Moral naturalism in M. T. Cicero’s Lucullus: the concepts of virtutum cognitio and perspicui adsensio against Carneades’ scepticism

Abstract

In this article we deal with two excerpts from the Cicero's Lucullus - VIII 23 and XII 38-39 - where there are two important concepts for the understanding of his quarrel with the scepticism of Carneades of Cyrene, namely, the notions of virtutum cognitio and perspicui adsensio. After an introduction where we locate the text of Lucullus within the context of Academica and its intimate relation with the theme of lex naturalis, in the first section we show how Cicero aligns himself with the Socratic thesis, regarding the relation between knowledge and virtue. In the second section we treat the virtutum cognitio as a connatural moral notion prior to speculation. And, finally, in the third section we treat on perspicui adsensio as a predecessor notion of moral action. We conclude by reiterating that these two passages in question must be understood within the general theme of Ciceronian moral epistemology, which includes its natural law, which considers him as an authentic ancient moral naturalist.