<b>Some cracks on Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism
Abstract
Bas van Fraassen' Constructive empiricism was thought as an anti-realist position that avoids any ontological commitment to undesirable metaphysical entities and is deeply divorced from both the scientific realism and logical positivism. In this paper, I claim that the only way the author finds to achieve that goal is to adopt a particular type of empiricism which, unfortunately, has some cracks that allow filtration of metaphysics. The positivist's anti-metaphysic empiricism is replaced by a new kind of empiricism who inadvertently makes some concessions to metaphysics. The outcome is that the author's position is closer to realism he always rejected.
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