GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA E HOLDINGS: ASSIMETRIAS INFORMACIONAIS EM EMPRESAS DA B3
Resumen
Problemas de agencia, que envolvem os gestores e acionistas, são constantemente colocados como uma das causas para o mau desempenho das firmas. Neste contexto o presente artigo busca verificar se há maiores indícios de assimetrias informacionais em Holdings, devido à disposição desequilibrada de informações entre os agentes a respeito das suas subsidiárias. Através de uma regressão Logística robusta, foi possível mostrar relações diretas entre as proxies de entrincheiramento e de tunneling ao fato da empresa se organizar como Holding. Os resultados sugerem que estes indícios de assimetria informacional podem estar relacionados à pior valorização do mercado que essas empresas tem, com relação as que não pertencem a grupos Holding.
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ALMEIDA, H. V., & WOLFENZON, D. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups. The journal of finance, 61(6), 2637-2680, 2006.
ALMEIDA, H., KIM, C. S., & KIM, H. B. Internal capital markets in business groups: Evidence from the Asian financial crisis. The Journal of Finance, 70(6), 2539-2586, 2015.
ALTMAN, E. I. Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589, 1968.
AMIN, Q. A., & LIU, J. Shareholders' control rights, family ownership and the firm's leverage decisions. International Review of Financial Analysis, 72, 2020. doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101591
ANDRADE, A., & ROSSETTI, J. P. Governança corporativa: fundamentos, desenvolvimento e tendências. In Governança corporativa: fundamentos, desenvolvimento e tendências. São Paulo: Atlas, 2004.
ARAÚJO, J. J., PAULUS, C. I., & QUEIROZ, A. Z. Planejamento Tributário Por Meio De Holding: Aspectos Econômico-Financeiros. Revista de Direito Internacional Econômico e Tributário, 12(1 Jan/Jun), 597-631, 2017.
BELKHIR, M., BOUBAKER, S., & DEROUICHE, I. Control–ownership wedge, board of directors, and the value of excess cash. Economic Modelling, 39, 110-122, 2014.
BERGER, P. G., OFEK, E., & YERMACK, D. L. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. The journal of finance, 52(4), 1411-1438. 1997.
BERLE, A. A., & MEANS, G. C. The modern corporation and private property. New Brunswick. NJ: Transaction, 1932.
BERTRAND, M., MEHTA, P. & MULLAINATHAN, S. Ferreting out tunneling: An application to Indian business groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 121-148, 2002.
BLAIR, M. M., & STOUT, L. A. A team production theory of corporate law. In Corporate Governance. 169-250, 2017.
BRELLOCHS, J. A. The Corporate Governance of Subsidiaries in Multinational Corporations. VDM Verlag Müller, 2008.
BREUSCH, T.S. & A.R. PAGAN. A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation, Econometrica 47, 1287- 1294, 1979.
CATAPAN, A., & COLAUTO, R. D. Governança corporativa: uma análise de sua relação com o desempenho econômico-financeiro de empresas cotadas no Brasil nos anos de 2010–2012. Contaduría y Administración, 59(3), 137-164, 2014.
CLAESSENS, S., DJANKOV, S., FAN, J. P. H., & LANG, L. H. P. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2741–2771, 2002.
COLLA, P.; IPPOLITO, F. & LI, K. Debt Specialization. The Journal of Finance, 68(5), 2013.
CORNETT, M. M., MCNUTT, J. J., & TEHRANIAN, H. Corporate governance and earnings management at large US bank holding companies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(4), 412-430, 2009.
DAHROUGE, F. M., & SAITO, R. Cash Holdings Policy: a Dynamic Analysis of Brazilian Companies. Brazilian Review of Finance, 11(3), 343-373, 2013.
DYCK, A., & ZINGALES, L. Private benefits of control: An international comparison. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 537-600, 2004.
FACCIO, M., LANG, L. H., & YOUNG, L. Pyramiding vs leverage in corporate groups: international evidence. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(1), 88-104. 2010.
FAMA, E. F., & JENSEN, M. C. Separation of ownership and control. The journal of law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325, 1983.
FLORACKIS, C. Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms: Evidence for UK firms. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 4(1), 37-59, 2008.
FRANK, M. & GOYAL, V. Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors are Reliably Important? Financial Management, 38(1), 1-37, 2009.
FONSECA, J. J. S. Metodologia da Pesquisa Científica, 2002.
FREITAS, L. R. Comparação das funções de ligação logit e probit em regressão binária considerando diferentes tamanhos amostrais. (Doctoral dissertation, Tese (Doutorado) Universidade Federal de Viçosa), 2013.
GREENE, W. H. Econometric analysis 4th edition. International edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 201-215, 2000.
GOYAL, V. K., & PARK, C. W. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 49-66, 2002.
JENSEN, M. C., & MECKLING, W. H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360, 1976.
JOHNSON, S., LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., & SHLEIFER, A. Tunneling. American Economic Review, 90(2), 22–27, 2000.
JUDGE, W. Q., NAOUMOVA, I., & KOUTZEVOL, N. Corporate governance and firm performance in Russia: an empirical study. Journal of world business, 38(4), 385-396, 2003.
KIM, B., PRESCOTT, J. E., & KIM, S. M. Differentiated governance of foreign subsidiaries in transnational corporations: An agency theory perspective. Journal of International Management, 11(1), 43-66, 2005.
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. Legal determinants of external finance. The Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150, 1997.
LEAL, R. P. C., SILVA, A. L. C. D., & VALADARES, S. M. Estrutura de controle das companhias brasileiras de capital aberto. Revista de Administração Contemporânea, 6(1), 7-18, 2002.
LINDNER, A., & PITOMBO, C. S. Modelo logit binomial com componentes principais para estimação de preferência por modo de transporte motorizado. Journal of Transport Literature, 10(3), 5-9, 2016.
LIU, Q., LUO, T., & TIAN, G. G. Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 31, 220-245, 2015.
LONGO, J. H. Criação de holding e proteção patrimonial. Instituto Bra., 2013.
MANOS, R., MURINDE, V., & GREEN, C. J. Leverage and business groups: Evidence from Indian firms. Journal of Economics and Business, 59(5), 443-465, 2007.
MARTINS, H. C. Investor protection, managerial entrenchment, and cash holdings: Cross-country evidence. International Finance, 22(3), 422-438, 2019. doi:10.1111/infi.12343
MARQUES, L. D. Modelos dinâmicos com dados em painel: revisão de literatura. Centro de estudos Macroeconómicos e Previsão, Faculdade de Economia do Porto, 2000.
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315, 1988.
KHATTREE, R., & NAIK, D. N. Multivariate data reduction and discrimination. SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina, 2000.
NIKOLOV, B., & WHITED, T. M. Agency conflicts and cash: Estimates from a dynamic model. The Journal of Finance, 69(5), 1883-1921, 2014.
PASSAGLIA, L. F., & DA ROCHA-PINTO, S. R. Governança de participação societária: Fatores críticos para a redução do conflito de agência entre holding e controladas. Revista de negócios, 19(1), 3-26, 2014.
RAUPP, F. M., & BEUREN, I. M. (2006). Metodologia da Pesquisa Aplicável às Ciências. Como elaborar trabalhos monográficos em contabilidade: teoria e prática. São Paulo: Atlas, 2006.
SAUERWALD, S., HEUGENS, P. P., TURTUREA, R., & VAN ESSEN, M. Are All Private Benefits of Control Ineffective? Principal–Principal Benefits, External Governance Quality, and Firm Performance. Journal of Management Studies, 56(4), 725-757, 2019.
SAFDAR, M. N., LIN, T., TANCHANGYA, P., & AMIN, S. Ownership hierarchy and cash holding: A study from pakistan. International Journal of Financial Research, 10(6), 67-77, 2019. doi:10.5430/ijfr.v10n6p67
SHAPIRO, S. S., & WILK, M. B. An analysis of variance test for normality (complete samples). Biometrika, 52(3/4), 591-611, 1965.
SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25(1), 123-139, 1989.
____________ . A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783, 1997.
SINGH, D. A., & GAUR, A. S. Business group affiliation, firm governance, and firm performance: Evidence from China and India. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(4), 411-425, 2009.
STRIKWERDA, J. An entrepreneurial model of corporate governance: devolving powers to subsidiary boards. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 3(2), 38-57, 2003.
URZÚA I., F. Too few dividends? Groups’ tunneling through chair and board compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(2), 245–256, 2009.
VILLARÓN-PERAMATO, Ó., MARTÍNEZ-FERRERO, J., & GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ, I.-M. CSR as entrenchment strategy and capital structure: corporate governance and investor protection as complementary and substitutive factors. Review of Managerial Science, 12(1), 27–64, 2016.
WANG, K., & XIAO, X. Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(1), 89-100, 2011.
WOOLDRIDGE, J. M. A unified approach to robust, regression-based specification tests. Econometric Theory, 6(1), 17-43, 1990.
ALMEIDA, H., KIM, C. S., & KIM, H. B. Internal capital markets in business groups: Evidence from the Asian financial crisis. The Journal of Finance, 70(6), 2539-2586, 2015.
ALTMAN, E. I. Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589, 1968.
AMIN, Q. A., & LIU, J. Shareholders' control rights, family ownership and the firm's leverage decisions. International Review of Financial Analysis, 72, 2020. doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101591
ANDRADE, A., & ROSSETTI, J. P. Governança corporativa: fundamentos, desenvolvimento e tendências. In Governança corporativa: fundamentos, desenvolvimento e tendências. São Paulo: Atlas, 2004.
ARAÚJO, J. J., PAULUS, C. I., & QUEIROZ, A. Z. Planejamento Tributário Por Meio De Holding: Aspectos Econômico-Financeiros. Revista de Direito Internacional Econômico e Tributário, 12(1 Jan/Jun), 597-631, 2017.
BELKHIR, M., BOUBAKER, S., & DEROUICHE, I. Control–ownership wedge, board of directors, and the value of excess cash. Economic Modelling, 39, 110-122, 2014.
BERGER, P. G., OFEK, E., & YERMACK, D. L. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions. The journal of finance, 52(4), 1411-1438. 1997.
BERLE, A. A., & MEANS, G. C. The modern corporation and private property. New Brunswick. NJ: Transaction, 1932.
BERTRAND, M., MEHTA, P. & MULLAINATHAN, S. Ferreting out tunneling: An application to Indian business groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 121-148, 2002.
BLAIR, M. M., & STOUT, L. A. A team production theory of corporate law. In Corporate Governance. 169-250, 2017.
BRELLOCHS, J. A. The Corporate Governance of Subsidiaries in Multinational Corporations. VDM Verlag Müller, 2008.
BREUSCH, T.S. & A.R. PAGAN. A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation, Econometrica 47, 1287- 1294, 1979.
CATAPAN, A., & COLAUTO, R. D. Governança corporativa: uma análise de sua relação com o desempenho econômico-financeiro de empresas cotadas no Brasil nos anos de 2010–2012. Contaduría y Administración, 59(3), 137-164, 2014.
CLAESSENS, S., DJANKOV, S., FAN, J. P. H., & LANG, L. H. P. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2741–2771, 2002.
COLLA, P.; IPPOLITO, F. & LI, K. Debt Specialization. The Journal of Finance, 68(5), 2013.
CORNETT, M. M., MCNUTT, J. J., & TEHRANIAN, H. Corporate governance and earnings management at large US bank holding companies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(4), 412-430, 2009.
DAHROUGE, F. M., & SAITO, R. Cash Holdings Policy: a Dynamic Analysis of Brazilian Companies. Brazilian Review of Finance, 11(3), 343-373, 2013.
DYCK, A., & ZINGALES, L. Private benefits of control: An international comparison. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 537-600, 2004.
FACCIO, M., LANG, L. H., & YOUNG, L. Pyramiding vs leverage in corporate groups: international evidence. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(1), 88-104. 2010.
FAMA, E. F., & JENSEN, M. C. Separation of ownership and control. The journal of law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325, 1983.
FLORACKIS, C. Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms: Evidence for UK firms. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 4(1), 37-59, 2008.
FRANK, M. & GOYAL, V. Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors are Reliably Important? Financial Management, 38(1), 1-37, 2009.
FONSECA, J. J. S. Metodologia da Pesquisa Científica, 2002.
FREITAS, L. R. Comparação das funções de ligação logit e probit em regressão binária considerando diferentes tamanhos amostrais. (Doctoral dissertation, Tese (Doutorado) Universidade Federal de Viçosa), 2013.
GREENE, W. H. Econometric analysis 4th edition. International edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 201-215, 2000.
GOYAL, V. K., & PARK, C. W. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 49-66, 2002.
JENSEN, M. C., & MECKLING, W. H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360, 1976.
JOHNSON, S., LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., & SHLEIFER, A. Tunneling. American Economic Review, 90(2), 22–27, 2000.
JUDGE, W. Q., NAOUMOVA, I., & KOUTZEVOL, N. Corporate governance and firm performance in Russia: an empirical study. Journal of world business, 38(4), 385-396, 2003.
KIM, B., PRESCOTT, J. E., & KIM, S. M. Differentiated governance of foreign subsidiaries in transnational corporations: An agency theory perspective. Journal of International Management, 11(1), 43-66, 2005.
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. Legal determinants of external finance. The Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131-1150, 1997.
LEAL, R. P. C., SILVA, A. L. C. D., & VALADARES, S. M. Estrutura de controle das companhias brasileiras de capital aberto. Revista de Administração Contemporânea, 6(1), 7-18, 2002.
LINDNER, A., & PITOMBO, C. S. Modelo logit binomial com componentes principais para estimação de preferência por modo de transporte motorizado. Journal of Transport Literature, 10(3), 5-9, 2016.
LIU, Q., LUO, T., & TIAN, G. G. Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 31, 220-245, 2015.
LONGO, J. H. Criação de holding e proteção patrimonial. Instituto Bra., 2013.
MANOS, R., MURINDE, V., & GREEN, C. J. Leverage and business groups: Evidence from Indian firms. Journal of Economics and Business, 59(5), 443-465, 2007.
MARTINS, H. C. Investor protection, managerial entrenchment, and cash holdings: Cross-country evidence. International Finance, 22(3), 422-438, 2019. doi:10.1111/infi.12343
MARQUES, L. D. Modelos dinâmicos com dados em painel: revisão de literatura. Centro de estudos Macroeconómicos e Previsão, Faculdade de Economia do Porto, 2000.
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315, 1988.
KHATTREE, R., & NAIK, D. N. Multivariate data reduction and discrimination. SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina, 2000.
NIKOLOV, B., & WHITED, T. M. Agency conflicts and cash: Estimates from a dynamic model. The Journal of Finance, 69(5), 1883-1921, 2014.
PASSAGLIA, L. F., & DA ROCHA-PINTO, S. R. Governança de participação societária: Fatores críticos para a redução do conflito de agência entre holding e controladas. Revista de negócios, 19(1), 3-26, 2014.
RAUPP, F. M., & BEUREN, I. M. (2006). Metodologia da Pesquisa Aplicável às Ciências. Como elaborar trabalhos monográficos em contabilidade: teoria e prática. São Paulo: Atlas, 2006.
SAUERWALD, S., HEUGENS, P. P., TURTUREA, R., & VAN ESSEN, M. Are All Private Benefits of Control Ineffective? Principal–Principal Benefits, External Governance Quality, and Firm Performance. Journal of Management Studies, 56(4), 725-757, 2019.
SAFDAR, M. N., LIN, T., TANCHANGYA, P., & AMIN, S. Ownership hierarchy and cash holding: A study from pakistan. International Journal of Financial Research, 10(6), 67-77, 2019. doi:10.5430/ijfr.v10n6p67
SHAPIRO, S. S., & WILK, M. B. An analysis of variance test for normality (complete samples). Biometrika, 52(3/4), 591-611, 1965.
SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. Management entrenchment: The case of manager-specific investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25(1), 123-139, 1989.
____________ . A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783, 1997.
SINGH, D. A., & GAUR, A. S. Business group affiliation, firm governance, and firm performance: Evidence from China and India. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(4), 411-425, 2009.
STRIKWERDA, J. An entrepreneurial model of corporate governance: devolving powers to subsidiary boards. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 3(2), 38-57, 2003.
URZÚA I., F. Too few dividends? Groups’ tunneling through chair and board compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(2), 245–256, 2009.
VILLARÓN-PERAMATO, Ó., MARTÍNEZ-FERRERO, J., & GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ, I.-M. CSR as entrenchment strategy and capital structure: corporate governance and investor protection as complementary and substitutive factors. Review of Managerial Science, 12(1), 27–64, 2016.
WANG, K., & XIAO, X. Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(1), 89-100, 2011.
WOOLDRIDGE, J. M. A unified approach to robust, regression-based specification tests. Econometric Theory, 6(1), 17-43, 1990.
Publicado
2023-12-18
Cómo citar
Silva de Oliveira, A., Stoever, E. P., Sonza, I. B., Freitas, C. A. de, & Von Ende, M. (2023). GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA E HOLDINGS: ASSIMETRIAS INFORMACIONAIS EM EMPRESAS DA B3. Caderno De Administração, 31(2), 43-65. https://doi.org/10.4025/cadadm.v31i2.64537
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