nexus (Freud, S. 1911/1969, p.25).

³ The term psychosis is included in the more general meaning of the Classification used by DSM V and ICD-10 as code F.20, corresponding to "Schizophrenia". " (CID-10. *Classificação Estatística Internacional de Doenças e Problemas relacionados à Saúde, 1997 & DSM-5. Manual Diagnóstico e Estatístico de Transtornos Mentais, 2014*). But here, we always refer to the work of J. Lacan with the psychoses as a subjective structure and not just as a psychiatric picture. See in: (1958) On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis. In: *Writings*, p. 562.

From this, Lacan (1955-56/1988) is more concerned with changes in the habitual use of language: "The promotion, appreciation in psychosis of language phenomena is for us the most fruitful of teachings" (p. 171). These elements, the neologisms, for example, will show their relevant functional character from the plot of Schreber, as opposed to being understood in lag with respect to what would be considered like the ordinary operation of the language.

Both the appreciation of the disorders of language and the recomposition of their own language are a compass that guides both Freud and Lacan to define the role of the psychoanalyst as the one that will promote, according to Éric Laurent, the "inclusion of the subject in the text." Laurent (1988/1990) stated in this sense that:

The introduction, then, of the category 'subject' by the psychoanalyst, leads first to consider the psychotic text as fiction and apportionment of joy, and secondly to assert this function of the text, not as a detachment of identifications, but speaking strictly as a form of emptying of joy (p.106). [Free Spanish translation]

For Laurent, the inclusion of the subject in the text requires, on the part of the psychoanalyst, the understanding of the function that the delirious construction has, as a symbolic fiction that distributes the joy⁴ and thus generates its emptying. To understand this, first let us define what is the subject for Lacan, and then define what that function that the delusional plot of Schreber promotes is.

The subject, in Lacan's definition (1968-69/2008) is situated in a hiatus; it is always between two, between two words and can not be apprehended by any definition or meaning, it is what always escapes it (p. 300). So, what Laurent says about including the subject in the text does not mean grafting that hiatus into the text, which would be including something that was not there before, but rather materializing something that is already supposed to be there, in this "between" or hiatus, space where the unconscious lives, and in which the psychoanalyst, in an analysis, seeks to present in the text of the analyzed author. This gap in neurosis always appears as an interval.

However, in psychosis, the interval is already materialized by the patient himself. For example, instead of the subject being between two signifiers, it is translated by the delusional postulate, that is, it is presentified through a neologism, such as those used by Schreber (1905/1984), "state of bliss", "nerves ", "attributes of God", etc. (p.31). The hiatus is then spontaneously materialized. Therefore, the psychoanalyst does not need to materialize the unconscious in the text, because it is already there. This is what leads Lacan (1955-56/1988) to state that it is, in madness, an open unconscious. Hence Freud (1911/1969) understands so easily that the delusional construction is homologous to the formations of the unconscious.

Thus, mentioning again Laurent's quotation, in addition to the function of delusional construction in psychosis materializing the subject in the text, this construction also has the function of distributing joy. And this distribution promotes their emptying and, with that, their treatment. What exactly does that mean?

Instead of being overwhelmed by the enjoyment of God, an experience in the psychosis that makes Lacan (1955-56/1988) use the expression "martyr of the unconscious", the psychotic, by locating it in his delirious axiom, can thus wipe out an unbridled joy (p.153).

This unbridled joy is what put Schreber (1905/1984) in the position of pure object, which he names with the word "perfidy", also highlighted by Lacan to refer to the relations of pure whim that God kept with him: "But at the same time all the *perfidy* of politics that followed me is revealed there" (p. 154) [*italic emphasis added*]. This phrase expresses strong indignation on the part of Schreber to have been the product of a whole articulation made by this God.

To conclude the introduction and in order to continue reading, we will corroborate the aforementioned Freudian "genius", also reinforced by Lacan in all his originality, in his unique approach to the delirious plot of Schreber. It is what made Freud the pioneer to consider the production of a

⁴ Joy is a Lacanian concept homologous to what Freud formalized from his death drive in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1925-26) Vol. XVIII. And it was resumed by Lacan in *Seminar V: The Formations of the Unconscious* (1958). It means a drive that threatens the homeostasis of the pleasure principle. Mixture of pleasure and pain (Vieira, M. A., 2005).

psychotic as the subjective solution to his suffering. Thus, Freud opens the floodgates of madness without any modesty:

Freud certainly would not repudiate that one attributed this text to himself, since it was in the article in which he promoted it to the category of case that he declared not to see unworthiness, not even risk, in letting himself be guided by such a brilliant text, despite having to expose himself to the censorship of being delirious with the patient, which does not seem to have touched him.[...] The freedom Freud gave himself was simply that, decisive in such a matter, to introduce the subject as such, which means not to evaluate the crazy person in terms of deficit and dissociation of functions. But the simple reading of the text shows with evidence that there is nothing similar in this case (Lacan, J. 1966/2003, p. 29).

The freedom with which Freud was fascinated by Schreber's text had consequences from which we have benefited to this day. It is what invites us to take us into this fabulous universe, warned of the Freudian choice that this reading implies, a choice that does not fail to take into account the subject of the text and its promotion to the central category. We will follow, therefore, its trace. On this track, our interest will be on the writing activity of Schreber's autobiographical book and its subsequent publication, motivated by the following question: how important is it in its stabilization that Schreber wrote his book and then made it public?

The case of Schreber

We will now turn to a brief history of Schreber's madness based on Schreber's own writing and supported by the biographical synopsis of the translator of his Portuguese book, Marilene Carone, which appears in the prologue of *Memoirs* and, of course, influenced by the Freudian reading.

Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911) became a jurist and his first crisis was close to the time he had been appointed to a higher position than he had until then, the position of Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal (p. 44). At the same time, he had a dream described by him, in which an idea or thought crossed his mind between sleeping and waking, "the idea that it must be a rather nice to be a woman undergoing intercourse" (p. 45).

The period relating to the emergence of this idea was considered by Freud as the incubator of his later illness. This period occurred in the interval between being appointed to the new position and the assumption of the position. The content of this idea will be central and will later become his "delusional belief"⁵, thus configuring a delirious syntagma about emasculation:

The exciting cause of his illness, then, was an outburst of homosexual libido; the object of his libido was probably from the very first his doctor, Flechsig; and his struggles against the libidinal impulse produced the conflict which gave rise to the symptoms (Freud, S. 1911/1969, p. 52).

Freud states that the appearance of this female fantasy may have been the result of the "transfer" mechanism, through which he had transferred a homosexual libidinal cathexis to the person of the physician referred to in the above quotation. This libidinal idea or impulse, which could not be contained, gave rise to the conflict considered as pathological.

The defensive struggle to avoid libidinal drive and the internal resistance on the part of the patient, for unknown reasons, took the form of a delusion of persecution addressed to Dr. Flechsig, which later became his delirium, suffering the substitution of the figure of the physician by God (p. 52).

At this point, Freud (1911/1969) alludes to recent research of his time which directed our attention to a stage of libido development between "autoeroticism and object love" (p.147). He also makes reference to his text: "On narcissism: an introduction" (1914/1974), that deals with this theme.

He quickly describes in this text that every individual, after an initial period of self-eroticism, gathers their sexual instincts toward a loving object and hence this results in homosexuality or heterosexuality. However, unlike what is imagined, after this choice has been reached, homosexual tendencies are not put aside or interrupted, they are simply diverted from their sexual goals and applied to new uses.

⁵ The "delirious belief" is an expression coined by J. Lacan (1955-56/1988) from the Clérambault, p.93.

Following the Freudian line of thought, there are two mechanisms linked to this cause: the mechanism by which the symptom is formed and the mechanism by which the repression is not caused. In this sense, Freud (1911/1969) comments:

The most striking characteristic of symptom formation in paranoia is the process which deserves the name of projection. An internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a certain kind of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external perception (p. 81).

Here Freud describes that the homosexual desire that is suppressed, renegade, undergoes deformation and returns as external perception. This mechanism was called by Lacan as "forclusion" inspired by the legal term that means the deprivation of a faculty or right, that for not having been executed in the due time, have become obsolete, which enabled Lacan to translate the Freudian "Werwergung"⁶ of the law on the side of refusal (Maleval, 2002).

On this particular mechanism of psychoses described by Freud, it is important to remember that, according to Jean Claude Maleval (2002), the term "werwergung" used by Freud to denote exclusion or rejection was not elevated to the category of technical concept. But it ended up gaining technical status because it was highly valued by Lacan, who made use of it to think later the concept of forclusion.

As a result of this forclusive mechanism, we would have as a product the paranoid symptom in the form of its delusion of persecution, in which Schreber (1905/1984) feels coerced by God to become a woman (p. 54).

The phenomenological description of this process contained in his book *Memoirs* during the early years of his illness is horrifying. Schreber starts to experience, according to his descriptions, hallucinatory corporeal sensory phenomena, such as feeling that he lives for long periods without stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with torn esophagus and shattered ribs. These sensations, interpreted by Schreber as part of his emasculation process, were part of a whole series of also verbal, visual, as well as sensory-perceptive hallucinations, followed by his frightening trigger.

Schreber (1905/1984) describes that after these lacerating periods, his organs were always restored by divine miracles, called "rays". In alternation with these phenomena, when they offered respite or stopped a little, his "femininity" became prominent (p. 50).

At these times, Schreber describes that he has the feeling that a great number of "feminine nerves" has already passed into his body and from him a new race of men will originate through his direct process of fertilization by God. Only then can he die of natural death and, together with the rest of humanity, he will regain his state of bliss.

Thus, at this initial moment, prior to the more consistent elocubration about his delusional postulate, Schreber is forced to undergo this process of reinventing himself. This process, as a consequence of the cataclysm experienced by him, will be cited by the description of Lacan (1955-56/1988):

Souls are not human beings, nor are these shadows with which he deals, but dead human beings with whom he has particular relations, bound up with all sorts of feelings of bodily transformation, inclusions, intrusions, and bodily exchanges. [...] From the phenomenological point of view, and remaining prudent, one must admit that there is a state there that may be qualified as the twilight of the world (p. 127).

This twilight of the world is the scene of all the source of phenomena, in which Schreber (1905/1984) deals with "dead beings", and remains connected even if he does not want to, physically and mentally (p. 50), which causes in him changes and transformations of invasive and tearfulness in his body. Since then, the world has become strange for Schreber, who enters a dark universe that eclipses all his previous universe in force so far.

It is from this moment that Schreber begins to establish a strong relationship of dependence on this God, who is his crucial interlocutor. It is a God who speaks not saying anything, but who speaks endlessly. The essential relation that Schreber (1905/1984) maintains with this fundamental interlocutor

⁶ Term in German that means in Portuguese "rejection", "denial", "exclusion".

has different dimensions. And what is most atrocious is that this God can leave him, abandon him, with no justification: "let lie", in German (p. 76).

Each time he loses contact with this God, with whom he maintains a double relationship, that is, through verbal contact and through voluptuousness, all kinds of internal phenomena of laceration and pain take place; intolerable phenomena, when this presence of God withdraws and leaves him helpless (p. 76).

Maybe this God is who speaks to him through a famous "fundamental language", composed of neologisms, such as the expressions already mentioned, "vestibules of heaven", "hurried men", "miraculous birds". They are expressions always marked by the author in quotation marks: "These are expressions which I would never have come by myself, which I have never heard of any other man of a scientific nature, especially a medical nature" (Schreber, 1905/1984, p. 31). They are neologisms which he does not recognize as having been invented by him, but rather they were imposed by that God:

souls learn the language that is spoken by God himself, the so-called '*fundamental language*', a vigorous, although somewhat old-fashioned, German language, which is especially characterized by the great richness in euphemisms (Schreber. 1905/1984, p. 31).

The existence of this vocabulary in a certain way does not dispense with writing, in the sense of the existence of the symbolic in the plot of the fictions of these neologisms, but the writing that we are going to address here is referred to the activity itself of writing, as we shall see later. However, these neologisms assume a rather peculiar position, condense meanings and are differentiated from the other words that are articulated in a significant chain, as already signaled.

From this brief immersion in the Schrebian universe we will try to emphasize the writing activity that occupied Schreber and which originated its extensive book with all the report of what he had gone through.

Discussion

Writing as a substitute for Schreber: the transcription of delirium and its publication

The discursive products characteristic of the register of paranoia usually blossom into literary productions, in the sense in which *literary* simply means *sheets of paper covered with writing*. Notice that this fact militates in favor of maintaining a certain *unity* between those delusions (Lacan, J. 1955-56/1988, p. 95). [*italic emphasis added*]

This present quotation is important to situate what we are calling the activity of writing. In this paragraph, Lacan defines the literary productions of patients equivalent to the action of covering sheets of paper with writing. We understand this definition reduced to just the activity of writing. That is to say, when Lacan refers to "literary" productions, it is exclusively about filling blank sheets of writing and not necessarily the creation of a literary work within the scope of literature.

So it is not the work of a poet, but rather what we might call the work of a "scrivener" to counteract that of a writer. To this office we would like to give special emphasis, since it is defined by the activity that involves covering blank sheets of writing. It is what Schreber puts in evidence as a "scrivener," and we assume that this activity involves fostering a reinforcement of the unity of his delusion.

So why does the psychotic write for? Our hypothesis supported in Lacan, and what made us affirm above that Schreber seeks the reinforcement of delirious unity would be: to objectify himself as subject. That is, unlike the writer who writes to create a world or do poetry, the psychotic would write here to objectify himself as subject. The subject in psychosis understood as we have already discussed in the introduction, relative in the psychosis to the delirious axiom, and his activity of writing in this case would seek the reinforcement of his syntagma or fundamental postulate:

We could summarize the position we are in with respect to his discourse on first encountering it by saying that while he may be a writer, he *is no poet*. Schreber does not introduce us to a new dimension of experience. There is poetry whenever writing introduces us into a world other than our

own [...]. Poetry is the creation of a subject adopting a new order of symbolic relations to the world. (Lacan, J. 1955-56/1988, p. 96). [italic emphasis added]

The poet would subvert the symbolic from the material that is previous in the Other in order to produce new relations, effects, new perspectives on a certain experience. The poet reinvents himself, the psychotic wants to objectify himself. But why?

Schreber does not reinvent himself, because he already is; he is already the woman of God, and if he writes is to witness what he is already in his delirium. What motivates him to write, then, is of a different order. For this reason, we will call this writing "transcription of delirium", from Jean Allouch (1995), to emphasize its characteristic testimony, bearer of a truth already established and concretized.

The expression "transcription", taken from Jean Allouch (1995), is as follows: "Transcribing is writing by regulating that written based on something outside the field of language. Thus the sound, recognized outside this field [...]" (p. 15). That is to say: "Writing is called transcribing when that written is regulated by sound, translating when it is based on the meaning[...]" (p. 15). In this definition, a writing that is based on sound and on what articulates in a particular way interests us in what concerns the one that comes closest to a characteristic of the testimonial writing realized by Schreber that we want to emphasize here. Lacan (1955-56/1988), in this respect, states that:

Let us say that the lengthy discourse in which Schreber testifies to what he has finally resolved to acknowledge as the solution of his problem nowhere gives us the feeling of an original experience in which the subject is himself included - his *testimony* can be said to be truly *objectified* (p. 94). [italic emphasis added]

Schreber gives us a testimony in which his subject is objectified, included in the text as already mentioned in this introduction. That is, when he writes about the "miraculous birds" or "hurried men," he materializes his being in those words. His subjectivity thus appears contained in the neologisms and sustained by these creative words, so he must write them. The subject here is not supposed to be in neurosis, nor is he between two signifiers, he is. And it is embodied in Schreber's unconscious text in open air, which he witnesses through what he writes.

The Schreber's subject we refer to here is a product of the fabric he weaves himself. It is what constitutes his subjective response to this real God who speaks to him, from whom he can only give the testimony of his existence in his face of real and massive presence, and which, as a consequence, responds with his delirious axiom, to be the woman of God. Even if this fixity or character of that response and destiny were in dissonance with his former life and not particularly pleasing to him, it seems to have no way out, and the axiom is his forced choice. Therefore, for this fate, Schreber can do nothing but bear his testimony of this singular delusional solution to the worst.

The writing of this delusional axiomatic solution is what promotes "substitution", by reinforcing the unity of delusion and also objectifying the subject by means of its materialization. In order to situate this term "substitution", we will briefly present here a theoretical digression, since according to Deffieux (2007) this term is an intransitive verb in French, and refers always to supplying some fault: an substitute is someone who occupies the place left (La Sagna, 2007). This verb appeared for the first time in Lacan, according to Deffieux (2007), in "On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis" (1957-58/1998), indissociated from the forclusion of the Name-of-the-Father, in compensation of the void of the paternal forclusion in the psychosis in Schreber.

As a consequence, as Schreber shows us, we see how a rupture or triggering can occur just when the substitution that functioned as a suture ceases or stops functioning.

However, it is important here to mention that the term "substitution", according to Deffieux, linked to the emptiness provided by the forclusion of the Name-of-the-Father promotes the psychosis as deficient in relation to the phallic signification and the substitution of the Name-of-the-Father. The Name-of-the-Father, for Lacan, is connected to the regulating apparatus of Oedipus, to which language is subjected. This signifier would place order in language, inscribing the subject in the symbolic law. (Deffieux, 2007). For that purpose, (1953/2008) "The Neurotic's Individual Myth", as well as (1953/1998) "The Function and Field of Speech and Language" are the consecrated texts in which Lacan will develop the concept of the Name-of-the-Father.

Therefore, later in his teaching, Lacan, in 1970, will reduce the prevalence of paternal function in psychoanalysis from the introduction of the Borromean nodes. Thus, the term substitution "linked to the forclusion of the Oedipus' Name-of-the-Father becomes a dated term" (Deffieux. 2007, p. 373-374). Such a notion, however, comes to life especially from his *Seminar 23* (1975-76/2007).

Leaving this theoretical digression, could we then say that the subject objectified by Schreber by the writing activity to be stamped by this activity has as consequence a reinforcement in his substitution? Applying the definition of substitution above, we understand that what, for Schreber, was in place of the forclusive hole left by the non-operation of phallic signification was later filled with the syntagma or delusional metaphor: "I am the woman of God".

Our hypothesis is that in addition to this substitution for the delirious axiom there is an extra gain that only the writing activity establishes. And that, in the case of Schreber, as already mentioned, we call "transcription of delirium".

What about publication? Let us now, before concluding, take a brief pause to consider something about this dimension. Schreber (1905/1984) had the ambition of making his text known:

I have only the purpose of promoting the knowledge of the truth in a field of greater importance, the religious one. I have the unmistakable certainty that I have this mastery of experience which - once the general knowledge of its exactness is obtained - it could act in the most fruitful way possible over the rest of humanity (p. 20).

Here Schreber makes clear his ambition and his desire to make public and known his formulations concerning the delirious constructions to which he had reached. And, in addition, he was convinced that what served him could be useful to the rest of humanity. On this intentionality of publication, in Lacan's terms (1955-56/1988):

What is it about these delusional testimonies? Let's not say that the crazy person is someone who lives without the recognition of the other. If Schreber writes this enormous work, it is precisely so that *no one should be ignorant of what he has suffered*, or even that, in this circumstance, the specialists will *verify in his body* the presence of the feminine nerves through which he has been progressively penetrated, in order to objectify his singular connection with the divine reality. This is proposed as an effort to be *recognized* (p. 94). [italic emphasis added]

This desire for recognition here is worth clarifying. We could infer from the quotation from Lacan that what he would like to be recognized by the Other is the order of an "objective" verification of the divine presence in his body. A recognition that is verifiable. But how this verifiable would be? For this we need first to briefly define the statute given by the Other by Lacan in psychosis, which will help us to understand this.

Lacan, in *Seminar 3* (1955-56/1988), says that the great Other is the one before whom we all make ourselves known. But to this end, it must first be recognized. The dimension of reciprocity is necessary in order to assert the place occupied by the subject in the world: "You are my teacher", "You are my wife" (p. 65). This is what makes each one enter the game of symbols, since in it one is always forced to behave according to some rule.

What about psychosis? The psychotic, like all of us, does not live without the recognition of the Other. And in this case, recognition is sought from the living testimony or from the actual verification in the body of the divine presence by the Other.

But what counts here is that recognition, in the case of Schreber, claims that the Other does not ignore what he has gone through. But it does not depend on a certificate from the Other so that his experience will come into existence. The "you are my teacher" or "you are my wife", in Lacan, J. (1955-56/1988), implies that in the act of naming the Other, something that was already there, happens to be. So, in this scope, the subject is defined from the Other. The appointment, in this case, would create a place.

But in Schreber, what we have seen so far reveals that the objectified subject, who materializes in the act of writing, is already defined beforehand and does not depend on the attestation of the Other to be. He is already the woman of God, without Other, in that sense. The Other with whom he relates is that of the delusional metaphor.

As a consequence, this certainty Schreber will not obtain from the act of naming the Other, as in the neurotic, because he already has it. What does he seek recognition for? Schreber wants everyone to know what he already knows and still wants to confer legality on it.

This is what Schreber (1905/1984) attests in his intention when he publishes. For example, it is known from his book that he has struggled against his family's will to make his story public, defending to reveal his idea and to benefit humanity with the contribution of scientific knowledge that could result (p. 20).

And as a consequence of having focused on this end, Schreber made gains in his personal life, including the redemption of his legal capacity, not only at the conclusion of his work, but also at the beginning. According to Schreber (1905/1984): "My legal capacity to work was then recognized and restored to the free disposal of my assets." (p. 20).

The fact that he had achieved recognition in the publication of what had occurred to him paradoxically had the consequence of progressively gaining more freedom and finally his independence. It is soon attested the reason for his insistence on this recognition so that, consequently, he has the obvious benefits associated.

And yet, on the other hand, he achieved an important effect of organizing his experience and transforming it into a finished product when he published it, which only reinforces the recognition of the subjective objectification that his delirious construction gave him.

Final considerations

We have seen with Schreber that the substitution made through the establishment of his delusional metaphor is reinforced by the writing activity and its consequent publication. The aspect related to the writing activity itself, what we also call activity of writing and "transcription" with Jean Allouch (1995) of delirium, was what we have tried to promote here as the central operation linked to substitution.

That is, the construction of the delusional metaphor itself already refers to a symbolic fictional construction and therefore also inhabits the dimension of writing on the level of the symbolic aspect, expressed by the unconscious in the open air. But we have sought to give prominence to the writing activity itself, expressed by the fact that the scrivener fills a blank sheet of paper to the detriment of the "symbolic" character already contained in the act of creating the delirious plot itself.

So our main interest has been more specifically on the writing activity in its "transcription" dimension. This operation is understood as the transposition of the sensory-perceptive experience of a hallucinatory nature to the delusional neologisms or axioms. This operation connects with the effect that, according to Lacan, is linked to what a psychotic seeks when he writes, driven by the need to objectify himself as subject.

Objectivation of the utmost importance that we have seen to be related to the materialization of the subject in the text, materialization of the hiatus of the intervalar subject that in the psychosis is fulfilled in a way supplanted by the delirious axiom. From what we could approach in the case of Schreber.

When Schreber writes his "fundamental language," the deformation of the language tries to give way to what is nowhere to be found in the invasive enjoyment to which Schreber is subjected. This enjoyment appears in his libidinous and imperative relationship with the God who speaks to him and with whom he continually depends and relates.

For this reason, it is crucial to take into account in the treatment of psychoses with Lacan and Freud the possible writing that each psychotic can give about what is invading him. In this sense, the writing referred to here will be understood in both aspects, the former regarding the symbolic writing of the delirious plot and the latter as the writing activity of this plot.

The consequences, for Schreber, of completing his book was a separator of this same enjoyment that made him write it, which does not mean that this has set a definitive solution, but Schreber was partly successful in promoting his substitution thanks to being able to write and then publish his *Memoirs*.

And finally, Schreber achieved, with the publication, that no one ignores or forgets what he had gone through, and thus he could dig recognition of the Other about this experience that gave him new existence; a recognition that allowed Schreber to regain his right as a citizen and civil liberty.

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