Monitoring or expropriation? the relations between ownership control, board of directors and executive management team in brazilian publicly traded companies
Abstract
Objective: This study analyzed the relationships among ownership control, board of directors and executive management team in Brazilian publicly traded firms, and verified whether the relationship of the characteristics of the board of directors and executive management team with the value of these firms depends on the type of ownership control.
Originality/Relevance: In a market characterized by firms with defined shareholder control, this paper advances the Corporate Governance literature by identifying how the type of ownership control is related to the characteristics of the management bodies and how the overlap between ownership and management is related to the Brazilian firms’ value.
Method: The sample was composed of 741 observations from 281 firms over the period 2018-2020. Ownership control was categorized into dispersed, shared, family, corporate and governmental. Through principal component analysis five characteristics of administration were identified: executive management team compensation, independence of administrators, for evaluating of administrators, separation between board of directors and board of directors’ compensation. Through feasible generalized least squares estimations, it was investigated the relationship between shareholder control and characteristics of administration and whether the type of ownership control differentiates the relationship between characteristics of administration and firm value.
Results: The type of ownership control is related to the administration characteristics analyzed, except for the type of compensation of the board of directors. All five management characteristics are related to firm value, but the sign and significance of these relationships depend on the type of shareholder control.
Theoretical/methodological/practical contributions: The findings indicate that the overlap between ownership control, board of directors and executive management team is present in Brazilian firms with defined ownership control, and, depending on the identity of controlling shareholders, can be interpreted by outside investors as a monitoring mechanism or an instrument that facilitates the expropriation of the firm's wealth.
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References
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