Medidas de desempeño no financieras en contratos de remuneracion y la gestion de ganancias
Resumo
Objetivo: El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar la relación entre el uso de medidas de desempeño no financieras en contratos de remuneración gerencial y la gestión de las ganancias.
Método: Explorando una muestra no probabilistica de 128 empresas no financieras que negociaron en la bolsa de valores brasileña [B]3, con datos desde el año 2012 hasta 2019 y análisis econométrico basado en mínimos cuadrados ordinarios. Originalidad / Relevancia: Esta investigación avanza al evaluar la relación entre MDNF y la gestión de ganancias basada en factores contextuales que rodean a la empresa en una economía emergente.
Resultados: Los resultados evidenciaron las empresas que usaron los dos tipos de medidas redujeron sus gastos discrecionales para aumentar las ganancias. Asimismo, los accruals discrecionales fueron menores en los entornos con mayor propensión de uso de medidas no financieras, con todo, la gestión de ganancias a través de la disminución de gastos discrecionales fue usada en todos los contextos independientemente del grado de propensión de uso de tales medidas. Aportes teóricos/metodológicos/prácticos: Las evidencias permiten suponer la posibilidad que los gerentes de las empresas que usan MDNF en contratos de remuneración estén haciendo un trade-off entre la gestión contable y la manipulación de actividades reales.
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