Analysis of corporate acquisition on executive compensation: a study between brazilian family and non-family firms
Abstract
Studies on corporate compensation have aroused the interest of academia and the business community in recent years, especially after the normative and regulatory bodies have established stricter rules for the transparency of executive compensation forms. In this sense, this study aims to analyze whether there is a difference in the total executive compensation between family and non-family firms that made corporate acquisitions in the period 2009-2016. Executive compensation data were collected on the B³ website. The identification of corporate acquisitions and the collection of other information took place using the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. Firms were classified as family members or non-family members based on the family involvement component approach in the control, ownership and management of the firm and the organizational identity approach, self-declared in the firm's history. In total, 96 firms, 39 family members and 57 non-family members, participated in 281 acquisitions as acquirers, which were analyzed using multiple regression with unbalanced panel data. The results showed that the increase in the total compensation of executives of non-family firms is higher than that of family firms in the post-acquisition period. Thus, as a practical contribution, the findings may lead the shareholders of the firms to reflect on the use of the corporate acquisition strategy, since the executives of the non-family acquiring firms receive, on average, higher compensations. The theoretical contribution is in the segregated analysis of firms, whether family or non-family, which allows a different view of the results and peculiar to the Agency Theory.
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