The influence of the control structure on corporate tax aggressiveness

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to verify whether the control structure would reduce the fiscal aggressiveness given less interest of the controller is exposed to the risk of fiscal oversight in public companies listed at B3. This article studies corporate fiscal aggression in the face of the agency conflict, between majority and minority shareholders, evidenced in the usually concentrated control structure in the Brazilian reality. To address the agency problem, the company’s adherence to particular corporate governance segments proposed by B3 is observed, and it is verified if the control structure impacts on fiscal aggressiveness as companies are more transparent in their information for minority shareholders. Methodologically, tax aggressiveness was measured by the percentage of value added destined for tribute and the study period was 2009 to 2014. The estimation was promoted by the ordinary least squares (MQO), as well as by the quantil e regression method. The results suggest a negative relationship between fiscal aggressiveness and control concentration, it implies that higher concentration of control structure leads to a less fiscal aggressiveness, but this relation is moderate when the company adheres to the excellent levels of governance.