Corrupção, instituições e desenvolvimento
Palavras-chave:
Corrupção, Instituições, Desenvolvimento Econômico, Burocracia, Corrupção percebida
Resumo
Este artigo tem por foco explorar a relação entre instituições, corrupção e os seus impactos sobre o desenvolvimento econômico. Esta relação é explorada por meio de revisão bibliográfica e de análise exploratória da relação bidirecional entre nível de corrupção percebida e PIB per capita (desenvolvimento econômico). Ademais, examina-se a influência de fatores como religião, sistema jurídico e localização geográfica dos países no PIB per capita e na corrupção percebida. Os resultados revelam que o baixo nível de corrupção apesar de não ser uma condição suficiente para atingir o desenvolvimento econômico é sem dúvidas uma condição necessária. A redução dos níveis de corrupção passa pelo fortalecimento das instituições, o que é um tanto quanto desafiador para locais que se encontram em um círculo vicioso de más instituições, as quais tendem a se perpetuar. Dessa forma, é importante que se tire proveito de qualquer espaço que houver para mudanças institucionais positivas.
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Referências
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Breusch, T. S., & Pagan, A. R. (1979). A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, 1287-1294.
Breton, A., (1996). Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
De Vaal, A., & Ebben, W. (2011). Institutions and the relation between corruption and economic growth. Review of Development Economics, 15(1), 108-123.
Duflo, E., & Banerjee, A. (2011). Poor economics. PublicAffairs.
Fisman, R., & Svensson, J. (2007). Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence. Journal of development economics, 83(1), 63-75.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.,Vishny, R.W. (1999). The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1), 222–279.
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Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. Journal of political Economy, 115(2), 200-249.
Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in developing countries. Annu. Rev. Econ., 4(1), 479-509.
Olson,M. (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy and Development. American Political Science Review 87, 567–76
Pande, R., & Udry, C. (2005). Institutions and development: A view from below. Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper, (928).
Rauch, J.E., Evans, P.B. (1997). Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries, University of California, San Diego, Manuscript.
R Core Team. (2021). R: A language and environment for statistical computing.
Robinson, J. A., & Acemoglu, D. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty. London: Profile.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shepsle, A. K. (1997). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. Chapter 11. 355-368.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. The quarterly journal of economics, 108(3), 599-617.
Tanzi, V. (1994). Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets. IMF Working Paper, IMF, Washingtonn DC.
Tanzi,V. (1995). Fiscal federalism and decentralization: a review of some efficiency and macroeconomic aspects. In: World Bank, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995, World Bank, Washington, DC.
TI (2021). Transparency International the global coalition against corruption. Disponível em: < https://www.transparency.org/en>.
Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and Bureaucracies. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations 2, 181-214.
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of public economics, 76(3), 399-457.
Wathne, C., & Stephenson, M. C. (2021). The credibility of corruption statistics. A critical review of ten global estimates. CMI CHR. Michelsen Institute.
Weingast, B.R. (1995). The economic role of political institutions: market-preserving federalism and economic development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1), 1–31.
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. American economic review, 89(4), 982-993.
Aidt, T. S. (2009). Corruption, institutions, and economic development. Oxford review of economic policy, 25(2), 271-291.
Banerjee, A. V., Banerji, R., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., & Khemani, S. (2010). Pitfalls of participatory programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in India. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(1), 1-30.
Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005). History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India. American economic review, 95(4), 1190-1213.
Breusch, T. S., & Pagan, A. R. (1979). A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, 1287-1294.
Breton, A., (1996). Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
De Vaal, A., & Ebben, W. (2011). Institutions and the relation between corruption and economic growth. Review of Development Economics, 15(1), 108-123.
Duflo, E., & Banerjee, A. (2011). Poor economics. PublicAffairs.
Fisman, R., & Svensson, J. (2007). Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence. Journal of development economics, 83(1), 63-75.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.,Vishny, R.W. (1999). The quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1), 222–279.
Laffont, J. J. (2000). Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laffont, J. J. (2006). Corruption and development. In: Duflo, E., & Banerjee, A (Eds.), Understanding poverty, 61-168.
Macrae, J. (1982). Underdevelopment and the economics of corruption: A game theory approach. World development, 10(8), 677-687.
Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. Journal of political Economy, 115(2), 200-249.
Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in developing countries. Annu. Rev. Econ., 4(1), 479-509.
Olson,M. (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy and Development. American Political Science Review 87, 567–76
Pande, R., & Udry, C. (2005). Institutions and development: A view from below. Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper, (928).
Rauch, J.E., Evans, P.B. (1997). Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries, University of California, San Diego, Manuscript.
R Core Team. (2021). R: A language and environment for statistical computing.
Robinson, J. A., & Acemoglu, D. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty. London: Profile.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shepsle, A. K. (1997). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. Chapter 11. 355-368.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. The quarterly journal of economics, 108(3), 599-617.
Tanzi, V. (1994). Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets. IMF Working Paper, IMF, Washingtonn DC.
Tanzi,V. (1995). Fiscal federalism and decentralization: a review of some efficiency and macroeconomic aspects. In: World Bank, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995, World Bank, Washington, DC.
TI (2021). Transparency International the global coalition against corruption. Disponível em: < https://www.transparency.org/en>.
Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and Bureaucracies. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations 2, 181-214.
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of public economics, 76(3), 399-457.
Wathne, C., & Stephenson, M. C. (2021). The credibility of corruption statistics. A critical review of ten global estimates. CMI CHR. Michelsen Institute.
Weingast, B.R. (1995). The economic role of political institutions: market-preserving federalism and economic development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1), 1–31.
Publicado
2022-04-17
Como Citar
Luz, G., & Werneck Capodeferro, M. (2022). Corrupção, instituições e desenvolvimento. A Economia Em Revista - AERE, 29(3). Recuperado de https://periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/EconRev/article/view/60749
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