The pragmatic theory of observation: feyerabendian ontological incommensurability

Abstract

This article discusses the concept of theoretical incommensurability in the philosophy of science, focusing on the ontological perspective proposed by Paul Feyerabend. The aim is to present a comprehensive analysis of Feyerabend's proposal, highlighting the unfeasibility of explanation and reduction in general or non-instantiable theories. Feyerabend argues that Nagel's reduction theories and Hempel and Oppenheim's explanation theories are at odds with current scientific activity and acceptable empiricism. The author maintains that the transition between theories occurs not only through conceptual annexation but also involves linguistic, theoretical, and ontological changes. The replacement of one theory by another can alter the correspondence of meanings between terms and the scientist's worldview. However, the theory of incommensurability faces criticism, especially regarding linguistic and theoretical aspects, neglecting its ontological significance. This article examines both the theoretical-linguistic criticisms and incommensurability and proposes a broader defense of the ontological relationship between scientific theories.