Nonfinancial performance indicators in compensation contracts and the earnings management

Keywords: Executive Remuneration; Management Performance; Earnings Management.

Abstract

Objective: The objective of this research is to analyze the relationship between the use of nonfinancial performance measures in managerial compensation contracts and the management of earnings.

Method: Exploring a non-probabilistic sample of 128 nonfinancial companies listed at Brazilian stock exchange [B]3, with data from 2012 to 2019 and econometric analysis based on ordinary least squares.

Originality / Relevance: This research advances by evaluating the relationship between MDNF and earnings management based on contextual factors surrounding the firm in an emerging economy.

Results: The results showed that companies that used both types of measures reduced their discretionary spending to increase earnings. Likewise, discretionary accruals were lower in settings with a higher propensity to use nonfinancial measures, yet earnings management through the reduction of discretionary expenses was used in all contexts regardless of the degree of propensity to use such measures.

Theoretical/methodological/practical contributions: The evidence suggests that managers of companies that use MDNF in remuneration contracts are making a trade-off between accounting management and the manipulation of real activities.

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Author Biographies

Manuel Antonio Perdomo Castellanos, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Mestre em Ciências Contábeis pela Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE)

Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Luiz Carlos Marques dos Anjos, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Doutor em Contabilidade pelo Programa Multiinstitucional e Interregional de Pós-Graduação em Ciências.

Contábeis UnB / UFPB / UFRN Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

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Published
2025-07-04
How to Cite
Castellanos, M. A. P., & Anjos, L. C. M. dos. (2025). Nonfinancial performance indicators in compensation contracts and the earnings management. Enfoque: Reflexão Contábil, 44(2), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.4025/enfoque.v44i2.67354
Section
Original Articles