Informação contábil e remuneração executiva: uma análise a partir da qualidade do lucro
Palavras-chave:
Remuneração executiva; Qualidade do lucro; Gerenciamento de resultados.
Resumo
Verificou-se a relação entre a remuneração executiva e a qualidade do lucro como forma de mitigação do problema de gerenciamento de resultado para obtenção de maiores remunerações, por parte dos executivos. Foram analisadas 288 empresas que divulgaram as informações sobre remuneração executiva no período de 2008 a 2017, de países que compõem a União Europeia, por meio de regressão por dados em painel com efeitos fixos. Os resultados permitem afirmar que os pacotes de remuneração executiva são influenciados pela magnitude de accruals e suavização de resultados. Executivos que lançam mão de accruals e de práticas de suavização de resultados observam maiores remunerações. Por outro lado, não foi possível identificar relação entre persistência de lucros, tempestividade no reconhecimento de perdas e a remuneração executiva, fato que não permite afirmar que estas duas proxies apresentam influência sobre os pacotes de remuneração. As variáveis de controle de tamanho, endividamento de curto prazo, retorno contábil, retorno de mercado e governança corporativa apresentaram significância estatística. A principal contribuição do estudo é a evidenciação de que, para este período e amostra, os pacotes de remuneração não sofreram influência de todas as métricas de qualidade do lucro, apenas pelo uso de accruals e suavização de resultados, combinados com o retorno das ações no mercado acionário, o que sugere, segundo a literatura, um desalinhamento entre os interesses de longo prazo de investidores e seus executivos.
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Referências
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Conyon, M. J. (1997). Corporate governance and executive compensation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 15(4), pp. 493-509. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(96)01032-6
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Cordeiro, J.; He, L.; Conyon, M. J.; Shaw, T. (2013b). Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 30 (4), pp. 1031-1058. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10490-013-9353-9
Dalmacio, F. Z.; Rezende, A. J.; Slomski, V. (2009). Análise setorial das medidas de performance utilizadas nos contratos de remuneração dos gestores. Revista Universo Contábil 5(3), p. 6-23. DOI:10.4270/ruc.2009319
Dechow, P.; Dichev, I. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accruals estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77, p. 35-59. DOI: 10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35
Dechow, P.; Ge, W.; Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: a review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, p. 344-401. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1485858
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Friedman, H. L. (2014). Implications of power: when the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports. Journal of Accounting and Economics 58, p. 117-141. DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.06.004
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Greckhamer, T. (2016). CEO Compensation in relation to worker compensation across countries: the configurational impact of countr-level institutions. Strategic Management Journal 37, 793-815. DOI: 10.1002/smj.2370
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Jiang, J. X.; Petroni, K. R.; Wang, I. Y. (2008). CFOs and CEOs: who have the most influence on earnings management? Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1121131 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121131
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Ali, A.; Zhang, W.N. (2015). CEO Tenure and Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 59, 60-79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.11.004
Almadi, M.; Lazic, P. (2016). CEO incentive compensation and earnings management: The implications of institutions and governance systems. Management Decision 54(10), p. 2447-2461. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-05-2016-0292
Almeida, J. E. F.; Sarlo Neto, A.; Bastianello, R. F.; Moneque, E. Z. (2012). Alguns aspectos das práticas de suavização de resultados no conservadorismo das companhias abertas listadas na BM&F BOVESPA. Revista de Contabilidade e Finanças, 23(58), p. 65-75. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1519-70772012000100005
Araujo, J., & Ribeiro, M. (2017). Trinta anos de pesquisa em Remuneração Executiva e Retorno para o Acionista. Revista De Educação E Pesquisa Em Contabilidade (REPeC), 11.
Ashley, A. S.; Yang, S. S. M. (2004). Executive compensation and earnings persistence. Journal of Business Ethics 50(4), p. 369-382.
Assaf Neto, A. (2002). Estrutura e análise de balanços: um enfoque econômico-financeiro. (7 ed.) São Paulo: Atlas.
Baber, W. R.; Kang, S. H.; Kumar, K. R. (1999). The explanatory power of earnings levels vs. earnings changes in the context of executive compensation. Accounting Review 74(4), p. 459-472. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.1999.74.4.459
Baginski, S. P.; Lorek, K. S.; Willinger, G. L.; Branson, B. C. (1999). The relationship between economic characteristics and alternative annual earnings persistence measures. The Accounting Review 74(1), p. 105- 120. DOI: 10.2308/accr.1999.74.1.105
Baker, G. P.; Jensen, M. C.; Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives: Practice vs. theory. The Journal of Finance 43(3), p. 593-616. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x
Baker, M. P.; Wurgler, J. A. (2006). Investor sentiment and cross-sectbaion of stock returns. The Journal of Finance 61(4), p. 1645-1680. DOI: 10.3386/w10449
Balsam, S., 1998. Discretionary accounting choices and CEO compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 15 (3), 229–252.
Bergstresser, D.; Philippon, T. (2006) CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics 80, 511-529. DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.011
Boeri, T.; Lucifora, C.; Murphy, K. J. (2013). Executive remuneration and employee performance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Breusch, T. S.; Pagan, A. R. (1980). The langrange multiplier test and its applications to model specification in econometrics. The Review of Economic Studies 47(1), p. 239-253. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297111
Brockman, P.; Ma, T.; Ye, J. (2015). CEO compensation risk and timely loss recognition. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 42(1-2), p. 204-236. DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12100
Burns, N.; Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics 79, p. 35-67. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2469/dig.v36.n3.4211
Bushman, R. M.; Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 32, p. 237–333. DOI: doi=10.1.1.467.6157
Byrd, J., Parrino, R., & Pritsch, G. (1998). Stockholder-manager conflicts and firm value. Financial Analysts Journal, 54(3), 14-30. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v54.n3.2177
Chen, F., Hope, O.K., Li, Q.Y., Wang, X., 2018. Flight to quality in international markets: investors’ demand for financial reporting quality during political uncertainty events. Contemporary Accounting Research, 35(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12355.
Cheng, Q.; Farber, D. (2008). Earnings restatements, changes in CEO compensation, and firm performance. The Accounting Review 83(5), p. 1217-1250. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.5.1217
Clarke, R. N.; Conyon, M. J.; Peck, S. I. (1998). Corporate governance and directors´ remuneration: views from the top. Business Strategy Review 9(4), pp. 21-30. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8616.00079
Clay, D.G., (2001). Institutional ownership, CEO incentives, and firm value. The University of Chicago.
Conyon, M. J. (1997). Corporate governance and executive compensation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 15(4), pp. 493-509. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(96)01032-6
Conyon, M. J.; Gregg, P. (1994). Pay at the top: a study of the sensitivity of top director remuneration to company specific shocks. National Institute Economic Review 149, pp. 83-92. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/002795019414900107
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2004). Compensation committees and CEO compensation incentives in US entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Management Accounting Research 16(1), pp. 35-56. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2012a.) Executive compensation and corporate finance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance 18 (2), pp. 1-51. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2012b). CEO compensation and corporate governance in China. Corporate Governance an International Review 20(6), pp. 575-592. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006
Conyon, M. J.; He, L. (2013). Executive compensation and corporate fraud in China. Journal of Business Ethics 112(2), pp. 187-201. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2390-6
Conyon, M. J.; Leech, D. (1994). Top pay, company performance and corporate governance. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 56(3), pp. 229-247. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.1994.mp56003001.x
Conyon, M. J.; Schwalbach, J. (2000). European differences in executive pay and corporate governance. In Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden. Horst Albach (Ed.). Corporate Governance: ZfB-Ergänzungshefte (Vol. 1, pp. 97-114). Wiesbaden: ZfB-Ergänzungshefte
Cordeiro, J.; He, L.; Conyon, M. J.; Shaw, T. (2013a). Chinese executive compensation: the role of asymmetric performance benchmarks. The European Journal of Finance 19(6); pp. 484-505. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2013.769892
Cordeiro, J.; He, L.; Conyon, M. J.; Shaw, T. (2013b). Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 30 (4), pp. 1031-1058. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10490-013-9353-9
Dalmacio, F. Z.; Rezende, A. J.; Slomski, V. (2009). Análise setorial das medidas de performance utilizadas nos contratos de remuneração dos gestores. Revista Universo Contábil 5(3), p. 6-23. DOI:10.4270/ruc.2009319
Dechow, P.; Dichev, I. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accruals estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77, p. 35-59. DOI: 10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35
Dechow, P.; Ge, W.; Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: a review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, p. 344-401. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1485858
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney A. P. (1995). Detecting Earnings Management. Accounting Review, 70, 193-225.
Elayan, F. A.; Jingyu, L.; Meyer, T. O. (2008). Accounting irregularities, management compensation structure and information asymmetry. Accounting and Finance 48, 741-760. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2008.00266.x
Europa. Eu. (2017). Digital economy & society. Europa.eu. Retrieved August 1, 2017. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/economy_pt
Ewert, R.; Wagenhofer, A. (2015). Why more forward-looking accounting standards can reduce financial reporting quality. European Accounting Review 25(3), p. 487-513. DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2015.1043927
Faccio, M., Lang, L., Young, L., (2001). Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review 91 (1), 54-78.
Friedman, H. L. (2014). Implications of power: when the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports. Journal of Accounting and Economics 58, p. 117-141. DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.06.004
Funchal, J. A.; Terra, P. R. S. (2006) Remuneração de executivos, desempenho econômico e governança corporativa: um estudo empírico em empresas latino-americanas. In: ENCONTRO NACIONAL DE PESQUISAS EM ADMINISTRAÇÃO. 30., 2006, Salvador. Anais... Rio de Janeiro: ANPAD, 2006. p. 1-16.
Greckhamer, T. (2016). CEO Compensation in relation to worker compensation across countries: the configurational impact of countr-level institutions. Strategic Management Journal 37, 793-815. DOI: 10.1002/smj.2370
Hopkins, J. J.; Maydew, E. L.; Venkatachalam, M. (2015). Corporate general counsel and financial reporting quality. Management Science 61(1), p. 129-145. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2072
Hutton, W., (2002). The world we're in. Little, Brown, London
Jensen, M.; Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, New York 3(4), pp. 305-360. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Jensen, M.; Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago 98(2), pp. 225-264. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261677
Jensen, M.; Murphy, K. J.; Wruck, E. G. (2004). Where we´ve been, how we got to here, what are the problems, and how to fix them [Working Paper n. 44 / WEP. 2-117]. European Corporate Governance Institute, Bruxelas, Belgium.
Jiang, J. X.; Petroni, K. R.; Wang, I. Y. (2008). CFOs and CEOs: who have the most influence on earnings management? Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1121131 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121131
Jones, J.J. (1991). Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29 (2): 193–228.
Kirschenheiter, M., Melumad, N. D. (2002) Can “big bath” and earnings smoothing co-exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies? Journal of Accounting Research 40(3), 761-796
Lev, B. (1983). Some economic determinants of time-series properties of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, p. 31-48. DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(83)90004-6
Martinez A. L. (2001). Gerenciamento dos resultados contábeis: estudo empírico das companhias abertas brasileiras. Tese de doutorado, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis, Departamentos de Contabilidade e Atuária, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, SP, Brasil.
McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612.
Murphy, K. J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1), pp. 11-42. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90026-6
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Publicado
2023-07-25
Como Citar
Augusto Orsi de Araujo, J., & de Sousa Ribeiro, M. (2023). Informação contábil e remuneração executiva: uma análise a partir da qualidade do lucro. Enfoque: Reflexão Contábil, 42(2), 71-87. https://doi.org/10.4025/enfoque.v42i2.59117
Seção
Artigos Originais
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