CONCEPTUAL POSITIONS IN CREATIVITY

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ABSTRACT. This article's goal is to analyze the various conceptualizations of creativity from the multiple epistemological and theoretical approaches. The psychology of creativity is a scientific field of investigation with more than 70 years of history, and along these years, it has been a very productive research domain. The definition of the concept of creativity has evolved over the years due to theoretical and epistemological transformations innovations in the area. Conceptual positions that have been practiced in literature need to be analyzed critically, especially since they mark the starting point for any research in the psychology of creativity. This article will discuss four conceptual positions of creativity, namely: standard conceptualization, systemic conceptualization, socio-historical conceptualization and sociocultural conceptualization. It is from a vision of creativity that a research will begin. Knowing the different concepts about the phenomenon and recognizing its transformations over time is an indispensable requirement for scholars in the area. Beyond the critical and conceptual analysis, this paper suggests ways to promote fruitful dialogues on the conceptual positions of creativity, seeking to understand the possibilities and limitations present in the communication between theories.

Keywords: Creativity; concept; theory.

POSIÇÕES CONCEITUAIS EM CRIATIVIDADE

RESUMO. Analisar conceituações de criatividade a partir de múltiplos posicionamentos teóricos e epistemológicos retrata o objetivo central deste artigo. A psicologia da criatividade, campo de investigação com mais de 70 anos de história, vem desenvolvendo pesquisa e teoria na área, para demonstrar vigor e força em seus esforços científicos. A compreensão do conceito de criatividade, considerando suas transformações ao longo do tempo, fruto da renovação teórica e epistemológica que a área vem vivenciando, configura uma questão central para a pesquisa. Posições conceituais que têm sido praticadas na literatura necessitam ser analisadas, de modo crítico, especialmente por marcarem o ponto de partida de qualquer investigação na psicologia da criatividade. Este artigo vai discutir quatro posições conceituais da criatividade, a saber: a conceituação padrão, conceituação sistêmica, conceituação sócio-histórica e conceituação sociocultural. É a partir de uma visão de criatividade que uma pesquisa terá início. Conhecer os diversos conceitos sobre o fenômeno e reconhecer suas transformações ao longo do tempo apresenta-se como requisito indispensável para estudiosos da área. Para além da análise crítica conceitual, o presente trabalho exercita a inferência acerca de prováveis diálogos entre as posições

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conceituais da criatividade, a fim de compreender as possibilidades e limitações presentes na comunicação entre teorias.

Palavras-chave: Criatividade; conceito; teoria.

POSICIONES CONCEPTUALES EN CREATIVIDAD

RESUMEN. La base central del artículo se concentra en analizar las diferentes conceptualizaciones acerca de la creatividad a partir de múltiples perspectivas teóricas y epistemológicas. La Psicología de la creatividad, un campo de investigación con más de 70 años de historia, viene desarrollando investigaciones y teorías en el área, demostrando vigor y fuerza en sus esfuerzos científicos. La comprensión del concepto de creatividad, llevando en cuenta sus transformaciones a lo largo del tiempo, fruto de la renovación teórica y epistemológica que el área viene vivenciando, configura una de las cuestiones centrales para la investigación. Perspectivas conceptuales que han sido practicadas en la literatura necesitan ser analizadas, de modo crítico, especialmente porque definen el punto de partida de toda la investigación en el área de la Psicología de la Creatividad. En este artículo se discutirá cuatro posiciones conceptuales de la creatividad, a saber: la concepción estándar, conceptualización sistémica, conceptualización socio-histórica y conceptualización sociocultural. Es a partir de una visión de creatividad que la investigación tendrá su inicio. Conocer los diversos conceptos acerca del fenómeno y reconocer sus transformaciones a lo largo del tiempo se presenta como el requisito indispensable para los estudiosos en el área. Más allá del análisis crítico conceptual, el presente trabajo realizar un ejercicio de inferencias con relación a los probables diálogos existentes entre las posiciones conceptuales acerca de la creatividad, buscando comprender las posibilidades y limitaciones existentes en la comunicación de las teorías.

Palabras-clave: Creatividad; concepto; teoría.

Introduction

The conceptual trajectories of creativity have undergone constant transformations because of the insertion and renewal of epistemological and theoretical approaches to this research field. As a central part of scientific knowledge, concepts need to be critically analyzed for understanding their development processes. Conceptualizing creativity is a challenge. Researchers agree that few psychological concepts are as difficult to define as creativity (Sternberg, 1988). With the expansion and growth of this area of research in the last decades, we have currently found a range of theoretical and epistemological options proposing different conceptualizations of this phenomenon (Amabile & Hennessey, 1987; Glaveanu, 2010, 2015a; Stein, 1953; Vygotsky, 1990, 2009). These concepts, however, do not seem willing to dialogue. There is the need of an analysis that considers the main definitions of creativity practiced in the literature and the positions they take in the discourse of the psychology of creativity for the identification of the conceptions of creativity used in psychology. The present work proposes to carry out this analysis using the expression "conceptual positions" as a critical indicator of the epistemic and theoretical places inhabited

by the concept of creativity in the last decades. In the end, we will make considerations about possible dialogues between conceptual positions.

For science, theoretical models are interpretations of supposed realities arising from research efforts in specific fields. Such efforts translate into processes built by the researchers, carried out, controlled and transformed by them. Conceptualizing phenomena in the scientific field is like constructing discourses that support the birth, permanence and consolidation of a theoretical model. The scientific making, however, does not always recognize the relevance of the dialogue between the concepts or even the interlocution between the discourses. It is only in dialogue, no matter how discordant it is, that different conceptual positions find opportunities for growth, transformation and renewal. The best for science does not always happen in the context of scientific doing. Prejudice against the novel, against transformations and changes is not attached only to the common person. Worldwide, scientists struggle against changes in their procedures, methods, and concepts. This resistance to dialogue between concepts and theories eliminates the creative possibility in scientific research, which includes the field of the psychology of creativity. It is something to think about more strictly.

Conceptual positions under analysis

The use of the term "conceptual positioning" allows, in an almost scenic way, a dialogical space "between" concepts of creativity used in the last decades of research. Looking at a phenomenon of a certain position means to anchor this phenomenon to a body of meanings, highlighting its context and development. Considering several positions, when analyzing the same phenomenon, means to try to put these anchors in dialogue, to look at the development of a concept that transits between theories in movement. Theoretical models are (and must be understood as) open systems in permanent exchange with the environment, destined to development, stagnation or even extinction (Valsiner, 2014). Each theory has its corpus, an instance that aggregates stories, people, decision-making, social, cultural, economic and political interferences in the path of the knowledge it produces. A theory is more than a window that opens to look at a phenomenon. It is, in particular, the result of decisions that have been made throughout its history and which places it in a particular epistemological place. These places, or positions, emerge from the work of researchers in different spaces and times, under multiple influences. It is from this dynamic and changeable look that we will analyze the development of the concept of creativity, focusing on the possibilities and limitations of each position.

Recently, Runco and Jaeger (2012) wrote an article called "The standard definition of creativity". In this work, the authors analyze the conceptual issue of creativity, stating that quality research in the psychology of creativity should add to what has already been done, always remembering the cumulative importance of knowledge. The importance of recognizing the criteria of novel, original and useful as describing creativity is central to the development of investigations. Runco and Jaeger (2012) emphasize in their discourse aspects and criteria about the conceptualization of creativity that characterize what we will call the first conceptual position in analysis: the standard conceptual position. The first conceptual positioning in analysis is based on the criteria of innovation, originality and usefulness as structuring the conceptualization of creativity. The standard positioning predominates in the studies on psychology of creativity. It is a pluralistic theoretical and epistemological place (sometimes absent of epistemologies), of descriptive and normative character and in which there is greater consensus regarding the definition of creativity.

The standard conceptual position

Stein (1953) is an important researcher for the standard conceptual position. His concept of creativity embraces the criteria of novel, original and useful as defining elements of the phenomenon. For this author, creativity is a "process that results in a novel product that is accepted by a significant number of others as useful and/or satisfying at some point in time (p. 311)." Stein's conceptualization was well accepted in his time, especially for presenting constructs that fit quite easily in empirical verification processes. Investigating novelty, a statistical concept, and usefulness, a measurable factor in scales, for example, has opened a space of comfort and safety necessary for the advancement of research in this area. Glaveanu and Kaufman (in press) argue that the criteria of novelty/originality and usefulness/value, as conceptual elements of creativity, had the same weight and importance in the expansion of research in this area in the 1950s. However, there has been was a tendency to privilege the criteria of novelty and originality to the detriment of others. This option was aligned with the Zeitgeist of the time, in which pragmatic and functional values of American psychology prevailed, indicating almost predetermined directions for scientific research.

Understanding creativity as the emergence of something novel, original, and useful has opened safe paths to his investigation. Psychometrics researches were then quickly augmented, especially by the endorsement of Guilford (1967), himself a renowned psychometrist. Tests (Torrance, 1966) were created to measure aspects of creative thinking. Lines of research on creative personality, creative process, creative product, among other themes, emerged in large scale (Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Simonton, 2016; Sternberg, 1988). In the 1970s to 1990s, research on the psychology of creativity flourished based on the concepts anchored in Stein's (1953) contribution, namely:

> A product or response will be judged creative to the extent that (a) it is both a novel and appropriate, useful, [emphasis added] correct, or valuable response to a task, and (b) the task is heuristic rather than algorithmic (Amabile & Hennessey, 1987, p. 7).

> Creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process, and environment by which an individual and/or group produces perceptible product that is both novel and useful [emphasis added] as defined within a social context (Plucker & Beghetto, 2004, p. 90).

The developmental trajectories of the standard conceptual position show discrepancies in the use of novelty and usefulness criteria (Simonton, 2016). The usefulness criterion, which refers to valuation issues, has had a low insertion in contemporary definitions. Weisberg (2015) proposes, for example, the substitution of the criterion of usefulness, better understood as a value than a criterion, by the term "intentional novelty". The author questions how it is possible to develop cumulative knowledge in the scientific field using a value that is interpreted in different ways over time. Intentional novelty, according to the author, configures a conceptual path that adds usefulness to the definition of creativity, escaping from the interpretive difficulties that involve this construct. Some people disagree with these arguments (Simonton, 2016) pointing to the problematic use of the term "intentional" as definer of a phenomenon that often requires randomness to occur, as it is the case of creativity.

A very interesting discussion about the vocabulary used in researches and conceptualizations on creativity was made by Glaveanu, Tanggaard and Wegener (2016).

Vocabulary, or the set of words of a language, are words created, used and re-signified by social groups. The word (the sign) and its meanings take a central role in the processes of the production of human knowledge, and given the polysemic nature of some concepts, some words speak "more" than their meanings in themselves: "vocabularies are never innocent " (p. 271), as stated by the authors. In the field of scientific research, it is always hoped that the main concepts in a given area of knowledge will be consolidated and will be used by a large part of the community.

> In creativity research, consolidation has been a high priority because of the somehow slippery character of the phenomenon of interest. There is no doubt that consolidating a research field requires some kind of consistency in the concepts used, in order to enable communication between researchers (Glaveanu et al, 2016, p. 271).

Formalizing scientific terminology helps strengthening a field of knowledge and facilitating communication among peers, and also builds habits and ways of approaching scientific knowledge that can become rigid. This rigidity, which goes beyond the formation of concepts and extends to the modes of thinking of groups working in certain areas of knowledge, ends up producing enormous resistance to the renewal of scientific knowledge (Glaveanu et al, 2016). Thinking equally not necessarily provides credibility to scientific knowledge, on the contrary. The multiplicity of theoretical and epistemological structures enriches science, in addition to paving the way for future transformations to (and in) knowledge. Perhaps, creativity is more important to science as a human possibility to be developed by the researcher than as an object of study. Studying creativity is very important, but being creative in science seems to be a more relevant proposition.

In spite of the reasonableness of the standard conceptual positioning, considering its multiple variations, the criteria of novelty and usefulness are not enough to define creativity (Corazza, 2016; Runco & Jaeger, 2012). Different theories have discussed the concept of creativity, configuring new contrasting and challenging conceptual positions.

The standard conceptual positioning has had a prominent role in the construction of the psychology of creativity. Through studies begun in the 1950s, and consolidated over decades of investment, a body of knowledge on creativity was created. In its theoretical and epistemological multiplicity, the standard conceptual position generated a rich descriptive scenario of the creative phenomenon, encouraging a redistribution of themes in new areas of research, such as the study of processes, products, creative personality, cognitive aspects linked to creativity, among many others. This descriptive, causal and correlational dimension began what we now understand as the psychology of creativity and launched the foundations of this field of knowledge. Its reductionist view of creativity, expressed in the almost exclusively quantitative approach of the phenomenon and in the absence of an ontogeny, situates this position in a place where a subject without history, without social insertion and without a vision of human development acts. Overcoming this limitation can only be possible with the acceptance of a development dimension inherent to the creative individual.

Addressing creativity as a phenomenon apart from an ontogeny has been the overall rule. There is prevalence, in literature, of the non-contextual and uncritical approaches that often presuppose that the definition of the concept of creativity is previously known by the different scientific audiences. When the investigation of creativity disregards an ontogeny in its organicity, it leaves aside an important issue of psychology: the consideration of a developing subject, whether he is in a creative moment or not. Since this discussion explores

the conceptual issue of creativity, not only do we need to construct an ontogenetic look at the phenomenon as we must insert the interactional-relational and sociocultural human dimension into its conceptualization. Over time, new positions have emerged, some diverging drastically from what was known about creativity until then, others promoting deep transformations in the conceptual dimension. We will call these positionings as **systemic, socio-historical and sociocultural**.

The systemic conceptual position

Conceptual divergences arise in the scope of the psychology of creativity by modifying the concept of Stein (1953). Theoretical and sociogenic approaches (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, 2014; Glaveanu, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Vygotsky, 1990, 2009) argue that the standard definition of creativity is insufficient for an adequate investigation of the phenomenon. Changes in the conceptual and theoretical field of the psychology of creativity start to arise, enriching the scenario with differentiated, sometimes antagonistic, complementary, unusual and especially creative conceptualizations. Not only has the concept of creativity been questioned in recent years, but also the epistemological, theoretical and methodological foundations have been transformed. Today we find a plurality of theories that investigate the creative phenomenon, from the approaches still faithful to the initial concepts to sociogenetic and predominantly qualitative models that have modified substantively the understanding about what is creativity and how we can investigate it (Glaveanu, 2010, 2014; Neves-Pereira, 2004; Neves-Pereira & Branco, 2015; Vygotsky, 1990, 2009).

The systemic conceptual position, which is the second position to be analyzed in this work, is well represented by the Systemic Model of Creativity, created by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1996, 2014). The originality of Csikszentmihalyi's work (1996) has made a significant contribution to the psychology of creativity, especially because it is not limited to the framework of "usefulness-novelty" as the defining criteria of the act of creating. The author broadened the understanding of creativity by designing it in systemic operation in a social context. Currently, there is a quite different conceptual position change from the previous model. That conception of creativity as an almost linear and causal phenomenon, which until then was defined as an individual process capable of generating the novel and useful was replaced by a social and systemic phenomenon, conceptually distributed in constitutive instances that operate in an interdependent way and that depends on these interactions to generate something that can even be novel and/or useful.

For Csikszentmihalyi (2014), creativity has been investigated more as a mental phenomenon than social and cultural, aspects that characterize it with more emphasis. His model is based on the premise that creativity cannot emerge without a social endorsement. Conceptualizing creativity based on personological traits or only on consensual criteria, such as "novel and useful" is not enough to investigate in a complex and dynamic way the act of creating. A product, idea or thought is only recognized as creative when exposed to the judgment of other people, when socially and culturally contextualized. Creativity is a phenomenon "in context", defined and identified from human interactions in social groups.

Csikszentmihalyi (1996, 2014) defines creativity as a phenomenon constructed through the interactions between the systems (a) subject; (b) domain (culture) and (c) field (social organizing instance of the domain). In this perspective, for creativity to occur, a range of practices, beliefs and values must be transmitted from the domain to the subject. The subject can, through processes of signification of this cultural information, produce

something novel from the domain. However, this production or variation in the domain must be selected and approved by the field, so that there is future inclusion of the novelty in the domain and, consequently, cultural transformation. Creativity is not the product of singular individuals in individual actions, but rather the result of the judgment and acceptance of certain groups of individuals about the products presented as creative. From a systemic perspective, creativity will always generate changes in all the instances involved in this process: the subject, their social nucleus and their cultural niche. By innovating, the subject starts from premises, ideas and information received through cultural mediators, returning this material in the form of a sufficiently impacting product or idea, to the point of generating new standards in the same culture from which it originated. It is a self-feeding process that works by modifying all the dimensions involved and that originates from the relationships between man and culture. The concepts of "novel and useful" were not neglected by the Systemic Model of Csikszentmihalyi (1996, 2014). They were repositioned, showing that the consensual definition of creativity can facilitate research but, like any concept, can and should be modified, making knowledge on the phenomenon richer and more diversified.

The systemic conceptual position added great value to the psychology of creativity. Investigating the creative phenomenon, considering it part of a system, has modified the understanding about the creation processes and acts. The conceptualization of creativity was significantly altered with the work of Csikszentmihalyi (1996, 2014) and this transformation innovated the field, paving the original ways for research. As a dissonant aspect of the model, the focus is given to the social dimension, with a strong social and historical emphasis, which masked the creative phenomenon in its primary instance of daily manifestation (Glaveanu, 2010). The Csikszentmihalyi's model (1996) left ordinary creativity aside. How to evaluate everyday and child creativity, for example, in the absence of domains of expertise? The model advances by broadening the understanding of creativity in its various instances, but ignores central aspects to a vision of creativity that encompasses its multiple expressions. The developmental dimension of creativity is not addressed in the systemic conceptual position. Sociogenetic contributions enable an epistemological, theoretical and methodological dive into the subject's origins.

The socio-historical conceptual position

The Vygotskyan sociogenetic approach names the third conceptual analysis of this work: the socio-historical conceptual position of creativity. Vygotsky's work inaugurated new ways of understanding processes of human development and learning and also modified the dominant sense of creativity. Vygotsky's contributions to psychology and to the psychology of creativity have allowed the repositioning of the analysis focus of human psychological processes and inserted within the framework of the psychology of creativity an ontogeny supporting the investigation of phenomenon. In short, the creative subject began to have a developmental history that situates him in time and in the existential space and allows him to construct development routes that favor the emergence of creativity (Neves-Pereira, 2004).

The psychology of Vygotsky (1990, 2009) is qualitative, systemic, hierarchical, dialectical, anchored in the process of semiotic mediation and based in social and historical contexts. Vygotsky (1990) changes the vector of human development, redefining its direction from an internal evolutionary process to a socio-historical process. By stating that human psychological development occurs at first intersubjectively and then becomes intrasubjective, Vygotsky (1990) transforms human development into a social process, a

phenomenon not only influenced by this dimension but constituted by it. The vision of human development as an individual, evolutionary process that uses the sociocultural dimension only as a backdrop for developmental phenomena is deconstructed in a striking way by sociogenetic models (Glaveanu, 2015b; Valsiner, 2014; Vygotsky, 1990, 2009). The conception of creativity as a human phenomenon is also affected.

Vygotsky produced three texts related to creativity, namely: (1) Imagination and creativity in childhood, written in 1930 and with several later publications; (2) Imagination and creativity in the adolescent, produced as a chapter of a book entitled "The Paedology of the Adolescent" and published in 1931 for the first time and (3) Imagination and its development in childhood, a lecture presented in 1932 at the University of Moscow (Smolucha, 1989). In these works, Vygotsky (Smolucha, 1989) sometimes considers creativity as a higher psychological function (Vygotsky, 1990) and sometimes addresses it as "a process that includes play, imagination and fantasy." (John-Steiner, Connery & Marjanovic-Shane, 2010, p. 12). Transiting between different definitions and characterizing creativity in a varied way, Vygotsky (Smolucha, 1989) made it challenging for his readers to grasp a concept of creativity. His publications on the subject have given us a preliminary drawing of his ideas abouton creativity and imagination with the prospect of a model he called Creative Imagination. His texts on creativity predominantely deal with this proposed model and its developmental trajectories, highlighting the relevance of play and imagination for the development of the subject's creativity (John-Steiner et al., 2010; Vygotsky, 1990). However, in the three texts produced by the author (Smolucha, 1989) there is no objective definition of creativity.

The absence of a concept of creativity in Vygotsky's work (1990, 2009) has not generated conflict, incredible as it may seem. Most of the authors who work with socio-historical psychology accept the definition of Creative Imagination as satisfactory for the understanding of creativity and end up constructing their own concepts, considering the main constructs of the Vygotskian psychology. Smolucha (1989) argues that:

> In sum, Vygotsky proposed a developmental theory of creativity in which creative imagination develops from children's play activities into a higher mental function that can be consciously regulated by inner speech. In adolescence, a new level of creativity is reached as when imagination and thinking in concepts begin to interact. But it is not until adulthood that creativity fully matures (p. 2).

John-Steiner *et al.* (2010) bring a definition of creativity as "a transformative activity in which emotions, meanings and cognitive aspects are synthesized" (p.12). The authors further argue that Vygotsky, in dealing with creativity, considered both everyday, mundane creativity and products, ideas and artifacts elaborated with geniality and capable of impacting generations. The socio-historical conceptual position transits through these multiple definition possibilities, without an official concept of creativity. Creativity, for Vygotsky (John-Steiner et al, 2010; Smolucha, 1989), is a *higher psychological function* that develops following the same dynamics of other functions; it is also a system that arises when imagination finds conceptual thinking and enhances the child's ability to create. In some moments, creativity emerges as *behavior* that belongs to our species (Vygotsky, 2009).

Creativity, for socio-historical psychology, is a phenomenon understood "in a relation" with imagination, with play, with the processes of signification, among other conceptual frameworks of the model. This "intermixture" (Valsiner, 2014) between concepts has generated an extensive and ambiguous research area, in which study objects become mixed, rebuilt and merged. There is prevalence of investigation on creativity in the

educational context, especially due to the strong impact that the Vygotsky model (1990) has generated by repositioning the relations between human development and learning. The renewal of methodological practices proposed by socio-historical psychology inaugurated a certain sense of freedom and creativity in the construction of research designs, encouraging researchers to risk in their studies. In this scenario, conceptualizing creativity, especially articulating the concept to the criteria of novel, original or useful, did not raise the interest of the Vygotskyans. The dominant criteria in the standard definition of creativity get lost in socio-historical research. Here, there is no point in questioning only the usefulness or novelty of the creative phenomenon. What really matters is to see it as part of complex developmental processes and articulated to other human psychological functions. The researches oriented by the conceptual socio-historical position have been dedicated to investigate themes such as: (a) creative imagination, innovative and collaborative ways of solving problems, artistic creations (Connery and John-Steiner, 2012); (b) creative process and meaning processes (Connery, 2010) and (c) empathy, imagination and creation (Brolezzi, 2015), among other themes, but without questioning the conceptualization of the creative phenomenon.

It is surprising that the conceptual frameworks of socio-historical psychology do not meet a conceptualization of creativity. There are questions that arise in this direction and that indicate this concern, such as: after all, despite the imagination and other processes of construction of the higher psychological functions, what is this creativity that we are talking about? The cultural psychology of creativity answers this question also from sociogenetic premises of human development, but does not end the discussion.

The sociocultural conceptual position of creativity

A final theoretical model comes to mark a position in this discussion: it is the cultural psychology of creativity, a recent field of research and that has the best reference in the work of Vlad Glaveanu (2010, 2014), a Romanian psychologist. This theory under construction embraces sociogenetic epistemological bases, being strongly influenced by the works of George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, Vygotsky, Bakhtin and by the cultural psychology of Jaan Valsiner. We will name it the sociocultural conceptual position of creativity.

Although the cultural psychology of creativity has Vygotsky's psychology (1990) in its foundation, it has a clear and objective definition of creativity. The creative act is understood as a phenomenon of sociogenetic, relational, dialogical, intersubjective origin, distributed in psychological (people), material (objects, ideas), social (places) and temporal (historical time and chronological time) instances (Glaveanu, 2014). Like Vygotsky (1990), the sociocultural conceptual position has a special interest in everyday creativity, which is constituted in everyday life, in the small acts practiced by people and by social groups. The aim to understand creativity with a lower "c" does not eliminate the investigation of genius creativity, which modifies systems, ideas, and people's lives. If we think of creativity as a developing process, it is not difficult to understand that creativity with a lower "c" is part of the same continuum where genius creativity is expressed. The designs of the developmental paths of these two types of creativity are different, but both emerge from common developmental processes.

The work developed by Glaveanu (2010, 2014, 2015a, 2015b) and his collaborators has a recent history. It arises from the author's interest in creativity as a social phenomenon and requires an interdisciplinary research to be understood. Glaveanu (2010) proposes the

investigation of three conceptual paradigms of creativity as an analytical resource that allows us to place the epistemological paths that the cultural psychology of creativity chose to tread.

The first paradigm is called "He" and is characterized by strong individualism, well illustrated in the figure of the creative genius. This model understands creativity as exclusive to genius extremely skilled men who create from their biopsychological characteristics, apart from their sociocultural contexts. The relations with the sociocultural environment are not one of interdependence, but rather of predominance of the genius man who, in creating, modifies the whole of society. It is an elitist and exclusionary model that seeks to understand the "pure and genial" creativity of some men (and rare women), disregarding the ordinary creativity that organizes our everyday experience. The second paradigm, called "I", turns its focus to the creative subject, but with a more democratic look. With the advances of research on creativity and considering the impacts generated in the educational and organizational areas, it became impossible not to consider different levels of creativity expressed by the subjects in different contexts. The studies on intelligence and giftedness have brought the concept of gifted to psychology in a definitive manner. Guilford was the voice of the paradigm I, when in his famous speech he called for more studies that investigated the creative personality. He was convinced that the ways of understanding the creative phenomenon passed through the subject as a unit of analysis. This model has borne fruit and generated innumerable studies, all supporting an intrapsychic view of creativity. Sociocultural contexts remained as influential or impeding elements of creativity situated "around" the subject, without being part of the analysis. For this paradigm, creativity is well defined by the concept of Stein (1953), analyzed in the standard conceptual position. The third and last model, the paradigm "We", begins the rescue of the social dimension of creativity. The holistic and systemic models (Amabile and Hennessey, 1987; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, 2014) appear in the research scene recovering the constitutive role of the social dimension in the genesis and development of creativity, rejecting partially atomistic and positivist positions (Glaveanu, 2010). The We paradigm, however, kept the dynamics of excluding subject and culture by analyzing these categories as distinct units. The social dimension has played a crucial role in the development of creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014), but has remained detached from the subject, acting as a regulator of creativity, but not constituting the subject that creates. Creativity has continued to be an individual phenomenon orchestrated by the social dimension.

The cultural psychology of creativity comes with a proposal beyond the We paradigm, in which the model subject versus society is replaced by a theoretical perspective that considers the subject and the sociocultural dimension in relations of otherness, as co-constituted, as interdependent, non-separate entities and that are drawn in the interactions and tensions that give rise to a world full of symbols (Glaveanu, 2010, 2015a). As Vygotsky (2009) emphasized, the relationship with the other allows the self to define itself, because even when alone, the dialogue between the self and the other remains. When we exist as "in-cultured" subjects, we give meaning to symbols, we construct identity and otherness, we develop in sociocultural contexts. Mediation processes mediate the constitution of the subject and culture, in a bidirectional dynamics (Valsiner, 2014). If the subject is constituted in and with culture, creativity will also originate from this alive, tensioned, unpredictable and creative meeting. The cultural psychology of creativity seeks the origins and processes of development of this phenomenon in the daily actions carried out by people in sociocultural contexts, generating new, original, differentiated or even surprising instances that we can call creative. This process is not situated in people, in dynamics, in places, or in sociocultural

settings, but rather distributed among these instances, from interactive and dialogical movements that give rise to the creative act (Glaveanu, 2014, 2015a).

For the sociocultural conceptual position, creativity is:

> Starting from a cultural perspective, I will define creativity as a complex sociocultural-psychological process that, by working with culturally impregnated materials within an intersubjective space, leads to the generation of artifacts that are evaluated as new and significant by one or more persons or communities at a given time. As presented above, the sociocultural-psychological process is a dialogical one, the culturally impregnated materials are symbolic resources (signs and tools in a Vygotsky's perspective) used in creative acts, and the intersubjective space is a potential space between creator and community (Glaveanu, 2010, p. 87).

The sociocultural conceptual position retakes the criteria of novel, original and useful for the definition of creativity without reducing it to these aspects (Glaveanu, 2010). A new epistemological, theoretical and methodological model emerges, allowing the investigation of the creative phenomenon in an absolutely innovative way (Glaveanu, 2014, 2015a, 2015b). Similar to Vygotsky's (1990) model, which works with the emergence of creativity from social interactions mediated by other social aspects and building a symbolic world, the cultural psychology of creativity introduced concepts that are based on the same interactive and semiotic dynamics for the emergence of the creative act without, however, directing its gaze exclusively to the play, the development of the imagination and the construction of meanings. New terminologies emerge as the concept of distributed creativity, taking away from the subject the main role of the creative act and distributing this phenomenon through various instances, including the temporal dimension and the existing affordances of an object (Glaveanu, 2015a).

The cultural psychology of creativity marks its position by arguing that every creative act is, in its origin, sociocultural. It highlights the relevance of an intersubjective space where the creative act is born and develops, through dialogical social interactions; and seeks to understand the processes that transform symbolic cultural elements into new and original products, that is, into creative products (Glaveanu, 2010). The gains coming from this theoretical proposition have been duly recognized, however, some difficulties placed on scholars who begin to adhere to the model should be discussed. The conceptual amplitude of the proposal of a distributed creativity (Glaveanu, 2014) and the approximation of the model with social psychology makes the concept of subject, which is very important to psychology, ambiguous. When we analyze the emergence of creativity in the midst of so many influential and interfering aspects, such as the sociocultural dimension, time, space, affordances and acts of the subject, with their possible results, we notice that the self tends to dilute in face of the complexity of the scenario. Conceptually, the subject merges with the creative instances in such a way that sometimes it is difficult to see him. Being the object of study of psychology the subject's understanding intra and intersubjectively in different contexts, how can we access this subject in such a broad model? This anguish lies not only in the conceptual dimension, but probably in the methodological structuring of studies in the area.

Final considerations

Possibilities and consequences of a dialogue between conceptual positions of creativity

The question that arises, in this final stage of the work, is: who is interested in a dialogue between conceptual positions in a scientific field? In theory, it should be of interest to all researchers in the field. After all, science needs the exchange and interlocution to grow and improve its ways of producing knowledge. In practice, dialogue is much less practiced in the scientific field than one imagines or intends. Thinking of dialogue, from Bakhtin's view (2010), as the practice of communicative interactions that takes place in sociocultural scenarios, where the self and the other construct and share collectively world meanings, how can science, product of the collective, escape from dialogue? Strange as it may seem, practice has exposed this escape. This fact is observed in scientific meeting settings, such as congresses, seminars and other events. In general, the works are presented and rarely discussed. As much as there is disagreement of the audience regarding the subject being presented, in general there is no questioning. It is as if there was an unspoken agreement not to disturb the other's trajectory. Dialogue is confused with conflict and the opportunity of communication is lost in these spaces, migrating to articles responding to an author of whom one disagrees, where the possibility of written dialogue immediately eliminates the non-verbal dimension, rich in potentialities and expressions.

In the field of psychology of creativity, the conceptual dialogue has not occurred. The standard conceptual position remains dominant and not sensitive to sociogenetic models (Simonton, 2016). Investigations on creative personality, for example, disregard the developmental dimensions. Its subjects remain without history and without development trajectories. Creativity, as a human possibility, is denied to the creative individual of the standard conceptual position by the absence of a view of subject practiced in these models. The creative process is also affected as it loses its agent. In theories that do not discuss the ontogeny of the subject it is not possible to know or even identify who takes the role of the creative act. The descriptive, causal, and correlational nature of the standard conceptual position precludes an investigative view of the reasons, the places where creativity emerges not only as a phenomenon, but as a human possibility of a social, cultural, and historical subject, circumscribed by time and existential space.

Systemic approaches have rescued the social dimension of creativity and initiated a reconfiguration of the research scenario. The lack of dialogue, however, has not allowed the divergent theoretical currents to permeate one another. Socio-historical and sociocultural positions have much to say to the systemic positions on how to give a sociocultural meaning to the creative phenomenon. Subject and culture not only coexist in a figure-background relationship, they are constituents of one another. The sociogenetic view changes the whole developmental scenario of the subject and, consequently, transforms the development of his creativity (Neves-Pereira, 2004).

Different conceptual positions reflect different epistemologies. In the psychology of creativity, as in psychology in general, it is very difficult to negotiate theoretical positions. The visions of being human, constituted in the most different psychological schools, tend to be perceived as the most adequate or even correct version of the human psychological phenomenon. Human sciences, however, must not give up the dialogue, because, as difficult, undesirable or fruitless it may be, it still sets the right path for the understanding of the human being in his existential complexity.

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